Behavioral economics and the impact of message framing on financial planning intentions by Todd, Timothy Michael Jr
  
Behavioral economics and the impact of message framing on financial planning intentions 
 
 
by 
 
 
Timothy Michael Todd Jr. 
 
 
 
B.S., Liberty University, 2008 
M.S., Liberty University, 2008 
J.D., Liberty University School of Law, 2011 
 
 
 
AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
School of Family Studies and Human Services 
College of Health and Human Sciences 
 
 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
 
 
2019 
 
  
  
Abstract 
Neoclassical economics asserts that individuals maximize their utility subject to 
constraints, such as income. Rational choice and expected utility theories are natural outgrowths 
of utility maximization and posit that, when making decisions, individuals consider all 
information, weigh the costs and benefits, and then consistently make the best choice to 
maximize their utility. Behavioral economics, on the other hand, advances that these constant-
rationality assumptions are dubious and unrealistic. Among other things, behavioral economics 
recognizes that individuals use heuristics and that decision making can be subject to cognitive 
biases, which cause divergences from neoclassical rational choice expectations. A popular (and 
growing) use of applied behavioral economics is in “choice architecture” and “nudges”—that is, 
increasing desirable outcomes by strategically structuring information and choices (i.e., the 
framing of information and choices).  
In financial planning, there are many financially healthy behaviors, such as planning for 
retirement, engaging in monthly budgeting, and ensuring that various risks are covered by 
insurance. Despite these tasks being objectively useful, positive, and valuable behaviors, many 
individuals do not engage in these behaviors (or other behaviors that are regularly recommended 
by financial advisors and planners).  
Therefore, this dissertation investigated whether applying a behavioral economics-based 
approach—namely narrative message framing through a prospect theory lens—affected the 
intentions to engage in retirement planning, monthly budgeting, and analyzing the need for 
insurance. In short, whether narrative message framing can be used as a “nudge” to increase 
financial planning intentions. This study also incorporated regulatory focus theory, which 
  
regards how individuals self-regulate. Under this theory, framing effects may be stronger when 
the frame matches the individual’s regulatory focus—this is known as regulatory fit.  
Using primary data from randomized experiments, this dissertation explored three 
financial planning domains and investigated four research questions in each domain: (a) the 
effect of narratives on financial-planning intentions; (b) whether the valence of the narrative 
(positive or negative framing in the story) mattered (and if this varied by domain); (c) whether 
the framing effect, if any, depended on the individual-level characteristic of regulatory focus; 
and (d) whether regulatory fit enhanced framing effects. The three financial planning domains 
explored were retirement planning (a behavior with future consequences), cash-flow and budget 
planning (a behavior with present consequences), and insurance-needs planning (a behavior that 
involved risk analysis).  
Results indicated that narrative message framing was effective to increase financial 
planning intentions. Moreover, the framing effect depended on the underlying financial behavior. 
The framing effect also varied based on the individual’s regulatory focus. Stated simply, stories 
were powerful, framing mattered, and people responded differently to those frames. These 
findings are relevant to financial planners, financial services companies, financial-related non-
profits and professional organizations, and policymakers, among others, all of whom can use 
these results to increase (nudge) the intentions to engage in various positive financial behaviors.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
This dissertation revolved around several core premises. First, financial planning can be 
complicated, challenging, and scary—to many people, money matters are foreign to them and 
often stressful and induce anxiety (O’Neill et al., 2005; Sages, Britt, & Cumbie, 2013). Second, 
stories are powerful (indeed, many of our timeless truths have been communicated by stories, 
fables, or parables) (Green & Brock, 2002). Third, the way information is presented matters 
(more technically, that framing influences decision making) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Fourth, people can respond differently to the same information (Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 
2004).  These premises set the background, inform the research questions, influence the 
experiments, and impact the implications that this dissertation advances.  
Financial planning can be complicated, challenging, and scary; there are a lot of 
decisions, which are made over the course of a lifetime, that affect one’s financial arc. 
Emblematic of these decisions are to save for retirement, abide by a monthly budget, and have 
sufficient insurance in place. Not only do these decisions affect the decision maker, but they 
often have collateral consequences as well, such as on spouses, children, and even extended 
family members.  
Despite the importance of these decisions—and the gravity of the consequences of not 
engaging in those behaviors (e.g., not having saved for retirement)—research demonstrates that 
many people lack the financial knowledge or competence to make impactful savings and 
investment decisions (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007, 2011). Regrettably, this is compounded by an 
ever-changing tax law, ongoing health insurance reform, and the proliferation of financial 
products, among other factors (Lei & Yao, 2016; Marsden, Zick, & Mayer, 2011).  
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 This is borne out empirically as well. For example, in the 2012 Household Financial 
Planning Survey, commissioned by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., and 
the Consumer Federation of America, more than half of the respondents indicated that “it’s hard 
for me to know who to trust for financial advice” (Princeton Research, 2012, p. 4). Similarly, 
more than half of respondents noted that “to me investing seems complicated” (Princeton 
Research, 2012, p. 4). And, again, more than half indicated that they are worried about losing 
money if they invest it (Princeton Research, 2012).  
To help with this complexity, financial planning has developed into a robust field across 
various domains such as investment management, cash-flow and budget planning, insurance 
planning, tax planning, and estate planning. Through applied practice from practitioners and 
scholarly research from academicians, the field has developed core behaviors that clients are 
often advised to implement, such as goal-based retirement savings planning, monthly cash-flow 
monitoring and budgeting, and performing an insurance-needs analysis; these three behaviors, in 
particular, were investigated in this dissertation.  
Not only can financial planning help with decisions in these discrete domains, it offers 
other benefits as well. Those with a personal financial plan tend to feel more confident about 
managing their money, saving, and investment behaviors (Princeton Research, 2012). They also 
tend to feel more likely to meet their financial goals (such as saving for retirement). Those with 
financial plans are also more likely to describe themselves as “living comfortably”—that is, more 
optimistic about their financial status (Princeton Research, 2012, p. 6). Similarly, the 2008 FPA 
and Ameriprise Value of Financial Planning Study found that those in a financial planning 
relationship were nearly twice as likely to report being confident about their financial futures 
compared to those without financial professional support (Harris Interactive, 2008). It also found 
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that those with a comprehensive financial plan report feeling that they are on track for various 
financial goals, such as retirement or education saving (Harris Interactive, 2008). Those with a 
comprehensive financial plan also feel more prepared for unexpected life events due to having an 
emergency fund (Harris Interactive, 2008). Importantly, financial planning is not just for the 
affluent. In the CFP Board and CFA Study, although families with fewer resources were more 
susceptible to uncontrollable credit card debt, those with a financial plan generally handled credit 
cards to minimize this risk (Princeton Research, 2012).  
In short, financial planning can be hard and complicated—there is a lot involved across 
the various financial planning domains that require technical knowledge, skill, and application. 
There are some basic and universally prescribed behaviors: (a) saving for retirement, (b) abiding 
by a monthly budget, and (c) having sufficient insurance in place; these are standard healthy 
financial best practices that should be adopted by the public at large. Yet, as more fully explained 
below, that is not the case; investigating how to increase financial planning behavior adoption 
and implementation rates, then, is a valuable (and very much needed) area of research.  
 Theoretical Framework   
This study incorporated two main theoretical lenses. First (and primarily), was behavioral 
economics. Behavioral economics posits that the way information is presented matters. This 
premise is rooted in prospect theory. Prospect theory posits that losses and gains are not 
necessarily equivalent, and that, generally, people tend to avoid losses; stated otherwise, losses 
hurt more than equivalent gains—this is known as loss aversion. Based on prospect theory and 
loss aversion, then, negatively framed information may influence people to avoid those 
consequences (so that they, too, do not suffer the same consequences). One approach to increase 
4 
financial planning implementation, then, is to critically evaluate the way financial planning 
information is presented.  
 Indeed, behavioral economics has been used in similar contexts to incentivize (or 
“nudge”) individuals to engage in healthy or positive behaviors (e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). 
In the financial context, one of the most famous examples is Thaler and Benartzi’s (2004) “Save 
More Tomorrow” (SMarT) savings program. In a nutshell, to increase savings rates, they created 
a prescriptive savings program that exploited the now-mainstays of behavioral economics—
decisional inertia (status quo bias) and loss aversion—which resulted in a threefold increase in 
average savings rates in retirement plans among participants (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). 
Similarly, behavioral economics can be used in other financial planning contexts, like those 
explored in this dissertation.  
 The second main theoretical lens applied here was regulatory focus theory. Regulatory 
focus theory is a psychological theory that regards how people approach pleasure and pain. The 
integration of psychological theory to financial planning research has become more common 
(e.g., Asebedo et al., 2019). Under regulatory focus theory, there are two styles of self-
regulation, promotion focus and prevention focus. Prior research and theory indicate that 
regulatory focus affects the influence of message framing. Stated simply, some people may be 
more sensitive to avoid losses (prevention focused) and others may be more prone to pursue 
gains (promotion focused).  
When applied to framing, then, a particular frame (i.e., a gain or loss frame) can fit one’s 
underlying regulatory focus state. That is, those that are promotion focused may respond more 
favorably to a gain frame, and those that are prevention focus may respond more favorably to a 
loss frame. This phenomenon is known as regulatory fit. Stated more simply, people can respond 
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differently to the same information; that is, there can be individualized differences to processing, 
evaluating, and acting upon information and message framing.  
 Research Purpose and Questions 
Although there are objectively beneficial and rational financial behaviors and practices—
such as regularly saving for retirement (Asebedo et al., 2019), monthly budgeting, and having 
sufficient insurance—many Americans do not adequately implement these behaviors (Munnell, 
Hou, & Webb, 2014; Princeton Research, 2012). Indeed, even though financial planning and 
using a financial advisor have myriad benefits to provide (e.g., Blanchett, 2019; Blanchett & 
Kaplan, 2013; Grable & Chatterjee, 2014), implementation and usage rates are low—and this is 
exacerbated in minority communities (White & Heckman, 2016). For example, the 2012 
Household Financial Planning Survey found that only 31% of respondents reported having ever 
prepared a comprehensive financial plan, which is a cornerstone to comprehensive financial 
planning (Princeton Research, 2012). Furthermore, this report noted that this trend had not 
changed much over 15 years (Princeton Research, 2012). This lack of planning potentially 
creates primary and collateral consequences that can largely be avoided. In sum, having a 
solution to a problem is only as good as its implementation.  
This lack of implementation is similar to the problem addressed by Thaler and Benartzi 
(2004). This dissertation, therefore, examined ways to use aspects of behavioral economics, 
namely prospect theory and message framing—as influenced by one’s regulatory focus—to 
increase intentions (which may lead to later adoption) of these financial behaviors. 
Consequently, one potential way to bridge the implementation problem is to enhance the way we 
communicate the benefits of financial planning. For example, do we tout the benefits and upsides 
of engaging in a behavior—such as saving regularly for retirement—or do we highlight and 
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emphasis the consequences of not doing so? Does this depend on the specific underlying 
behavior? Does this depend on underlying characteristics of the client, like regulatory focus?  
Relatedly, because stories are powerful, should advisors communicate these ideas in a 
sterile, fact-based manner, or should they integrate a story to communicate these ideas? Our 
common human experience tells us that a colorful and vivid anecdote often makes more of an 
indelible impression than a litany of statistics. Indeed, both the deepest religious truths (e.g., 
Christ’s parables) and timeless secular wisdom (e.g., Aesop’s Fables) were often communicated 
by stories. Moreover, if in narrative form, does the “valence” (that is, is the narrative told in a 
gain-based outcome or a loss-based outcome) matter, too? This question is a natural implication 
of prospect theory (and loss aversion).  
Therefore, the main focus of this dissertation was to perform primary research using 
survey-based experiments to investigate the impact of narrative message framing on financial 
planning intentions. Based on behavioral economics, prospect theory, and regulatory focus 
theory, this dissertation investigated the effect of narrative (story) message framing on financial 
planning intentions—in particular, intentions to engage in the financial behavior in the next six 
months—across three financial planning domains: (a) retirement planning, (b) cash-flow 
planning and budgeting, and (c) insurance.  
As explored more in Chapter 2, these behaviors were selected because they represent 
behaviors with a future consequence (retirement planning), with a current consequence (monthly 
budgeting), and risk assessment and analysis (insurance needs analysis). In short, due to framing, 
different behaviors can be interpreted as risk-seeking or risk-averse, which can affect the 
expected reaction under prospect theory. Intentions to engage in the behaviors were examined 
because, as examined more in Chapter 2, various behavioral theories consider intentions as a 
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precedent (and necessary) step to actual behavioral action and implementation. To be clear, 
although this dissertation examined three behaviors, the research purpose and questions were not 
about the behaviors per se, but rather the impact of framing and narrative messaging on financial 
planning intentions; multiple behaviors were examined because the underlying nature of a 
behavior could affect its perceived riskiness.   
 This dissertation used three experiments, one for each domain:  
Experiment 1 & Research Question (RQ) 1 (Retirement Savings Planning):  
A. Does narrative message framing influence intentions to engage in retirement 
planning? 
B. Does the valence of the narrative (positive or negative) influence intentions to 
engage in retirement planning? 
C. Does the individual-level characteristic of regulatory focus affect the narrative 
effect, if any? 
D. Does regulatory fit affect the effectiveness of the narrative framing as applied 
to engage in retirement planning? 
 Experiment 2 & RQ 2 (Cash-Flow and Budgeting Planning):  
A. Does narrative message framing influence intentions to engage in cash-flow 
and budget planning? 
B. Does the valence of the narrative (positive or negative) influence intentions to 
engage in cash-flow and budget planning? 
C. Does the individual-level characteristic of regulatory focus affect the narrative 
effect, if any? 
8 
D. Does regulatory fit affect the effectiveness of the narrative framing as applied 
to cash-flow and budget planning? 
 Experiment 3 & RQ 3 (Insurance Needs Analysis):  
A. Does narrative message framing influence intentions to engage in insurance 
needs analysis planning? 
B. Does the valence of the narrative (positive or negative) influence intentions to 
engage in insurance needs analysis planning? 
C. Does the individual-level characteristic of regulatory focus affect the narrative 
effect, if any? 
D. Does regulatory fit affect the effectiveness of the narrative framing as applied 
to insurance needs analysis planning?   
Importantly, these questions are relevant on both an individual and public-at-large bases 
(e.g., in individual client counseling session or in crafting public awareness campaigns). As such, 
the results of this study are important to several constituencies, chief of whom is financial 
planners. Getting clients to engage, adopt, and implement financial beneficial behaviors is the 
entire point of the financial planning profession. If narrative message framing works, it can be 
used to encourage clients to adopt financially healthy behaviors. Moreover, the results of this 
study are relevant to policymakers, too, as they work to increase financial literacy and positive 
financial outcomes at the national levels.  
 Summary 
Financial planning can be powerful and impactful. However, to be effective, it must be 
implemented. One way to increase that implementation may be with a behavioral-economics-
based “nudge.” An easy way to do that is by strategically framing and conveying financial 
9 
planning information. This study therefore sought to examine whether narratives (stories) could 
be used to increase financial planning intentions and whether that effect, if any, changed based 
on the underlying behavior, and whether the effect can be increased by framing and regulatory 
fit. The results should be of interest to an array of audiences ranging from individual advisors to 
national-level associations and policymakers.  
  
10 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
This literature review proceeds as follows. First, an overview of neoclassical economic 
thought and expected utility theory is discussed. Under this view, individuals are rational 
economic agents, constantly (and consistently!) seeking to optimize their utility. Consequently, 
message and narrative framing should have no impact on the decision choice.  
Second, behavioral economics—a modern development in economics and finance—is 
explored. Under this school of thought (and its precursors), people are not always rational and 
are not always utility-maximizing actors. The quintessential example of this is prospect theory, 
which is explored in detail. From this approach, therefore, framing matters and can be outcome 
determinative.  
Next, because this study explores the effect of framing, regulatory focus theory is 
examined. Under regulatory focus theory, people have chronic regulatory states, which can either 
be promotion-focused or prevention-focused. An implication of this theory is that a message 
frame can be consistent with one’s regulatory state, which is known as “regulatory fit.” Past 
research has shown that regulatory fit can enhance the effect of the framing.  
Past empirical investigations of framing and narratives are explored. Of particular 
relevance here is the medical literature, which has a robust framing literature (e.g., in the public 
and individual health context). Indeed, this literature indicates that framing effects can be 
behavior-specific, depending on the underlying nature of the behavior; this is the approach taken 
by this dissertation.  
Because this dissertation explored intentions (as compared to actual behavioral changes 
over time), past literature and theory exploring intentions, in particular, are examined. Finally, 
the hypotheses are set forth based on theory and existing literature.  
11 
 Neoclassical Economic Thought—Expected Utility Theory 
 Neoclassical economics asserts that individuals maximize their utility subject to 
constraints, such as income (Nicholson & Snyder, 2017). This is known as constrained 
optimization (Thaler, 2015). This is implied by the assumption of no satiation—that is, extra 
goods always provide extra utility (Nicholson & Snyder, 2017). Under constrained optimization, 
the consumer will select a bundle of goods (an indifference curve) that lies tangent to their 
budget constraint, thereby maximizing the utility as constrained by their income (Nicholson & 
Snyder, 2017). Mathematically, this tangency is the point at which the slope of the budget 
constraint is equivalent to the slope of the indifference curve (Nicholson & Snyder, 2017).1  
Rational choice and expected utility theories are natural outgrowths of utility 
maximization, which posits that, when making decisions, individuals consider all information, 
weigh costs and benefits, and then consistently make the best choice to maximize their utility 
(Burton & Shah, 2013). This is known as the “economic man” or homo economicus (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2009). As summarized by Thaler (2015), “Optimization + Equilibrium = Economics” 
(p. 6). Indeed, it is this rationality coupled with utility maximization that leads to the prospect of 
predictable behavior (Burton & Shah, 2013). In short, how people will make various decisions.  
Formal decision-making research and theory, in particular, traces back to French 
mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat, who discussed gambling scenarios (Harman 
& Gonzalez, 2015). Relatedly, Bernoulli (1954) used expected utility to address the St. 
 
1 To be more precise, the tangency requirement is only a necessary (but not sufficient) condition. If indifference 
curves are assumed to be convex (due to diminishing marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between goods), 
however, the tangency condition will be both a necessary and sufficient condition for a maximum point. 
Equivalently, the utility function is assumed to be quasi-concave (Nicholson & Snyder, 2017).  Moreover, to rule out 
the possibility of linear segments, sometimes strict quasi-concavity is often assumed (Nicholson & Snyder, 2017). 
Mathematically, the tangency point is typically calculated by the Lagrange multiplier method (Dixit, 1990; 
Nicholson & Snyder, 2017). In addition to its tractability, the Lagrange multiplier also provides economic insight 
(i.e., it represents the common benefit-cost ratio for all the inputs) (Nicholson & Snyder, 2017). 
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Petersburg paradox, which presented the issue of a coin flip gamble with an expected value of 
infinity; Bernoulli postulated that it was not necessarily the direct dollar prize of gamble (its 
expected value), but rather the utility (its expected utility) derived from the gamble, and that 
marginal utility decreased as wealth increased (Nicholson & Snyder, 2017). Later, in the mid-
twentieth century, expected utility theory blossomed due to the work of, among others, von 
Newmann and Morgenstern (1947). 
As relevant here, expected utility theory (EUT) and rational choice theory posit similar 
choice behavior for rational consumers regardless of framing (Biswas & Grau, 2008; Maule & 
Villejoubert, 2007; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). This is known as utility invariance 
(Maule & Villejoubert, 2007; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). That is, “agents should 
exhibit consistency across choices” (Hollard, Maafi, & Vergnaud, 2016, p. 624).  
 Despite the mathematical beauty of EUT, evidence of its violations surfaced, particularly 
the famous challenge of French economist Maurice Allais (1953), which is now known as the 
“Allais Paradox” (Burton & Shah, 2013). As explained by Harman and Gonzalez (2015), the 
Allais Paradox is illustrated by the following gambling pairs: 
Gamble Pair 1: 
A: 1,000 (p = 1) 
B: 1,000 (p = .89), 5,000 (p = .1), 0 (p = .01) 
Gamble Pair 2: 
A': 1,000 (p = .11), 0 (p =. 89) 
B': 5,000 (p = .1), 0 (p = .9) 
So, in A (the first pair), there is a 100% chance of winning 1,000, and, in B, an 89% chance to 
win 1,000, a 10% chance to win 5,000, and a 1% chance to win nothing. In A' (the second pair) 
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there is an 11% chance to win 1,000 and an 89% chance to win nothing; in B', there is a 10% 
chance to win 5,000 and a 90% chance to win nothing (Harman & Gonzalez, 2015).  
 According to EUT—in particular, its independence axiom—a rational decision maker, 
who is optimizing utility, should not base preference on outcomes that are the same in amount 
and probability (Harman & Gonzalez, 2015). In other words, common outcomes should cancel 
out. Thus, in Pair 1, gambles A and B result in 1,000 89% of the time, and in Pair 2, they result 
in 0 for 89% of the time; as such, according to EUT, these common outcomes should cancel, 
resulting in the following identical gambles (Harman & Gonzalez, 2015): 
A(A'): 1,000 (p = .11) B(B'): 0 (p = .01), 5,000 (p = .1) 
Thus, if EUT is true, those who prefer A to B must also prefer A' to B'. Empirical evidence, 
however, shows that most respondents preferred A to B and B' to A' (Harman & Gonzalez, 
2015). In short, as noted by Burton and Shah (2013, p. 92), “expected utility theory is a flawed 
representation of how humans make decisions under uncertainty.” 
 Despite the mathematical allure of EUT and rational choice, the 20th century was host to 
the chipping of its veneer. An early naysayer of EUT and rational choice was Simon (1955, 
1978, 2000), who advanced the concept of bounded rationality—meaning that individuals have 
limited capacity to process information. This, in turn, can lead to decision making that is less 
than mathematically optimal.2  
Another breakthrough in utility theory was that utility can be “path dependent” (Burton & 
Shah, 2013). For example, consider a 50/50 gamble to win $1 million or $5 million or the certain 
outcome to win $2.5 million. Although these have mathematically defined expectancies, the 
actual choices a consumer makes may depend on their current level of wealth—that is, the utility 
 
2 Bounded rationality has been used a theoretical framework in explaining suboptimal financial behaviors and 
choices (e.g., Robb et al., 2015; Seay, Preece, & Le, 2017).   
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they derive from the gamble is path dependent (from where they start) (Burton & Shah, 2013). 
Additional explanations for deviations from EUT and rational choice are discussed next.  
 Behavioral Economics 
Although the traditional economic framework was tractable and led to predictable 
outcomes, as Thaler (2015) argued, “the premises on which economic theory rests are flawed” 
(p. 6). He advanced three flaws to the traditional framework. First, optimization problems are 
hard to solve (for example, he advances picking a career or spouse—all of which have 
demonstrable failures, e.g., divorces; alternatively, consider the optimization difference between 
a game of tic-tac-toe and chess (Thaler, 2016)). Second, beliefs that form the bases of choices are 
not unbiased (e.g., overconfidence bias). Third, there are many factors and elements that are left 
out of the traditional optimization model (Thaler, 2015). Thaler eloquently noted that the core 
problem of the traditional economic model was that it sought to use one theory (rational utility 
maximization) to accomplish two goals—first, to model optimal behavior, and second, to predict 
actual behavior (Thaler, 2016).  
Behavioral economics is a “mixture of psychology and economics” (Thaler, 2016, p. 
1577). Indeed, Thaler argued that a behavioral approach offers better economic models because 
other social science disciplines can be integrated into the model (Thaler, 2016). For its part, 
instead of relying on homo economicus, behavioral economics relies merely on homo sapiens, 
i.e., ordinary humans. Emblematic of behavioral economics are various effects, biases, and 
heuristics that have been studied that diverge from traditional economic theory—such as 
anchoring, availability bias, and the endowment effect, among others (Kahneman, 2011). A 
foundational theory from behavioral economics is prospect theory, which is described in detail 
next.  
15 
 Prospect Theory 
 Expected utility theory and rationality-based modeling posit that choice framing should 
have no impact on decision making. However, as studies have shown, that does not empirically 
hold water. Prospect theory advances a conceptual framework to explain, among other things, 
how gain and loss framing affects decision making. Under prospect theory, if faced with two 
choices with various risks involved (low versus high), choice preference will depend on how the 
choices are framed (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012).  
 In their seminal 1979 paper, Kahneman and Tversky critiqued expected utility theory and 
introduced prospect theory. Prospect theory posits two stages of a decision; first, is the editing 
phase, and second is the evaluation phase. During the editing phase, there is a preliminary 
evaluation of the prospects (choices). The purpose of the editing phase is to organize and 
simplify the options for later evaluation and ultimate choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This 
process is accomplished mainly by coding, combination, segregation, or cancelation (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979).  
Coding refers to perceiving outcomes as gains or losses relative to some neutral reference 
point. The reference point—which is a critical element of the process—typically relates to the 
current position (status quo). Thus, as Kahneman and Tversky explained, “the location of the 
reference points, and the subsequent coding of outcomes as gains or loss, can be affected by the 
formulation of the offered prospects, and by the expectations of the decision maker” (1979, p. 
274). Combination refers to the operation of “combining the probabilities associated with 
identical outcomes” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 274). Segregation refers to separating a 
risky component from a riskless component; for example, “the prospect (300, .80; 200, .20) is 
naturally decomposed into a sure gain of 200 and the risk prospect of (100, .80)” (Kahneman & 
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Tversky, 1979, p. 274). Finally, cancellation refers to discarding components that are shared by 
the prospects. They also describe the operators of simplification (rounding probabilities or 
outcomes) and dominance detection (scanning for dominant alternatives, which are rejected). 
During the evaluation phase, “the edited prospects are evaluated and the prospect of highest 
value is chosen” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 274). The value of an edited prospect, V, is 
expressed by two terms, p andn. The first part, p, is combined with a probability decision weight, 
p(p), “which reflects the impact of p on the over-all value of the prospect” (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979, p. 275). To be clear, though, p is not a formal probability measure (as it does not 
sum to one over possible values). The second part, n, assigns a number to each outcome, n(x), 
the subjective value of the outcome (which are defined relative to the reference point) 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
The key assumptions of the math behind prospect theory is that values do not regard end-
state conditions, but rather changes from the reference point. And, second, as noted above, that 
decision weights are not stated probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Summarizing the 
properties of the value function, then, Kahneman and Tversky posit that the value function is “(i) 
defined on deviations from the reference point; (ii) generally concave for gains and commonly 
convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains” (1979, p. 279). This results in the oft-
described “S-shaped value function.” The S-shaped value function plays a critical role in the 
framing literature, which is described next.  
 Framing 
From a conceptual perspective, framing has its roots in sociology and psychology (Borah, 
2011). Entman (1993) noted that framing revolved around selection and salience; that is, the 
framing process selects an aspect of perceived reality and then makes it salient. Accentuating 
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certain aspects in a message to influence the focus or impact of a communication is referred to as 
the “emphasis” approach to framing (Borah, 2011; Druckman, 2001). Applications and 
principles of framing emanate from prospect theory (e.g., Fatmawati, Dharmmesta, Purwanto, & 
Nugroho, 2018).  
In more simple terms, Kahneman (2011) provided an example about the 2006 World Cup 
final in which Italy and France played. He noted that, although the statements “Italy won” and 
“France lost” were logical equivalents (i.e., they both accurately and equivalently described the 
outcome of the game—the same “truth conditions”)—and this is how a homo economicus would 
interpret the statements—they likely do not have the same meaning to a normal reader. Meaning, 
as described by Kahneman, depends on what happens in associative memory while the statement 
is being read; here, two equivalent truth conditions can evoke different associations—the taste of 
victory for Italy fans and the pains of defeat for France fans. Consequently, because statements 
with equivalent truth conditions can yield different reactions, Kahneman argued that (normal) 
humans cannot be as rational as homo economicus. 
 More formally, in the decision-making context, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) noted that 
framing can have a differential impact on choice because individuals usually make decisions 
based on some reference point rather than in isolation (Biswas & Grau, 2008). When considering 
a gain or benefit—a positive framed message—people tend to avoid risk; but, when considering 
a loss or cost—a negative framed message—people tend to take more risks (Fatmawati et al., 
2018). In sum, then, framing concerns “the way in which individuals build internal 
representations of decision problems and how these determine the choices that they make” 
(Maule & Villejoubert, 2007, p. 25).  
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In a now infamous article in Science in 1981, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 
bucked the rational-expectation school of thought and connected the framing of decisions to 
prospect theory. There, they noted that traditional rational choice theory requires consistency and 
coherency in choice selection; their article, however, empirically demonstrated systematic 
violations of those axioms (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
They described a decision problem as acts or options the decision-maker must choose 
from, considering the outcomes, consequences, and even probabilities related to the acts. A 
decision frame, according to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), is the “decision-maker’s conception 
of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice” (p. 453). This 
frame, moreover, was affected by the formulation of the problem and other factors specific to the 
decision-maker, including his or her norms, habits, and personal characteristics.  
In their paper, they described a decision choice experiment consisting of a narrative 
(vignette) and two options. Famously, the first problem regarded an Asian disease that is about to 
outbreak in the United States, which would kill 600 people; there were two alternative solutions 
to the problem, from which to choose (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). First, “if Program A is 
adopted, 200 people will be saved”; however, “if Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability 
that 600 will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved” (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981, p. 453). Thus, in both options, the expected value of persons saved was 200. The 
substantial majority of respondents (72%) selected Problem A, which manifested risk averseness: 
the certainty of saving 200 was more attractive than the probabilistic chance of an equal expected 
value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
The second problem was given the same story regarding the looming Asian disease 
outbreak, but its solutions were posed differently: “If Program C is adopted, 400 people will 
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die”; “if Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability 
that 600 people will die” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). In this problem, the substantial 
majority of respondents (78%) selected Program D (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Under this 
formulation, the majority of respondents were risk-seeking: they chose the probabilistic outcome 
rather than the certain option with the same expected value (again, in each Program, the expected 
value was that 400 people will die) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
This interesting problem demonstrated “reversal”—that is, despite the same expected 
value (i.e., utility), the inconsistent responses “arise from the conjunction of a framing effect 
with contradictory attitudes toward risk involving gains and losses” (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981, p. 453). This pattern, as argued by Kahneman and Tversky, violated expected utility 
theory, but yet can be squared with prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
In analyzing this phenomenon through prospect theory, they demarcate two phases in the 
choice process: First, is the “initial phase,” referring to the acts, outcomes, and contingencies 
being framed; and second, is the evaluation phase. Under their formulation, “consider a prospect 
that yields outcome x with probability p, outcome y with probability q, and the status quo with 
probability of 1 – p – q” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 454). Harkening back to prospect 
theory, the overall value function of the prospect is  
 !(#) = &(') + 	!(*)&(+), (1) 
where &(.) is the value associated with outcomes and !(	. ) is the decision weight (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981, p. 454).  
Under prospect theory, the outcomes are thus expressed as positive or negative 
deviations—i.e., gains or losses—from the neutral outcome (value of zero) (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). A key aspect is the S-shaped value function, which is “concave above the 
20 
reference point and convex below it,” and that the curve is steeper in the loss region than the gain 
region, indicating that losses generate a more extreme displeasure than an equal magnitude gain 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 454). In other words, “the displeasure associated with losing a 
sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure associated with winning the same amount” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 454).  
Prospect theory also differed from the traditional expected utility model in the treatment 
of probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Under an expected utility paradigm, uncertain 
outcomes were weighted by their probability; however, in prospect theory, they were multiplied 
by a decision weight—a monotonic probability function regarding probability (but not the 
probability itself) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Here, low probabilities were over-weighted and 
more likely outcomes were under-weighted (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
If persons acted and thought linearly (consistently), then preferences would be 
independent of framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); nonlinearities, however, preclude this 
result in reality. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated this in the following thought 
experiment involving two decisions to choose from; in decision 1, choosing between (a) “a sure 
gain of $240” or (b) a “25% chance to gain $1,000” and a “75% to gain nothing” (p. 454); in 
decision 2, choosing between (a) “a sure loss of $750” or (b) “a 75% chance to lose $1,000 and a 
25% chance to lose nothing” (p. 454).  
In these thought experiments, the majority of respondents chose the sure gain—which 
was a risk-averse choice, i.e., a risk-free prospect was preferred to a risky prospect. However, in 
decision 2, the majority chose the gamble, which was a risk-seeking option (relative to the risk-
free option). Here, then, respondents were risk-averse in choices with gains but yet risk-seeking 
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in choices facing losses—this is a key conclusion of prospect theory due to the value function 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) also showed the effect of framing on contingent 
outcomes. They found what they dubbed the “certainty effect,” described as “a reduction of the 
probability of an outcome by a constant factor has more impact when the outcome was initially 
certain than when it was merely probable” (p. 455). Another key takeaway in the contingency 
context was that the ability to reduce the probability of a harm from, say, one percent to zero 
(uncertain to certain) was valued more highly than the same one percent change from two 
percent to one percent (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).   
In sum, based on the shape of the value function, prospect theory has three characteristics 
relevant to the framing effect. First, gains and losses are reference dependent—one’s feelings 
about the gain and loss are relative, based on a reference point (i.e., not purely on absolute terms) 
(Peng et al., 2017). Second, due to the slope of the value function, losses have larger 
psychological impacts than equivalent gains (Peng et al., 2017). And, third, sensitivity to gains 
and losses diminish as you move away from the reference point (Peng et al., 2017).  
Even though pure prospect theory is often applied to rationalize framing effects, other 
rationales have been advanced, too. For example, fuzzy-trace theory posits that decision-makers 
do not necessarily pay attention to details or exact calculations, but rather make decisions based 
on simple and vague distinctions (Peng et al., 2017; Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). Another advanced 
reason for framing effects is affective theory (Peng et al., 2017). This theory holds that framing 
results from emotional responses; those in a loss frame, for example, minimize negative 
emotions by compensating with positive emotions (Peng et al., 2017).  
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Other related developments in the framing space regard the underlying brain activity 
involved during decision making—known as neuroeconomics (Kahneman, 2011). As applied to 
framing, the amygdala tends to be active when choices conform to a frame; the anterior cingulate 
tends to be active when choosing the unnatural choice; and those who are least susceptible to 
framing effects tend to have active frontal areas of the brain (Kahneman, 2011).  
 Regulatory Focus Theory 
 In addition to prospect theory’s examination of message framing, another key related 
theoretical framework is regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1998; Yi & Baumgartner, 2009). 
Higgins (1997) noted that, “people are motivated to approach pleasure and avoid pain” (p. 1280). 
This simple principle—known also as the hedonic principle—undergirds many psychological 
theories about human motivation and behavior (Higgins, 1997).  
Self-regulatory theory posits that the hedonic principle operates differently when serving 
different needs, such as nurturance and security (Higgins, 1997). In other words, other than the 
hedonic nature of the outcome, decisions can be made based on whether “the imagined 
prospective outcome sustains [the individual’s] current regulatory state” (Idson, Liberman, & 
Higgins, 2004, pp. 926-927). Regulatory focus theory, then, “delineates how people engage in 
self-regulation, the process of bringing oneself into alignment with one’s standards and goals” 
(Brockner, Higgins, & Low, 2004, pp. 203-204).  
Under regulatory focus theory, there are two styles, promotion focus and prevention 
focus (Higgins, 1997; Yi & Baumgartner, 2009). Under this theory, “people are motivated to 
approach desired end-states, which could either be promotion-focus aspirations and 
accomplishments or prevention-focus responsibilities and safety” (Higgins, 1997, p. 1282). 
Regulatory focus theory was therefore “concerned with how people approach pleasure and avoid 
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pain in different ways” (Higgins, 1997, p. 1282). In other words, there were different “goal-
pursuit strategies” for each orientation (Cesario, Higgins, & Scholer, 2008).  
Those that are in a promotion focus are oriented towards satisfying hopes, aspirations, 
and accomplishment (Idson, Liberman, Higgins, 2004). So, promotion-focus actors tend to prefer 
“eager strategic means” of goal attainment—meaning that success is the presence of positive 
outcomes and failure is the absence of positive outcomes (Cesario et al., 2008; Idson et al., 
2004). For those in a prevention focus, they aim to meet their duties and responsibilities; the goal 
is security. So, they tend to use “vigilant strategic means” of goal attainment—meaning that 
success is the absence of negative outcomes, and failure is the presence of negative outcomes 
(Cesario et al., 2008; Idson et al., 2004).  
Bringing it together, promotion- and prevention-focused self-regulation vary along three 
dimensions (Brockner et al., 2004). First, the underlying motives being satisfied. Second, the 
nature of the goals or standards being obtained. And third, the types of outcomes that are most 
salient (Brockner et al., 2004). For example, those who are promotion-focused, growth and 
advancement tend to motivate them, so potential gains are more salient; whereas, those that are 
prevention-focused, their need for security or safety make avoiding potential losses more salient 
(Brockner et al., 2004).  
An outgrowth of regulatory focus theory is regulatory fit. Regulatory fit refers to when an 
individual pursues a goal that sustains their current regulatory state (Idson et al., 2004). 
Regulatory fit “places special emphasis on the relation between the motivational orientation of 
the actor and the manner in which that actor pursues the goal” (Cesario et al., 2008, pp. 444-
445).  So, when a person uses means that sustain his or her respective orientation, regulatory fit 
is experienced (Cesario et al., 2008). In short, regulatory fit is the “increased motivational 
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intensity that results when there is a match between the manner in which a person pursues a goal 
and his or her goal orientation” (Aaker & Lee, 2006, p. 15).  
In addition to increased engagement strength, another potential benefit is a sense of 
“feeling right” about the activity (Cesario et al., 2008). For example, a task that regards 
advancement would fit a promotion focus, but not a prevention focus; a carefulness task, on the 
other hand, fits a prevention focus (Idson et al., 2004). Regulatory fit is important because prior 
literature indicates that it increases motivational intensity (Idson et al., 2004; Shah, Higgins, & 
Friedman, 1998). Of course, this is relevant to decision making and framing.  
Idson et al. (2004) examined the effect of regulatory fit on prospective choice. They 
hypothesized that regulatory fit “increases the intensity of people’s motivation to approach or 
avoid different alternatives and thereby also influences evaluative responses toward those 
alternatives” (p. 928). Using regulatory focus theory and regulatory fit, then, those in a 
promotion focus should have stronger motivation and feel more positive towards a desirable 
prospective choice; whereas, on the other hand, those in a prevention focus should have a 
stronger motivation to avoid when anticipating an undesirable choice (Idson et al., 2004).    
Relatedly, Cesario et al. (2008) explained that regulatory fit was particularly relevant to 
motivate behavior change or to increase message effectiveness. Indeed, regulatory fit has been 
examined in myriad contexts and situations with respect to persuasion (Cesario et al., 2008). In 
many of these studies, message framing has been examined, too. For example, Cesario, Grant, 
and Higgins (2004) examined the impact of regulatory fit and message framing on, among other 
things, the persuasiveness of messages on eating more fruits and vegetables. The message 
framing concerned “eager” framing (gain/non-gain) and “vigilant” framing (non-loss/loss). They 
found a significant interaction effect between regulatory focus and type of framing, meaning a 
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regulatory fit effect—those in the promotion-focused condition showing increased intention 
ratings with the eager framing (compared to vigilant framing), and the opposite in the 
prevention-focused condition (i.e., showed greater intentions with the vigilant framing) (Cesario 
et al., 2004). 
Similarly, Spiegel, Grant-Pillow, and Higgins (2004) explored the impact of regulatory 
focus and outcome framing (benefits and costs) on fruit and vegetable consumption; they, too, 
found a significant interaction effect between regulatory focus and message framing—in 
particular, promotion-focused messages focusing on benefits were more effective than messages 
focusing on costs, and prevention-focused messages focusing on costs were more effective than 
those about benefits (Spiegel, Grant-Pillow, & Higgins, 2004).  
Lee and Aaker (2004) applied regulatory fit to message framing and looked at grape juice 
consumption and attitudes towards sunscreen. They found that promotion-focused appeals were 
more effective when gain-framed, and prevention-focused concerns were more effective when 
loss-framed.  
As another example, Yi and Baumgartner (2009) examined whether the persuasiveness of 
a message was improved when it matched chronic regulatory focus. They, too, found that, 
generally, gain end-state messages were more persuasive than those anchored by loss end-states. 
Similarly, that positive-valence frames were more persuasive than negative ones; and, that 
frames emphasizing security were more effective than achievement frames (Yi & Baumgartner, 
2009). 
 In sum, regulatory focus literature demonstrates at least three ways that it and message 
framing intersect (Yi & Baumgartner, 2009). First, as noted, if a person is promotion focused, 
then he or she will be extra sensitive to gain end-states (i.e., positive outcomes) (Higgins, 1997). 
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On the other hand, if the person is prevention focused, he or she will be more sensitive to the 
presence (or absence) of negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997). Similarly, Idson, Liberman, and 
Higgins (2000) noted that promotion-focused individuals exhibited more eagerness in working 
towards gains (compared to non-gains) and prevention-focused individuals exhibited greater 
vigilance in preventing losses (compared to non-losses). Second, literature suggests that message 
valences that are congruous with regulatory focus are more persuasive (Yi & Baumgartner, 
2009). Third, whether a message concerns achievement or security can interact with their focus 
(Yi & Baumgartner, 2009).  
 Framing and Valence Effects 
As Hasseldine and Hite (2003) importantly emphasized, “the concept of framing means 
different things to different people” (p. 519). For example, Druckman (2001) listed at least seven 
definitions of framing used by scholars, which he classified as either frames-in-communication 
or frames-in-thought. Frames-in-communication regard what the speaker sees as important; 
whereas, frames-in-thought describes more the individual’s perception of the situation—i.e., 
what the receiver of the communication views as important (Druckman, 2001). So, while both 
frames concern emphasis or salience, they differ on the reference: the speaker or the listener. 
This dissertation, then, focused on frames-in-thought.  
Prior literature often examined valence framing effects, “wherein the frame casts the 
same critical information in either a positive or a negative light” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 
1998). The literature has identified three different types of commonly used frames (Biswas & 
Grau, 2008; Levin et al., 1998). First, was risky-choice framing. As explained by Levin et al. 
(1998), “discrete choices between a risky and a riskless option of equal expected value depended 
on whether the options were described in positive terms (i.e., lives saved) or in negative terms 
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(i.e., lives lost)” (p. 152). At bottom, these frames present different levels of risks in different 
ways (Levin et al., 1998). This was the type of framing first introduced by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981). Under these frames, individuals are more risk-seeking when avoiding losses 
than when realizing gains; this, of course, gave rise to the S-shaped value function in prospect 
theory.   
 The second type of framing was attribute framing (Biswas & Grau, 2008; Levin et al., 
1998). This type of framing may be the “simplest case of framing” (Levin et al., 1998, p. 158). 
Typically, only a single attribute was framed (Levin et al., 1998). In this context, the relevant 
measure was the overall evaluation—like an overall degree of favorability—rather than a choice 
between two discrete options. Under attribute framing, positive framing was more associated 
with positive evaluations than negative framing (Biswas & Grau, 2008; Levin et al., 1998).  
The third type of framing was goal framing (Biswas & Grau, 2008; Levin et al., 1998). 
Goal framing refers to the individual taking an action or moving towards a goal (Biswas & Grau, 
2008). Levin et al. (1998) described a critical difference between goal framing and attribute 
framing, namely that, in goal framing, the behavior at issue was considered beneficial or good in 
both frames (Levin et al., 1998). In the positive frame, the benefits of engaging in the behavior 
were extolled (i.e., the gains that were associated with doing the behavior); whereas, the negative 
frame described avoiding the losses associated with not doing the behavior (Levin et al., 1998).  
 As relevant here, Cesario, Corker, and Jelinek (2013) aptly described gain/loss message 
framing as casting the outcomes of a behavior in terms of “either the benefits afforded by 
adopting the recommendation or the costs associated with failing to adopt it” (p. 238).  The 
differences in persuasiveness between gain- and loss-framed messages is rooted in the 
asymmetries between positive and negative information—that is, negative information is more 
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powerful (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006). There were several posited reasons for this asymmetry. 
First, “negative information generally has a disproportionate impact on decisions compared with 
equivalent positive information” (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006, p. 2). Second, negative stimuli may 
be detected earlier (at lower levels) than positive stimuli (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; O’Keefe & 
Jensen, 2006). Third, negative events may evoke stronger and quicker reactions (O’Keefe & 
Jensen, 2006; Taylor, 1991). In sum, negative information is more powerful and potent than 
positive information.     
 Empirical Examinations of Framing 
 Framing has been investigated empirically in various contexts and domains, ranging from 
health care and medical decisions, marketing and consumer product choices, energy saving 
behavior, and in financial-related contexts. Framing effects in the consumer decision-making 
context, in particular, have generally been empirically validated (e.g., Biswas & Grau, 2008). 
Despite this, in a meta-analysis, Kuhberger (1998) examined over 100 papers about 
framing effects. He concluded that framing effects, empirically, tended to be of small to 
moderate size, and that material differences existed between research designs. He further noted 
that, based on this analysis, the two most important elements were whether the framing was 
achieved by modifying the reference point or by manipulating outcome salience, and the 
response mode, i.e., choice versus rating. At bottom, he concluded that, although framing may be 
a “reliable phenomenon,” researchers should distinguish between salience manipulations and 
reference point manipulations, and care should be given to the experimental design and its effect 
on framing-effect sizes. Relatedly, in their meta-analysis, O’Keefe and Jensen (2006) argued that 
“gain-framed and loss-framed appeals do not generally differ in persuasiveness” (p. 16).  
29 
Examining framing in different contexts is important because perception of gains and 
losses—just like perceptions of risk—may vary (Ganzach & Karsahi, 1995; Jacoby & Kaplan, 
1972). Consequently, the framing-related literature in several contexts and domains was 
reviewed.  
 Marketing and Product Message Framing 
 Framing has been examined in the marketing and consumer product literature. In the 
marketing literature, a key concept is consumers’ “willingness to pay” (WTP), referring to the 
maximum amount of money they will pay for a product or service (Ayadi & Lapeyre, 2016). 
WTP is a function of the perceived trade-offs between the benefits and costs of the product or 
service (Ayadi & Lapeyre, 2016). Ayadi and Lapeyre (2016), for instance, examined the effect of 
framing on consumer perceptions as applied to “green” products. They hypothesized a 
relationship between different frames and the shaping of consumers’ WTP; as applied to 
framing, in particular, they hypothesized that framing the ecological message moderates the 
influence of WTP on purchase intentions. Positive frames, they noted, stress the ecological 
contribution of the product; whereas, negative frames highlight the prevention of the negative 
outcomes. They found a moderating effect of ecological messages on the WTP-intentions 
relationship, with the relationship stronger for negative framing (Ayadi & Lapeyre, 2016).     
 Biswas and Grau (2008) explored the intersection of option framing (e.g., added extra 
options to a base-level car) and cognitive resources (as measured by memorization and recall 
ability of a number sequence). They found an interaction effect between option framing and 
cognitive resources; in particular, that under low levels of cognitive ability, respondents were 
more likely to favor default options (a status quo bias). They also concluded that cognitive 
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constraints serve as a moderator of framing effects, indicating a loss-aversion relationship 
(Biswas & Grau, 2008).    
 A classic consumer product framing example was Levin (1987) (Donovan & Jalleh, 
1999). Levin investigated the role of information on the evaluation of a single stimuli (Levin, 
1987); the simple task was for respondents to indicate their associations to a purchase of meat 
that was described as either 75% lean or 25% fat (with “lean” being a positively associated frame 
and “fat” being a negatively associated frame). He found that responses were evaluated more 
favorably—across several criteria, such as taste and quality—for the positive-framed description. 
Based on these results, he explained that “the stimulus label elicits associations which, in turn, 
affect the evaluation of the stimulus object” (1987, p. 86). In other words, describing the stimuli 
in more positive terms (e.g., lean meat) leads to more favorable associations.    
 Gamliel and Herstein (2007) examined the effect of framing on a consumer’s willingness 
to buy private brands (those owned and sold by the retailer itself). In particular, they explored the 
negative and positive framing of the price differential between the private brand and the national 
brand. The negative frame was couched as “losing” the spread between the national brand and 
the private brand; the positive frame was couched as an equal savings. They found that the 
negative framing was related to more decisions to buy the private brand (Gamliel & Herstein, 
2007). Squaring their results with prospect theory, they explained that the subjective value of the 
gain was less than the subjective value of the loss (Gamliel & Herstein, 2007).    
 Another related empirical example was price discounting. A price discount can be 
expressed different ways—i.e., as a percent reduction, dollars off, or volume discount (buy one, 
get one free) (Gendall et al., 2006). Gendall et al. (2006), for example, argued that, generally, 
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price discounts expressed as dollars-off or cents-off were better than percent-off for high-priced 
products and that the opposite was likely true for low-price products.   
 Health Message Framing 
Message framing has been extensively studied in the medical literature, in particular in 
framing health communication (e.g., to encourage a particular behavior, such as engaging in 
regular exercise) (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012). Much of the health behavior framing literature 
focuses on intentions or attitudes towards the behavior, which is of particular importance to this 
dissertation (as it focused on intentions, too) (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012). Admittedly, this 
was a practical limitation, as intentions and actual behaviors may diverge (Gallagher & 
Updegraff, 2012; Webb & Sheeran, 2006).   
In the health domain, message framing has been examined in two general contexts—
public health decisions and personal health decisions (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Indeed, 
scholars have noted increased efforts to integrate psychological theories into health campaigns to 
improve effectiveness (Jasper, Woolf, & Chrisman, 2014).  
In the public health context, the disease problem—as originally advanced by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981)—demonstrated that framing alters decision preferences (Rothman & Salovey, 
1997). The disease problem has been replicated in other related contexts, such as in nuclear 
accidents, gas explosions, and cancer (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Shifting to personal health 
decisions, Rothman and Salovey (1997) noted that, in addition to framing, context matters, too. 
In other words, the framing was not the only information available; prior perceptions—such as 
family history of a specific disease—facilitated the impact of the framed message. Cho and 
Boster (2008), for example, found that antidrug ads that focused on the negatives of drug use 
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were more persuasive (relative to ads focusing on the positives of drug abstinence) but only for 
those that had friends who used drugs.  
Detweiler et al. (1999) aptly synthesized the application of prospect theory and framing 
to health choices. Under prospect theory, one would expect that people were risk averse when 
gains were emphasized (i.e., made salient); but they were risk-seeking when losses were 
emphasized. In addition to this general framework, Rothman and Salovey (1997) argued that the 
function of the health behavior affects the framing effect. There are three general functions of 
health behaviors: (a) to prevent, (b) to detect, and (c) to treat. The function of the behavior can 
affect the perceived risk of the behavior (e.g., a detection behavior can be seen as risky due to the 
prospect of identifying illness) and thereby influence the framing effect.  
Loss-framed information may be best served to promote detection behaviors due to their 
ability to detect illnesses (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). For example, loss framing increased 
participants’ positive attitudes about breast self-examinations (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987), 
mammography screenings (Banks et al., 1995), blood-cholesterol screenings (Maheswaran & 
Meyers-Levy, 1990), skin cancer exams (Block & Keller, 1995), and even HIV testing 
(Kalichman & Coley, 1995). Because the loss framing effect depends on the assessment of the 
underlying risk, the individual’s understanding of the detection behavior potentially affects their 
loss sensitivity (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). In the breast exam context, for example, Rothman 
and Salovey (1997) noted that a woman who actually worried about finding a lump would be 
particularly sensitive to loss framing—but those with a lesser perceived risk of finding a lump 
may be less affected by loss framing.  
Unlike detection behaviors, prevention behaviors allow people the ability to maintain 
current health and reduce risk of future health maladies (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). One critical 
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difference between detection and prevention behaviors was the perceived degree of proximal risk 
(Detweiler at al., 1999). In other words, detection behaviors—such as a Pap smear or 
mammography—are considered risky at the time of the test as the test can uncover the loss (the 
disease or health malady) (Detweiler at al., 1999).  
A classic example of a prevention behavior was sunscreen use; applying sunscreen is a 
relatively risk-free behavior—it is the lack of the behavior (applying the sunscreen) that carries 
the risk. As Rothman and Salovey (1997) noted, because loss framing encourages risky 
preferences, loss framing may actually be counter-productive for preventative behaviors. 
Therefore, gain framing should be used to promote preventative health behaviors. This has been 
borne out empirically; for instance, Christopherson and Gyulay (1981) demonstrated that 
focusing on positive consequences increased usage of car seats, and Linville, Fischer, and 
Fischhoff (1993) regarding condom use. Similarly, Rothman et al. (1993) showed that women 
exposed to a gain-framed message (compared to a loss-framed message) were significantly more 
likely to request a higher level of SPF sunscreen. Detweiler et al. (1999) showed that positive 
framing was successful in persuading beachgoers to use sunscreen.  
Treatment, or recuperative, behaviors ameliorate an existing health or medical problem 
(Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Rothman and Salovey (1997) argued that treatment behaviors 
should be similar to prevention behaviors in terms of framing; that is, to undergo the treatment is 
normally seen as a risk-averse (safer) option relative to no treatment (and succumbing to the 
malady). For surgical decisions, for example, gain-framed information (as to the likelihood of 
survival) has resulted in greater participation (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). In addition to 
choosing simply treatment or non-treatment, choice can also be structured between two different 
treatments. Consider, for example, the decision to undergo radiation or surgery for cancer 
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treatments. McNeil et al. (1982) showed that loss framing the likelihood of dying led to 
decreased preferences for surgery—in these cases the framing was based on the short- and long-
term consequences (e.g., better long-term survival but greater risk of surgical-based death in the 
short-term).   
It is important to emphasize and provide a theoretical justification for the divergence in 
these framing results (Rothman et al., 1999). The predominant view, as advanced by Rothman 
and Salovey (1997), was the behavioral function, as explained above, provided a theoretical 
justification for different frames having different results on behaviors. Because detection 
behaviors informed people that they were sick, detection behaviors could be considered risky 
decisions (exposing people to bad news) despite their long-term benefits (Rothman et al., 1999). 
On the other hand, prevention behaviors merely reduce or mitigate a potential future illness—
and, in the short-run, maintain the health status quo; as such, they are not risky decisions (in fact, 
the only risk involved is not engaging in the behavior) (Rothman et al., 1999).  
Empirically, this framework was demonstrated by Rothman, Martino, Bedel, Detweiler, 
and Salovey (1999) that examined mouth rinse that was designed to be either a detection 
behavior (detecting plaque) or prevention behavior (preventing plaque); thus, there was a single 
health behavior that could serve either function. There, after the loss-framed message, 
participants were more likely to request samples of a plaque-detecting rinse; but, after the gain-
framed message, were more likely to request the plaque-preventing rinse (Rothman et al., 1999). 
This phenomenon was similarly replicated in the Pap test context by Rivers et al. (2005), as a 
Pap test can be framed in either a prevention frame (e.g., preventing cervical cancer from 
developing) and a detection frame (detecting early cervical cancer).  
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Another view, advanced by Mann, Sherman, and Updegraff (2004), on the other hand, 
emphasized a person’s dispositional sensitivity to favorable or unfavorable outcomes and this 
moderated the effect of message framing. That is, individual differences interact with the 
framing effect. In particular, Mann et al. (2004) focused on the approach and avoidance 
motivations. These were related to behavior regulation, similar to the prevention/promotion 
focus advanced by Higgins (1997). The approach system (e.g., the behavioral activation system, 
“BAS”) controls appetitive motivation and the avoidance system (the behavior inhibition system, 
“BIS”) controls aversive motivation. Accordingly, those with BAS sensitivity respond to reward 
and incentive cues, and those with BIS sensitivity respond to punishment and threat cues 
(Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Mann, Sherman, & Updegraff, 2004). Consequently, under 
this view, individual dispositional motivation needs to be examined along with message framing 
to understand and predict behavioral effects.  
Rothman and Salovey (1997) also hypothesized that, in addition to the nature of the 
behavioral function, frequency may also matter—for example, a single vaccine with lifetime 
protection is different than sunscreen that must be applied repeatedly. Robbertson (1975), for 
instance, suggested that loss framing may not be effective for those behaviors that require 
continued effort (like sunscreen application), but may be effective to promote a one-time 
behavior (like a vaccine). 
Another potential moderator of framing effect is the risk (or perceived risk) of the 
behavior. This has been demonstrated in several contexts. Apanovitch, McCarthy, and Salovey 
(2003) considered this in the context of HIV testing. Although HIV testing is a detection 
behavior—such that loss-framing should be particularly effective—those with lower-perceived 
risks of testing positive responded favorably to gain framing; whereas, those with higher 
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perceived risks responded to loss framing, as expected (Apanovitch et al., 2003). Explaining this, 
they noted that for those with a lower perceived risk (based on known past physical practices), 
HIV testing was a psychologically safe behavior with basically a certain outcome and therefore 
persuaded by gain framing. On the other hand, those with a higher perceived risk of testing 
positive faced a more uncertain test outcome and therefore were more susceptible to loss 
framing.  
Similarly, Abhyankar, O’Connor, and Lawton (2008) considered risk as a moderator on 
the effect of framing and the MMR vaccine. Although vaccines are prototypical prevention 
behaviors (by definition), some vaccines may have perceived health risks, like the MMR 
vaccine. Here, they found that loss-framing (rather than gain-framing) was more effective in 
increasing MMR intentions. They attributed this finding to the degree of perceived risk in 
obtaining the vaccine (i.e., the MMR vaccine is potentially risky) (Abhyankar, O’Connor, & 
Lawton, 2008).  
Rothman and Salovey (1997) further proposed that the decision-making process is 
influenced by framing in three stages of the decision process. First, the attention given to the 
message affects the degree to which a mental representation is formed. Second, subjective 
experience and context can affect individual receptivity to the framing. Third, the influence of 
the framing depends on the perceived function of the behavior (as described above).  
 Rothman and Salovey (1997) argued that framing can only be influential if the framed 
information becomes a part of the cognitive representation of the issue. Thus, considering how 
the information is processed is of paramount importance. In terms of persuasive appeals, there 
are two modes of processing; systematically, referring to focusing on the details of the message, 
and heuristically, referring to the surface level of the message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
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Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Systematic processing is more associated with persuasiveness of 
gain- and loss-framed information (Takemura, 1992, 1993; Wegener, Petty, & Klein, 1994). 
Systematic processing can be affected by contextual variables, such as being involved or 
interested in the particular issue (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Maheswaran and Meyers-Levey 
(1990) also argued that personal involvement with an issue affects the effectiveness of framing. 
According to their argument, negatively charged (valence) information has more effect when 
systematically processed. Thus, if there is a high degree of personal involvement, there is an 
advantage to use loss framing. Though, Rothman and Salovey (1997) noted that this argument 
cannot account for certain preference reversals or some gain-framed effectiveness for highly 
involved persons.     
 Financial Context Framing 
 Framing effects have been studied in the financial context, too. An early example in 
financial domains—although not expressly invoking the concept of framing—is Dickson (1981). 
Dickson demonstrated that a difference in risk attitudes between professional risk-managers and 
professional non-risk managers, all of whom were business managers with years of work 
experience. In loss-framed scenarios (in which there was a prospect of loss), the risk managers 
were more risk averse; but the groups were not different in profit (gain) scenarios.  
Another early empirical example was Ganzach and Karsahi (1995), who examined the 
influence of framing in credit card usage. The loss-framed message explained the disadvantages 
of using cash or checks (compared to the credit card), and the gain-framed message discussed the 
mirror-image issue set in a positive light. They concluded that loss framing had a stronger effect 
on credit card behavior—with those subjected to the loss-framed message more than doubling 
usage (Ganzach & Karsahi, 1995).     
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 Roszkowski and Snelbecker (1990) explored framing effects on the risk tolerances of 
financial planners (who are routinely dealing with risk and financial management). They used the 
classic Kahneman and Tversky human-life based choices and substituted dollars for lives and 
constructed the scenario around stock market investments; in addition to the gain and loss 
framing, they also introduced an ownership element, i.e., “your” money as compared to 
“client’s” money. Roszkowski and Snelbecker (1990) found, among other things, a significant 
main effect for frame and a significant three-way interaction between age, ownership, and frame. 
In particular, that gain framing led to avoiding risks and loss framing led to taking risks. Thus, 
they concluded that even professional financial planners are subject to the same framing biases.  
 Framing has also been examined in other financial planning-related domains. Hasseldine 
and Hite (2003) examined the effect of framing (in particular, goal framing) in the tax 
compliance setting. They found a lack of a main effect for framing manipulation but did find a 
significant interaction effect between framing and gender (Hasseldine & Hite, 2003). 
Specifically, their results suggested that men were more persuaded by the negative message, but 
women were more persuaded by the positive message.    
 Pincus, Hopewood, and Mills (2017) examined the distinction between statistical and 
narrative evidence framing in the context of buying long-term care insurance. They argued that 
insurers have traditionally framed the insurance purchasing decision in a suboptimal manner by 
couching it in terms of a high probability loss frame.  
 Other Empirically Examined Influencers of Framing   
Feelings, mood, and disposition can also affect the influence and receptivity to message 
framing (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). At the simplest level, current mood may affect whether a 
situation is interpreted in terms of gains or losses (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). There is some 
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theoretical examination in the literature about mood congruency—that is, a specific mood may 
influence how a situation is perceived—but little direct empirical examination (Rothman & 
Salovey, 1997). An example of the intersection of mood congruency and framing would be that 
loss-framed arguments are more effective (persuasive) if the respondent is in a sad mood. 
Although current mood may play a role, chronic disposition (optimistic or pessimistic) might 
also shape the influence of framing (Scheier & Carver, 1985).    
 The literature also explored the effect of other individual-level characteristics on the 
framing effect. In the health messaging literature, for instance, Updegraff et al. (2007) found that 
tailored messages—those in which the message matches the recipient’s motivational orientation 
(as determined by the BIS/BAS scale (Carver & White, 1994))—can be more effective than 
untailored messages. Another example of individual-level characteristic is that of health locus of 
control. Health locus of control refers to a person’s perception of control over their health 
outcomes—that is, is their health status determined by their own behavior or external forces 
(Williams-Piehota et al., 2004). Williams-Piehota et al. (2004) found that, with respect to 
mammography utilization, messages matched with health locus of control were more likely to 
motivate behavior, and that this effect was particularly strong for internally focused subjects.  
This resonated with prior work done by Quadrel and Lau (1989), which found that health locus 
matched messages were more likely to motive breast self-exams (with the benefit primarily 
demonstrated by internally focused subjects).  
 Narratives  
 Not only can the positive or negative valence of information (as explored above) affect 
decision making, other research has also explored the presentation of that information (agnostic 
as to its valence charge). Although not framing per se, one example is the use of jargon versus 
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simple description. James (2018), for example, found that using technical jargon instead of 
simple descriptions of financial planning techniques resulted in decreased understanding and 
decreased interest in learning about those techniques. Similarly, James (2016) found that 
different phrases related to requests to leave charitable bequest resulted in different interest 
levels.  
Another presentation-related approach is narrative framing—that is, in effect, presenting 
information in a story-like format instead of a strictly fact-based (or even statistical-based) 
presentation. Under this approach, the presentation of the information—in a story like manner—
elicits a different emotional response in the decision-maker. This phenomenon is akin to framing 
because it hypothesizes that choice is not a function of strictly mathematic utility under 
uncertainty, but rather the choice is affected by how the information is presented (like the 
thought experiments in the prospect theory literature) (Carlsson Hauff et al., 2014).  
This approach exploits what has been dubbed the “affect heuristic,” in which emotions 
play important roles in decision making (Carlsson Hauff et al., 2014). Relatedly, under the affect 
heuristic, the risks and benefits of an activity may be judged by the associated negative and 
positive feelings associated with it (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). Indeed, 
Alhakami and Slovic (1994) noted that, if an activity was “liked,” people tend to judge the risk 
as low and the benefits as high; whereas, on the other hand, if the activity was “disliked,” the 
opposite was true.  
In the literature, a “narrative” refers mainly to “stories, accounts, tales, or descriptions” 
(Carlsson Hauff et al., 2014, p. 497; Shankar et al., 2001). They are normally chronologically 
weaved together by causal events to portray a particular plot or meaning (Hauff et al., 2014). 
Bennett and Royle (2016) defined narrative as “a series of events or actions which are connected 
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in time” (p. 55). Stories and narratives are pervasive in our existence, starting as soon as early 
childhood (Shankar et al. 2001). Moreover, most of the information that we actually obtain in our 
daily lives is conveyed by narrative (Wentzel et al. 2010). Relatedly, others have argued that the 
human memory system uses narratives to store knowledge (Schank & Abelson, 1955); and that 
narrative and story structure helps us store and retrieve ideas (Myrsiades, 1987). Shankar, Elliot 
and Goulding (2001) aptly noted that, “It is inconceivable to think of our lives without stories: 
whether listening, watching or reading them, or telling them” (p. 431).  
 Scholars and researchers have described narratives as a “source of sense-making,” which 
affect our emotions and help us find meaning (Carlsson Hauff et al., 2016, p. 153; Mossberg, 
2008). Indeed, narratives are an important way that experiences are made meaningful 
(Polkinghorne, 1988; Shankar et al., 2001). Scholars trace the origins and use of narrative to at 
least back to Aristotle, namely his work Poetics (Shankar et al., 2001). In western culture, 
Gergen and Gergen (1988) synthesized the following key features of narratives: (a) the valued 
end point; (b) events relevant to the goal estate (that help make the point); (c) a particular order 
of the events; (d) causal sequencing; and (e) demarcations (i.e., beginning, middle, and end). 
Relatedly, there tends to be four basic plot structures—comedy, romance, tragedy, and satire 
(Frye, 1957; Shankar et al., 2001).  
Narrative processing refers to how individuals process and make decisions related to 
stories (Carlsson Hauff et al., 2014). Narrative processing may encourage the individual to think 
of themselves in the narrative or evoke autobiographical memories (Carlsson Hauff et al., 2014; 
Sujan et al., 1993). Narrative processing also encourages the establishing of meaningful 
relationships between the narrative elements (Wentzel, 2010). Narrative processing helps 
individuals make meaning of the information; this aspect is known as “transportation,” which 
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refers to the individual transporting themselves into the narrative (Carlsson Hauff et al. 2014, 
2016; Gerrig, 1993; Green & Brock, 2000; Woodside et al., 2008). Formally, Green and Brock 
(2000, 2002) dubbed this the “Transportation-Imagery Model” of narrative persuasion.  
Due to the transportation, the reader may be given a taste of the consequences described 
by the narrative (Padgett & Allen, 1997; Wentzel, 2010). During transportation, the reader gives 
exclusive focus to the story; this can lead to a sense of a more “real” experience, which can 
create affect and feeling (Carlsson Hauff et al., 2014). It is the concept of transportation that 
advances that emotive response is increased (Carlsson Hauff et al., 2014; Escalas, 2004; Mar & 
Oatley, 2008). In sum, it is this emotional response (affective aspect) that makes narratives 
effective forms of persuasion (Oatley, 2002). Wentzel et al. (2010), however, showed this may 
not always be the case; they demonstrated that, when manipulative intent is made salient—i.e., 
the reader feels he or she is being manipulated (e.g., being flattered before a purchase)—the 
advantage of narrative ads over fact ads disappears.  
The express use of narratives in the consumer space is probably most obvious in the 
advertising context—like a commercial that tells a short story; for example, Escalas (1998) 
performed a content analysis study and found that over 20% of ads used well-developed stories. 
Past literature in this space has generally found that narrative ads receive more favorable 
evaluations than fact-based ads (Wentzel et al., 2010). In the advertising space, researchers posit 
that the narrative structure triggers narrative processing (Adaval & Wyer, 1998; Escalas, 2004; 
Polyorat, Alden, & Kim, 2007; Wentzel et al., 2010). As noted above, the narrative processing 
enhances persuasion by increasing emotional (affective) reactions (Deighton, Romer, & 
McQueen, 1989; Green & Brock, 2000; Wentzel et al., 2010). As argued by Wentzel et al. 
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(2010), “to the extent that the ad conveys a positively valenced experience, narrative processing 
and transportation are likely to elicit affect that is also positive in nature” (p. 512).  
Fact-based ads, on the other hand, trigger more analytical processing, which does not 
necessarily trigger an emotional response (Wentzel et al., 2010). These types of ads trigger 
analytical processing that “attempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of 
description and explanation” (Bruner, 1986, p. 12).  
Narratives have been used in other contexts, too, such as in healthcare decision making 
(Winterbottom et al., 2008). In this setting, narratives are a type of decision aid, designed to help 
patients make treatment choices (O’Connor et al., 2003; Winterbottom et al., 2008). Although 
decision aids have been historically up-to-date fact-based information about the treatment, a 
more recent development is to present them as patient narratives (instead of factual information) 
(Elwyn et al., 2006; Winterbottom et al., 2008). In a systematic review of the medical literature, 
Winterbottom et al. (2008) found that narrative information affected decision making in about of 
a third of reviewed studies (17 studies met the inclusion criteria), and that first-person narratives 
tended to have increased likelihood for having an effect.  
The power of narratives has even morphed into what some scholars have dubbed the 
“narrative bias” (Betsch, Haase, Renkewitz, & Schmid, 2015). The narrative bias refers to the 
phenomenon of the “excessive influence of narrative information, exemplars, and testimonies” 
(Betsch et al., 2015, p. 241). The classic example of narrative bias is demonstrated by Borgida 
and Nisbett (1977). In that study, they found that brief, face-to-face comments about college 
courses had a greater effect on course selection than average course evaluation scores. As Betsch 
et al. (2015) explained, “such reasoning is considered to be biased, i.e., formally incorrect, 
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because it fails to weigh different samples of data according to the respective sample size” (p. 
241).  
 Negativity Bias 
Related to the narrative bias generally, is that of a potential “negativity bias” (Betsch et 
al., 2015). Baumeister et al. (2001) poignantly commented that “bad is stronger than good.” In 
short, negative-valenced events are stronger than their positive counterparts (e.g., losing money 
as compared to winning money). More specifically, negativity bias refers to the phenomenon of 
weighing information about the presence of a risk more strongly than information about the 
absence of the risk. As relevant to narrative framing, negativity bias implies that narratives may 
have an asymmetric effect by portraying or implying a higher risk than that borne by factual, 
statistical information (Betsch et al., 2015).  
Rozin and Royzman (2001) developed a four-type taxonomy of negativity bias. First, was 
negativity potency, which refers to the negative event being more potent and more salient than its 
positive counterpart (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Negativity potency is, in effect, derived from the 
prospect function and loss aversion, as described earlier regarding prospect theory. Second, 
greater steepness of negative gradients refers to the notion that “negative events grow more 
rapidly in negativity as they are approached in space or time than do positive events” (Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001, p. 298). Third, was negativity dominance, which refers to the phenomenon that 
holistic perceptions of positive and negative events are more negative than just their 
mathematical or algebraic sums (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Fourth, was negative differentiation, 
which refers to the notion that “negative stimuli are generally construed as more elaborate and 
differentiated than the corresponding positive stimuli” (Rozin & Royzman, 2001, p. 299). A 
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typical example of negative differentiation are the words used to describe negative phenomenon 
is richer and more varied than positive stimuli (Peeters, 1971; Rozin & Royzman, 2001).  
 Financial Narratives 
Researchers have examined narratives in financial-related domains. Carlsson Hauff et al. 
(2014) examined the effect of narrative versus fact framing on consumers for retirement savings 
decisions. They hypothesized that narrative-format information, compared to strictly fact-based 
information, in the financial context would result in a stronger positive affect, which, in turn, 
leads to a stronger emotive response, culminating in stronger intention (e.g., to purchase a 
financial product like a mutual fund). They found that, indeed, narrative formats evoked stronger 
positive affect and emotive responses.  
 In another experiment, Carlsson Hauff et al. (2016) examined whether the level of trust in 
the sender of a narrative versus fact-related information influenced intentions to save in a mutual 
fund. Like the prior study, they hypothesized that the narrative format increases positive affect, 
which in turn increases interest, and this increased interest leads to increased intentions to save; 
and, specific to this study, that trust in the sender increases intention to save. Again, they largely 
confirmed their hypotheses.  
 Herzenstein, Sonenshein, and Dholakia (2011) examined the role of narratives in peer-to-
peer lending. They hypothesized that narrative information allows potential borrowers to manage 
the communication of their identity and facilitate impression formation and management (e.g., 
trustworthiness, successfulness, morality, religiosity, etc.)—in short, how a stranger (the 
creditor) will view the borrower. They found that those with poorer credit scores generated more 
identities (perhaps trying to overcompensate for lower objective credit information), and lenders 
46 
favored seeing more aspects of identity; indeed, this was true for identities related to being 
trustworthy and successful.  
 James and Routley (2016) examined the impact of donor stories on charitable bequest 
giving intentions. There, they asked respondents to review a vignette that was about a deceased 
donor or a living donor (images of the donor were also present). In accord with an avoidance 
response to mortality salience, they found that stories about living donors generated more interest 
than stories relating to deceased donors. As such, they suggested that stories can increase bequest 
intentions (James & Routley, 2016).  
 Examining Behavioral Intentions 
This study examined financial planning intentions and not actual behavior. Therefore, the 
theoretical justification for examining intentions specifically and the related empirical work on 
intentions are discussed next. 
 Theoretical Importance of Intentions 
 Gordon Allport, the famed American psychologist and considered a father to personality 
psychology, wrote that the attitude concept is “the primary building stone in the edifice of social 
psychology” (1954, p. 45). Despite this apparent psychological consensus in the mid-20th 
century, Wicker (1969) famously argued in a meta-analysis that “little evidence” supports the 
existence of “stable, underlying attitudes within the individual which influence both his verbal 
expressions and his actions” (p. 75). In the wake of Wicker’s critique, newer, more tailored 
models of the attitudinal-behavioral relationship were developed (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). 
In modern psychological literature, intentions have been defined as “self-instructions to 
perform particular behaviors or to obtain certain outcomes” (Webb & Sheeran, 2006, p. 249). 
Forming an intention typically ends the deliberative process and indicates the effort to be exerted 
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to effectuate the desired outcome (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Intentions, then, are a key 
determinant of actual behavior (Webb & Sheeran, 2006).    
Models of attitude-behavior relations—such as the theory of reasoned action, the theory 
of planned behavior, and the model of interpersonal behavior—all use intentions as a key 
predictor of behavior (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). The role of intentions in each of these models 
will be briefly discussed in turn.  
 The theory of reasoned action (TRA), as elucidated by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), was 
created to predict volitional behavior. It holds that attitudes and subjective norms impact and 
affect behavior by their influence on the creation of intentions to engage in that behavior (Webb 
& Sheeran, 2006). Thus, behavior intention is the “proximal determinant” of actual behavior 
(Webb & Sheeran, 2006, p. 249). Moreover, under the TRA, intention also mediates attitudes 
and subjective norms, thereby making intention “the most immediate and important predictor of 
behavior” (Webb & Sheeran, 2006, p. 249). 
 Later, Ajzen (1985, 1991) added additional concepts to the TRA, creating the theory of 
planned behavior (TPB). The theory of planned behavior recognized that behaviors also require 
perceived and actual control over the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). In other words, whether the person 
believes the behavior to be easy or difficult also predicts actual behavior. Relatedly, the person 
must have actual control over the behavior. Thus, while the TPB also viewed intentions as the 
most important driver of behavior—indeed, Ajzen (1991) noted that, generally, “the stronger the 
intention to engage in a behavior, the more likely should be its performance” (p. 181)—it 
realized the role—and potential moderating effect—of behavioral control. A common theme, 
then, between the TRA and TPB was that intentions were a central focus, and “intentions are 
assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior and to indicate how hard 
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people are willing to try or how much effort they would exert to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 
1991, p. 181; Armitage & Conner, 2001, p. 477).    
Another commonly used behavioral-change model is the transtheoretical model (TTM) as 
elucidated by Prochaska and DiClemente (1984). As originally used, this model posited that 
there were five distinct stages through which people pursue and attain health goals—and the 
model has been now used outside the health context. The five stages are precontemplation, 
contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1984; Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006). Behavioral intention is not an express aspect of the model, but researchers and 
scholars have averred that, at a minimum, intention increases linearly across the first three stages 
of change (Godin, Lambert, Owen, Nolin, & Prud’homme, 2004; Sutton, 2000; Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006). Thus, progress through the stages can be viewed through the lens of increasing 
behavior intention (moving towards actual behavior and behavior modifications).    
 Intention is also a construct central to related areas, such as goal striving and self-
regulation (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). In the goal striving context, under Locke and Latham’s 
(1990) theory of goal setting, intention formation for a task is critical to promote goal 
achievement (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Under control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1982), which 
regards self-regulation and comparing one’s current state to an aspirational future state, 
intentions are a determinant of behavior change (Webb & Sheeran, 2006).  
 In sum, intention is an important aspect of contemporary behavioral models and related 
domains, such as goal setting and self-regulation. 
 Moderators of Intentions 
 Literature indicates that several variables may moderate (influence) the impact of 
intention on behavior (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Webb and Sheeran (2006) synthesized the 
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literature and delineated three classes of intention-moderating variables: (a) conceptual factors, 
which were “theoretically specified variables that are predicted to affect how well intentions are 
realized in behavior” (p. 252); (b) measurement factors, such as time intervals and method of 
measurement (e.g., objective versus self-reporting), which can influence the intention-behavior 
relationship; and (c) study characteristic factors, such as the type of sample (e.g., students versus 
non-student sample, in which students may have higher test-taking abilities or greater innate 
desire to answer consistently and congruently) (Webb & Sheeran, 2006).    
 Empirical Examinations of Intentions 
 In addition to the theoretical importance of behavioral intentions, intentions have been 
examined empirically as well. Webb and Sheeran (2006) synthesized the literature and noted that 
correlational studies demonstrated that intentions were associated with behavior, even across 
different theoretical frameworks (e.g., TPB versus TRA).  Armitage and Connor (2001), for 
example, found in a meta-analysis of studies using the TPB that the average correlation between 
intention and behavior of .47. In applying the TRA and TPB to exercise behavior, the average 
correlation between intention and behavior was .47 (Hagger, Chatzisarantis, & Biddle, 2002; 
Hausenblas, Caron, & Mack, 1997; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Sheeran (2002) performed a meta-
analysis of 10 meta-analyses and found that intentions accounted for 28% of the variance in 
behavior on average. In sum, then, empirical data suggests that intentions have a big impact on 
actual behavior (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). 
 Nevertheless, there are some cautions in the literature about drawing conclusions on 
intentions from correlational studies. Many of these studies are cross-sectional and use self-
reporting, meaning that there could be consistency and self-presentational biases (Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006). Even more acute is that, due to the inherent nature of cross-sectional analysis, it 
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is impossible to rule out that it is actually behavior that causes the intention. Also, there is the 
ever-present concern of spurious association, in which an unmeasured variable is actually driving 
the relationship (Kenny, 1979; Webb & Sheeran, 2006).  
 A better way to measure the causal impact of intention on behavior is through 
experimentation; that is, changing intention and then observing whether a change in behavior 
results (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Some studies have used this approach. Brubaker and Fowler 
(1990), for example, examined persuasive messaging to increase testicular self-examinations 
(TSE). Those that received the persuasive messaging reported stronger intentions to perform 
TSE compared to those who only received factual information; one month later, rates of TSE 
performance were also higher among those who received the persuasive messaging (Brubaker & 
Fowler, 1990). Gratton et al. (2007) also used a TPB-based intervention to increase intentions 
and ultimately consumption of fruits and vegetables by children.  
 Measuring Intentions 
 Researchers have used inconsistent measures to examine the intention construct 
(Armitage & Conner, 2001). Some researchers have proposed to consider both intention and self-
prediction (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988). For example, “I 
intend to perform behavior X,” measures behavioral intentions; whereas, “How likely is it you 
will perform behavior X?” measures self-predictions (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Warshaw & 
Davis, 1985). Sheppard et al. (1988) argued that self-predictions measures are preferred, as they 
likely include contemplation of other factors that may affect the performance of the behavior and 
competition behaviors (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Notably, in a meta-analysis, Sheppard et al. 
(1988) concluded similarly, noting that self-predictions had a stronger relationship with behavior 
(mean r = .57) than behavioral intentions (mean r = .49).  
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 Hypotheses 
 Based on prospect theory, narrative literature, the robust medical framing literature, and 
regulatory focus theory, several hypotheses were examined. Similar to the medical framing 
literature, financial behaviors were selected based on their similarities to prevention, treatment, 
and detection behaviors, distinctions of which are rooted in behavioral economics’ prospect 
theory.  
 First, retirement-income planning was selected as a prevention behavior because the 
behavior prevents future harm (that is, by planning today, future financial harm is forestalled).  
H1a: Narrative message framing will be positively associated with intentions to actively plan 
for having sufficient retirement savings.  
H1b: Positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing will be positively associated with 
intentions to actively plan for having sufficient retirement savings.  
H1c: Negative-valence (loss) narrative message framing will be positively associated with 
intentions to actively plan for having sufficient retirement savings.  
H1d: Positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing will be more effective than negative-
valence narrative message framing for intentions to actively plan for having sufficient 
retirement savings.  
H1e: For promotion-focused respondents, positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing 
will be more effective than negative-valence (loss) framing for intentions to actively plan for 
having sufficient retirement savings.  
H1f: For prevention-focused respondents, negative-valence (loss) narrative message framing 
will be more effective than positive-valence (gain) narrative for intentions to actively plan for 
having sufficient retirement savings.  
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H1g: For promotion-focused respondents, as the strength of promotion focus increases, 
positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing will be positively associated with 
intentions to actively plan for having sufficient retirement savings.  
H1h: For prevention-focused respondents, as the strength of prevention focus increases, 
negative-valence (loss) narrative framing will be positively associated with intentions to 
actively plan for having sufficient retirement savings.  
 Second, cash-flow and budget planning was selected as a treatment behavior because 
current budgeting can “treat” current cash shortages and allow current savings.  
H2a: Narrative message framing will be positively associated with intentions to engage in 
monthly cash-flow budgeting.  
H2b: Positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing will be positively associated with 
intentions to engage in monthly cash-flow budgeting.  
H2c: Negative-valence (loss) narrative message framing will be positively associated with 
intentions to engage in monthly cash-flow budgeting.  
H2d: Positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing will be more effective than negative-
valence narrative message framing for intentions to engage in monthly cash-flow budgeting.  
H2e: For promotion-focused respondents, positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing 
will be more effective than negative-valence (loss) framing for intentions to engage in 
monthly cash-flow budgeting.  
H2f: For prevention-focused respondents, negative-valence (loss) narrative message framing 
will be more effective than positive-valence (gain) narrative for intentions to engage in 
monthly cash-flow budgeting.  
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H2g: For promotion-focused respondents, as the strength of promotion focus increases, 
positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing will be positively associated with 
intentions to engage in monthly cash-flow budgeting.  
H2h: For prevention-focused respondents, as the strength of prevention focus increases, 
negative-valence (loss) narrative framing will be positively associated with intentions to 
engage in monthly cash-flow budgeting.  
 Third, insurance-needs analysis was selected as detection behavior because it identifies 
whether there is a current financial malady (insufficient insurance protection). 
H3a: Narrative message framing will be positively associated with intentions to engage in an 
insurance needs analysis.  
H3b: Positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing will be positively associated with 
intentions to engage in an insurance needs analysis.  
H3c: Negative-valence (loss) narrative message framing will be positively associated with 
intentions to engage in an insurance needs analysis.  
H3d: Negative-valence (loss) narrative message framing will be more effective than positive-
valence narrative message framing for intentions to engage in an insurance needs analysis. 
H3e: For promotion-focused respondents, positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing 
will be more effective than negative-valence (loss) framing for engaging in an insurance 
needs analysis.  
H3f: For prevention-focused respondents, negative-valence (loss) narrative message framing 
will be more effective than positive-valence (gain) narrative for engaging in an insurance 
needs analysis. 
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H3g: For promotion-focused respondents, as the strength of promotion focus increases, 
positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing will be positively associated with 
intentions to engage in an insurance needs analysis.  
H3h: For prevention-focused respondents, as the strength of prevention focus increases, 
negative-valence (loss) narrative framing will be positively associated with intentions to 
engage in an insurance needs analysis.  
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Chapter 3 - Methods 
 Data and Sample 
 The population of interest in this study was adults in the United States that did not 
currently engage in one of the three examined financial behaviors. This study used a convenience 
sample recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (MTurk) with a Qualtrics-based 
survey (e.g., Hunt & Scheetz, 2019). MTurk has been used in financial planning-related primary 
research (e.g., Hoffmann & McNair, 2018; James & Routley, 2016) The goal number of 
respondents was approximately 1,200, which would result in approximately 400 per experiment 
and about 100 respondents per treatment (including control groups). Respondents were paid fifty 
cents for satisfactorily completing the survey.  
 MTurk samples have been used in an array of fields, such as psychology, behavioral 
economics, and consumer behavior (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013). A benefit of MTurk is 
that data collection can be done quickly and cost effectively. Naturally, then, a legitimate 
concern is that MTurk participants are unlike those found in traditional sample pools. Goodman 
et al. (2013) surveyed the literature and noted, however, that prior studies indicated that MTurk 
responses were demographically accurate (Rand, 2011); the psychometric properties of 
responses validated (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011); and MTurk samples can even be 
used for replicating classic experiments (e.g., Suri & Watts, 2011) and decision making research 
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Despite these showings, other valid concerns may be the 
effect of language or cultural barriers (for international participants)3 and the amount of time 
 
3 Though this is minimized—if not eliminated—in this study due to the requirement of being based in the United 
States and to be English speaking.  
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commitment invested by MTurkers (e.g., not paying sufficient attention to the study materials) 
(Goodman et al., 2013).  
Nevertheless, recent literature and studies indicate that MTurk samples are comparable to 
those from traditional sample pools (Hoffmann & McNair, 2018). Generally, MTurkers learn 
about MTurk from news articles, friends, and Internet searches (Goodman et al., 2013). 
Compared to the US population generally, MTurkers are not outliers in terms of demographics; 
though they tend to have slightly lower average income, are slightly younger, and tend to have 
fewer than average children (Goodman et al., 2013). But, compared to standard Internet samples 
generally, Buhrmester et al. (2011) found that a greater percentage of MTurkers were non-White 
and older than typical Internet samples. Mason and Suri (2012), moreover, found that MTurkers 
tend to be more diverse socio-demographically than traditional student sample pools—and 
commentators have consistently critiqued the reliance on college student samples (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Sears, 1986).  
Another valid concern for any MTurk-based survey was reliability (i.e., truthful and 
consistent responses). As applied at least to demographic responses, Rand (2011) found that 
more than 95% of MTurkers accurately reported their country location (as verified by IP address 
matching).  Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011) conducted a study investigating 
compensation and time completion levels. They found that compensation levels did not affect 
data quality, but could affect participation rates (i.e., data collection times). They also concluded 
that MTurk data met acceptable psychometric standards by comparing MTurk mean alpha 
reliability scores to traditional sample alphas and using test-retest reliabilities. Other researches 
have concluded similarly; for example, Goodman et al. (2013) concluded that “MTurk generally 
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provides an excellent opportunity for inexpensive and efficient behavioral data collection with 
reliable results” (p. 214).  
 In this study, to ameliorate some of the potential reliability concerns, MTurkers could 
only see and respond to the survey if they had completed 1,000 prior human intelligence tasks 
(HITs), had an approval rate of 99% or greater (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014), and reported 
being based in the United States. Limiting the sample pool to those MTurkers with a solid 
history of successful HIT completions, reduced, at least in part, the overall data quality risk.4 
Indeed, Peer et al. (2014) found that MTurkers with high reputations (in that study, above a 95% 
approval rating) rarely failed attention check questions, and that more productive high-reputation 
workers (those who completed more than 500 HITs) produced higher data quality (compared to 
those with fewer than 100 HITs). This current study, therefore, had even higher entrance limits.  
Another potential concern was that MTurkers would just click-through the survey 
without sufficiently reading the prompts. Some studies have used attention or comprehension 
checks to allay this concern; however, the literature is mixed (e.g., Vannette, 2017). In this 
survey, several strategies were employed to reduce this risk. First, the survey contained several 
timers in various question blocks (e.g., for the demographic portion and the regulatory focus 
block). If a respondent answered too quickly (indicating they did not fully read the questions), 
they were screened out of the survey (e.g., Hunt & Scheetz, 2019).5 Second, after the completion 
of the survey, surveys with a duration of less than 60 seconds (again, indicating a failure to 
earnestly read the questions and prompts), were listwise deleted.6  
 
4 In particular, this reduces potential “bot risk,” in which the respondents are really automated processes. There were 
six survey durations of less than 60 seconds that would have otherwise been included. 
5 In particular, the demographic block was set to seven seconds or less and the RFQ block was set to eight seconds 
or less; of course, a concern, in retrospect, was that these timers were too low. 
6 These respondents, however, were still paid as they completed the survey and submitted a code to MTurk.  
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 Another potential risk was “gaming” the survey eligibility screeners. That is, the survey 
population of interest was those people not presently engaging in one of the financial behaviors; 
these behaviors were screened early in the survey. If a respondent indicated they currently 
engaged in the behavior, they were screened out. To minimize the screener-gaming concern, 
screener questions were not indicated as such (so the respondents did not know which questions 
were acting as screeners) (Buchheit et al., 2018).7 Additionally, to prevent retakes (and to answer 
differently to the screeners), the “ballot box” feature was implemented in Qualtrics, which is 
designed to prevent survey retakes by the same respondent.8  
Data was collected in two batches, both of which took less than one week. The first batch 
consisted of about 10% of the total respondent count; the data was then reviewed to ensure that 
the survey worked correctly;9 the second batch consisted of the balance of the total respondent 
count.10 There were over 2,000 starts of the survey. Due to the different proportions of 
respondents that did not engage in one of the behaviors—that is, the proportion of those who did 
not budget was different than those who did not have a retirement plan—the data was reviewed 
periodically to ensure that the experiment blocks had roughly the same number of eligible 
respondents; to increase experiment block counts, the respective screener was showed to more 
respondents as needed (Hunt & Scheetz, 2019).  
Some respondents may have completed the survey but not properly submitted for 
payment; those responses were removed from the survey (as they could not be paid, their data 
 
7 The informed consent statement did expressly note that screener and eligibility questions were present early in the 
survey (e.g., Hunt & Scheetz, 2019).   
8 However, there may be ways to circumvent this function. That notwithstanding, the other quality measures also 
implicitly help here, too, namely requiring high quality MTurkers. Nevertheless, in future studies, using a two-stage 
survey process may reduce this risk further (e.g., Hunt & Scheetz, 2019).  
9 The survey was also tested before launching by the author, other PhD students, and simulated data.  
10 A custom qualification was created to ensure first batch respondents did not participate in the second batch.  
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was not used).11 Similarly, some respondents may have completed the survey, but entered the 
code wrong in MTurk (e.g., adding a hyphen, leaving off a digit, or pasting the code twice in the 
same space) (Hunt & Scheetz, 2019); those respondents were paid, and their data included if the 
responses could reasonably be matched with a submission. Some respondents may have 
completed the survey, though not clicked the last button on the survey completion screen, yet 
they submitted the generated code for payment in MTurk; these respondents were paid, and their 
data included. The final analytical sample survey consisted of 1,156 completed responses;12 the 
final respondent count by experiment block and treatment are found in Figure 1.     
 Experimental Design  
 The experimental design is shown in Figure 1 with actual experiment and treatment 
numbers. 
 
11 This was only about seven responses.  
12 This count is net of other data cleaning measures discussed later (namely regarding regulatory focus score).  
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Figure 1. Experimental Design 
 
Early in the survey, respondents were randomly given a screener question about engaging 
in one of the three behaviors; if they answered in the negative (i.e., did not currently engage in 
the behavior) and otherwise met eligibility questions, the survey continued. After answering 
demographic and regulatory state questions, respondents were then assigned to one of the three 
experiments, which corresponded to the earlier screener question). Within each experiment, they 
were randomly assigned to one of four treatments. The treatments consisted of a control, 
meaning that there was no explanation, description, or narrative of the underlying behavior; they 
were simply asked their intentions to engage in the behavior in the next six months. The fact-
based prompt conveyed sterile, non-charged factual based information about the behavior. The 
positive-valence narrative used a narrative that focused on the positives (gain state) of engaging 
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in the behavior. The negative-valence narrative used a narrative that focused on the negatives 
(loss state) of failing to engage in the behavior. Each of the narratives are provided below. After 
exposure to the treatment (or control), they were then asked questions about their intentions to 
engage in the behavior over the next six months.  
 Survey Design 
 The survey instrument had, in effect, 4 parts: (a) demographic questions, (b) regulatory 
focus questions, (c) treatment (narrative), and (d) post-treatment question about intentions. Each 
of those parts are now discussed. The full survey instrument is found in Appendix A. 
  Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables were the post-treatment questions about intentions; the 
dependent variable in each experiment was the intention to engage in the applicable financial 
behavior in the next six months; this was done on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 indicating 
very unlikely and 7 indicating very likely. The timeframe of six months was chosen to balance 
the concerns of providing sufficient time for the respondent to not be affected by scheduling 
concerns (like a timeframe of a few weeks may cause), but yet not long enough such that the 
respondent thinks eventually he or she will eventually engage in the behavior (e.g., a year or 
longer).  
  Independent Variables 
Standard demographic control variables were included, such as age (continuous), gender 
(male/female), income (categorical), race (categorical), ethnicity (categorical), marital status 
(categorical), employment status (categorical), education (categorical), and financially dependent 
children (continuous). The categorical variables were then coded using a dummy variable 
approach. These variables were included, in part, for the regression-based analyses in case 
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randomization did not work and to control for possible confounding effects. For example, 
disability insurance may be more salient for someone with full-time employment, and life 
insurance may be more salient for someone with children or a spouse. As well, retirement 
income planning may be more relevant to someone who was older and approaching retirement 
than someone who was younger.  
Due to data accuracy concerns, net worth was not included (i.e., trying to have 
respondents quickly and accurately sum assets across classes and subtract all debts). Also, 
because the dependent variable questions regarded financial planning behavior intentions, 
express questions about financial planning behaviors (such as having a retirement plan, regularly 
saving, having a budget, etc.) were intentionally not asked due to salience and priming concerns 
(which could—perhaps albeit subconsciously—then affect their later answers about related 
planning behavioral intentions) and related consistency bias concerns.  
 Financial knowledge was included as an independent variable.13 Measuring financial 
knowledge was achieved by using the “big three” financial knowledge questions designed by 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011). Financial knowledge was important to include as a covariate 
because financial knowledge is generally associated with positive financial behaviors, such as 
retirement planning (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011). Other variables—such as 
education, for example—are generally not good proxies for financial knowledge (Lusardi & 
Mitchell, 2011).  
The motivating principles behind Lusardi and Mitchell’s (2011) financial knowledge 
questions were simplicity, relevance, brevity, and capacity to differentiate. The questions were 
 
13 Financial knowledge is different than financial literacy (Huston, 2010; Seay, Kim, & Heckman, 2016). The latter 
includes financial knowledge, but also incorporates the ability and confidence to implement that knowledge—that is, 
there is both a knowledge dimension and an application dimension (Huston, 2010; Seay et al., 2016).  
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purposefully not numerically or computationally difficult so that they may be used in various 
survey modalities (such as face-to-face or telephonically). These questions asked about interest 
compounding, inflation, and risk diversification. These questions have become the empirical 
benchmark to measure financial literacy, and they have been implemented in the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), the American 
Life Panel, and the Financial Capability Study (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011). The questions 
answered correctly were treated as a continuous variable.14 
Relatedly, subjective financial knowledge was included by asking the respondent on a 7-
point scale to assess his or her overall knowledge about finances (with 1 indicating very low 
knowledge and 7 indicating very high knowledge).  
 Financial strain was included as an independent variable. Financial strain may be relevant 
because if respondents have difficulty in their day-to-day financial context (such as paying bills) 
it may be that they are less likely to engage in longer-term or more advanced financial planning 
behaviors. Financial strain was operationalized by asking respondents, in a typical month, how 
difficult is it for them to cover their expenses and pay all their bills. A 5-point Likert-type scale 
was used, with responses ranging from 1 (not at all difficult) to 5 (completely difficult); financial 
strain was indicated by a binary variable for those providing a response of 4 (very difficult) or 
higher.  
 Regulatory focus was assessed by the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ) (Higgins et 
al., 2001). This scale is routinely used to measure regulatory focus (e.g., Camacho, Higgins, & 
 
14 “Don’t know” (DK) responses were coded as incorrect answers. Although this is the traditional approach, recent 
literature as applied to financial knowledge examines this practice (Kim & Mountain, 2019). The effects of DK 
responses are perhaps most relevant to measuring intervention effects (e.g., effectiveness of a financial education 
intervention—that is, where financial knowledge is the dependent variable). Here, however, that was not the focus 
of this research. Moreover, due to the underlying randomization present in this study, any unobserved effects were 
assumed to be diffused across treatments.  
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Luger, 2003; Cesario & Higgins, 2008; Higgins et al., 2001; Molden & Higgins, 2004). This is 
an 11-item questionnaire, with two psychometrically distinct subscales, that asks how frequently 
specific events have occurred during the respondent’s life, with 5-point Likert type responses; for 
example, “How often have you accomplished things that got you ‘psyched’ to work even 
harder?” and “Do you often do well at different things that you try?” (Higgins et al., 2001). The 
promotion subscale measures subjective histories of promotion successes (6 questions), and the 
prevention subscale measures subjective histories of prevention successes (5 questions). 
 In describing the initial psychometric testing of the scale, Higgins et al. (2001) explained 
the scale had good internal reliability, with Cronbach’s alphas of 0.73 for the promotion scale 
and 0.80 for the prevention scale. Confirmatory factor analysis (with 268 undergraduate 
participants) showed an excellent goodness of fit index at 0.95 (0.93 for adjusted goodness of fit) 
(Higgins et al., 2001). A test-retest reliability study (with 71 undergraduate participants) showed 
that the promotion scale had a 0.79 correlation (p < 0.0001) and the prevention scale had a 0.81 
correlation (p < 0.0001) (Higgins et al., 2001). Higgins et al. (2001) also explored the convergent 
and discriminant validity of the RFQ.  
 Predominant regulatory focus was computed by subtracting the prevention subscale score 
from the promotion subscale score (Camacho et al., 2003; Cesario & Higgins, 2008; Molden & 
Higgins, 2004). The resulting index (or difference) score was a continuous measure, “with 
positive numbers indicating predominant promotion focus and negative numbers indicating 
predominant prevention focus” (Cesario & Higgins, 2008, p. 417). Like Cesario, Grant, and 
Higgins (2004) and others (e.g., Memmert, Unkelbach, Ganns, 2010; Pula, Parks, & Ross, 2014; 
Tam, Bagozzi, & Spanjol, 2010), a median split of the difference scores was then used to classify 
respondents as predominantly prevention- or promotion-focused as compared to other 
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respondents (i.e., a sample-relative median split). This method—median splitting the difference 
scores—can help mitigate small cell risk (i.e., not enough respondents of a particular focus). 
Cesario et al. (2004) also note other benefits to the median-split RFQ approach; first, making it 
categorical can simplify the analysis; and second, because the analysis and hypotheses at issue 
here regard fit (or nonfit) with a particular message framing, this, too, paired nicely with a 
categorical approach. Thus, in addition to the pure RFQ index score, a binary variable was 
created based on the RFQ median split, with respondents coded as one if promotion-focused 
(above the median scores) and zero if below the median.15 
 Treatments 
 There were three experiments, corresponding to the three behaviors: (a) retirement 
savings and income planning, (b) cash-flow/budget planning, and (c) insurance needs analysis. 
For each behavior, there were three treatments plus control—a positive-valence narrative, a 
negative-valence narrative, and a fact-based explanation. As shown in Table 3.1, and in line with 
Han and Fink (2012), each of the treatments were written to be similar in terms of number of 
words, number of sentences, average words per sentence, and Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease and 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level. In each experiment, care was taken to ensure the same context and 
emotional appeal (e.g., effect on family or children); to minimize any subliminal gender or name 
effect, the protagonist’s gender and her name were the same in each treatment narrative. Emotive 
appeals (like worry and stress) were not included in the fact-based treatment.   
 
 
 
15 Those that scored exactly at the median (here the median was zero) were removed from the analysis, as there were 
not enough respondents to be an independent reference group (i.e., neither relatively promotion- nor prevention-
focused).  
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Treatment Narratives   
 
Experiment 1 
Retirement   
Experiment 2 
Budgeting  
Experiment 3 
Insurance  
 PN NN FB  PN NN FB  PN NN FB 
Number of words 92 98 57  119 122 63  113 114 56 
Number of paragraphs 1 1 1  1 1 1  1 1 1 
Number of sentences 7 7 5  8 8 5  7 7 5 
Avg. words per sentence 13.1 14 11.4  14.8 15.2 12.6  16.1 16.2 11.2 
Avg. characters per word 4.2 4.5 4.5  4.4 4.4 4.8  4.7 4.4 5 
Flesch Reading Ease 74.8 63.1 67.6  66.8 71.7 53  59.1 72 50.4 
Flesch-Kincaid  
Grade Level 6 7.9 6.6  7.2 6.6 8.9  7.8 6 9 
Note: PN = positive narrative; NN = negative narrative; FB = fact-based.  
All calculations performed by Microsoft Word.  
 
As shown, within each experimental block, the positive-valence and negative-valence 
narratives were roughly equivalent in terms of total words, sentence count, and measures of 
reading difficulty. However, across the blocks, the fact-based information was necessarily 
shorter, as it did not need to develop a plot or other narrative elements. Nevertheless, they were 
all still similar in terms of reading ease and reading grade level.  
 Moreover, a relevant issue noted in the framing literature is whether the exact phrasing of 
the gain- or loss-framed appeals acts as a moderator. As noted by O’Keefe and Jensen (2006) 
and others, these appeals can each take two forms, resulting in a 2x2 array of possibilities, i.e, 
whether the outcome is described as desirable (or not), and whether the outcome is attained (or 
avoided). For example, O’Keefe and Jensen (2006) provide an example of a gain-framed appeal 
as “If you perform the advocated action, desirable outcome X will be obtained,” or “If you 
perform the advocated action, undesirable outcome Y will be avoided” (p. 5). On the other hand, 
a loss-framed appeal can take the form of “If you do not perform the advocated action, 
undesirable outcome X will be avoided,” or “If you do not perform the advocated action, 
undesirable outcome Y will be obtained” (p. 5). It is admittedly unclear whether these different 
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operationalizations matter; some evidence indicates that they do not (Devos-Comby & Salovey, 
2002). Nevertheless, to ameliorate any effect in this vein, the treatment/narrative wording was 
consistent in its wording across narratives. The treatment language is provided below.  
 Retirement Income Planning (Prevention behavior) 
Positive-valence narrative 
Sally is a recently retired schoolteacher. She planned for her retirement. She set a 
savings goal based on what she wanted her retirement to look like. Based on that 
goal, she saved each month to meet it, and her retirement is now funded. Now that 
she is in retirement and has enough saved, she does not worry about making ends 
meet. She does not stress about money matters. She is able to do the things she 
wants to in retirement, such as travel, take on new hobbies, and visit with her 
family.  
Negative-valence narrative 
Sally is a recently retired schoolteacher. She did not plan for her retirement. She 
did not have a retirement savings goal based on what she wanted her retirement to 
look like. Without a specific goal, she did not save regularly each month, and her 
retirement is not funded. Now that she is in retirement and does not have enough 
saved, she constantly worries about making ends meet. She regularly stresses 
about money matters. She is not able to do the things she wants to in retirement, 
such as travel, take on new hobbies, and visit with her family.  
Fact-based 
There are several steps to planning for retirement. You set a goal about your 
retirement. Based on that, you set a savings goal. You then save over your 
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working years to meet that goal. Properly saving for retirement will allow you to 
do those things you want in retirement, such as travel, hobbies, and visiting with 
family.  
 Cash Flow and Budgeting (Treatment behavior) 
Positive-valence narrative 
Sally is a schoolteacher. Money is tight, so she regularly monitors her monthly 
income and expenses. Based on that, she has been able to identify expenses that 
she can reduce and free-up additional monthly cash. She has established a budget. 
Due to this planning, she has been able to set aside funds for emergencies; if she 
had a sudden car repair or lost her job, she is comforted by knowing she has an 
emergency savings fund. With the budget, she is starting to save for long-term 
financial goals. Because of the monthly budget, she knows she can make ends 
meet each month. She does not regularly stress or worry about money matters 
because she has a plan in place.  
Negative-valence narrative 
Sally is a schoolteacher. Money is tight, but she does not regularly monitor her 
monthly income and expenses. Based on that, after her monthly expenses, she 
does not have extra additional monthly cash. She does not have an established 
budget. Due to this lack of planning, she has not been able to set aside funds for 
emergencies; she does not know where the money would come from if she had an 
unexpected car repair bill or if she lost her job. Without a budget, she is not 
saving for long-term financial goals. With no budget, she does not know whether 
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she can make ends meet each month. She regularly stresses and worries about 
money matters because she has no plan in place.  
Fact-based 
Budgeting is the process of monitoring monthly income and expenses. With a 
budget in place, you can identify expenses that can be eliminated. This may free-
up additional cash each month. Budgeting may allow you to set aside funds for an 
emergency, like an unexpected car repair bill or loss of a job. Budgeting may also 
help you start saving for long-term financial goals.  
 Insurance Needs Analysis (Detection behavior) 
Positive-valence narrative 
Sally is a school teacher. She is working with a financial advisor. A part of that 
process is insurance needs analysis—making sure she has the insurance protection 
she needs. Working with her financial advisor revealed that Sally did not have 
adequate insurance in place. She needed to increase her car insurance; take out a 
disability insurance policy (in case she became disabled); increase her life 
insurance policy (for the benefit of her kids); and take out an additional policy to 
protect her home and other assets. Now that she has identified these issues, she 
can fix them. Knowing that she is now protected, she does not worry and stress 
about these issues.  
Negative-valence narrative 
Sally is a school teacher. She does not work with a financial advisor. She has 
never analyzed her insurance needs, which would make sure she the insurance 
protection she needs. She does not know if she has adequate insurance in place. 
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She is unsure if her car is adequately protected; she is unsure if she is protected if 
she becomes disabled; she is unsure if her current life insurance is enough for her 
kids; and she does not know if her home and other assets are protected. Not 
knowing if she has enough in place, she does not know what needs fixed. Due to 
this uncertainty, she regularly worries and stresses about these issues.  
Fact-based 
An insurance needs analysis reviews if you have enough insurance. You review 
your current insurance policies. You also consider insurance you do not have but 
may need. Types of insurance include automobile, disability, life, casualty, and 
others. An insurance needs analysis is a first step in finding gaps and issues so 
that they can be fixed.  
Missing Data 
 Respondents could stop and leave the survey at any time (albeit without pay). Those who 
started the survey, but did not finish, were not examined; only fully completed surveys were 
analyzed. Because no intrusive or personally invasive information was sought in the survey, 
survey attrition was treated as random and considered to not bias the results. Moreover, 
preferences to skip or not answer a question (or a “prefer not to say” answer) were not included 
in the survey design. Some fields use manipulation checks or trap questions to identify 
respondents not earnestly reading and responding to the questions. However, due to the 
possibility of injected bias, attention checks or trap questions were not used (e.g., Vannette, 
2017). For example, Anduiza and Galais (2017) noted that manipulation checks may “aggravate 
the typical sample biases that plague nonprobabilistic samples” (p. 510). And, as noted earlier, 
Peer et al. (2014) found that MTurkers with high reputations rarely failed attention check 
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questions. Similarly, Hauser, Ellsworth, and Gonzalez (2018) also noted that manipulation 
checks may affect a respondent’s thought or emotional processes. As noted above, other failed 
quality checks (e.g., less than 60 seconds duration time) were listwise deleted. Consequently, 
there was no missing data.   
 Statistical Analyses 
 ANOVA & ANCOVA 
The statistical analysis proceeded in several steps. First, descriptive statistics were 
examined for the survey as a whole and then individually for each experiment. Then, for each 
experiment, various statistical techniques were used. To determine mean differences in financial 
planning intentions by treatment groups, a one-way ANOVA was used. Because the treatment 
groups were unbalanced, a general linear model-based ANOVA technique was used, which was 
based on the basic linear model in Equation 2 (SAS, 2018a). 
 - = 	./ + 0 (2) 
Consequently, the model used . as a (n x p) design matrix16 and a vector 1 (n x 1) of 
dependent variables (SAS, 2018a). The normal equations, .2./ = .21, were solved using a 
generalized inverse, .2.34, which produced a solution, 5 = (.2.)36.2- (SAS, 2018a). 
Naturally, since this was a least squares approach of estimation, errors were assumed to be 
uncorrelated with identical variances, which produce unbiased estimates (SAS, 2018a). GLM-
based standard errors require errors to normally distributed (to be valid), but they are good 
approximations generally in the absence of normality (SAS, 2018a). Moreover, if the errors are 
 
16 The design matrix changes depending on the parameterization of the model, e.g., a one-way or two-way ANOVA 
(or other linear model); in short, a column is created in the design matrix for each effect in the model (SAS, 2018a).  
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normally distributed, the estimates are the equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimates (SAS, 
2018a).  
 To test for homogeneity, Levene’s test was used, which performed a one-way ANOVA 
on the absolute values of the residuals (or squared residuals) as found in Equation 3 (Milliken & 
Johnson, 2009; SAS, 2018a).  
 789: = (+89 − +<8): (3) 
A significant F test here, then, provided evidence that the residuals for one treatment was larger 
than the others (i.e., variances were not equal) (Milliken & Johnson, 2009). The Brown and 
Forsythe (1974) method was analyzed, too; here, this method is similar to Levene’s test, but used 
group medians instead (Milliken & Johnson, 2009; SAS, 2018a).  
If significant differences in treatment means were found, pairwise comparisons of group 
means were conducted. Contrasts were used to compare narrative effects generally to the control 
and fact-based treatments (i.e., an average of the narrative treatments compared to the fact-based 
group and control groups, separately). Due to the unbalanced nature of the data, least squares-
means (LS-means) were used for all mean-based comparisons. Because multiple and 
simultaneous comparisons were made, moreover, various adjustments were implemented to 
control the error rates, namely the Tukey-Kramer method (Kramer, 1956; Milliken & Johnson, 
2009; SAS, 2018a). The Tukey-Kramer method rejected the null hypothesis of mean equivalency 
if 
 =>̂8 − >̂9= > *A,C,DEFGH: I 4JK + 4JLM  (4) 
where *A,C,D was the upper percentile of a Studentized range statistic (Milliken & Johnson, 2009, 
pp. 49-50). Because a control group was also present, Dunnett’s procedure was used, too, which 
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controlled for the family-wise error rate (Milliken & Johnson, 2009). Under this test—which is 
similar to Tukey-Kramer—a treatment mean was different from the control mean if 
 |>̂8 − >̂O| > PA,C,DQRS: I 1U8 + 1UOM (5) 
where >̂O was the control mean and PA,C,D was the upper percentile of a “many-to-one t-statistic” 
(Milliken & Johnson, 2009, p. 53-54).  
 Similar to the one-way ANOVA, a two-way ANOVA was also conducted that 
incorporated regulatory focus (promotion or prevention) in addition to a treatment group effect. 
The model and formulas were the same as the above, but now the design matrix was different to 
accommodate the additional treatment effect. Due to the unbalanced nature, Type III sums of 
squares were examined, which were not functions of cell counts (SAS, 2018a). Main effects and 
interactions effects (with regulatory focus) were considered. 
 To control for the effect of RFQ difference (in case the randomization did not equalize 
the distribution of promotion and prevention respondents or their numerical distribution), an 
ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) was performed. ANCOVA combined elements of regression 
and ANOVA and adjusted for the covariate (here, RFQ differences), which was now introduced 
into the linear model (set forth above) (Rutherford, 2011; SAS, 2018a). Main effects and 
interactions effects (with regulatory focus) were considered.  
 OLS Regression 
 Next, ordinary least squares regressions were examined that predicted financial planning 
intentions, which took the following matrix form 
 - = 	.V + W	 (6) 
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where - was the (n x 1) vector of response variables, . was the (n x k) matrix of predictor 
variables (including intercept), V was the (k x 1) vector of parameters to be estimated, and W was 
the (n x 1) vector of error terms (disturbances) (Mendenhall & Sincich, 2012; Wooldridge, 
2016). With lease squares estimation, then, VX minimized the sum of the squared residuals as 
found in Equation 7. 
 /X = (.2.)36.2- (7) 
And, of course, the model assumes that it was linear it its parameters, there was no perfect 
collinearity (i.e., . was full rank), and the error had a conditional mean of zero with no serial 
correlation and homoscedastic variance (i.e., Var(W|.) = σ:]J , where ]J was the (n x n) identity 
matrix) (Wooldridge, 2016).  
Moreover, for the OLS regression, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors were used, 
which were based off the heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrix of VX, which took the form 
 ^&_`ab/Xc = 	 (.2.)36 deWGfghfi6 jf2jfk (.2.)36	 (8) 
where diagonal elements were the White standard errors (Wooldridge, 2010). Importantly, as 
noted by Wooldridge (2010), these errors were “asymptotically valid in the presence of any kind 
of heteroskedasticity, including homoskedasticity” (p. 61). Additionally, residual-versus-fitted 
plots were examined.  
 Nonparametric Analyses 
 The above methods were all parametric analyses, which, among other things, assumed 
that the response variable (financial planning intentions) was continuous. The response variable 
here, however, was Likert-type data (on a seven-point scale). Although it is common in social 
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science literature to treat this type of data as continuous, nonparametric techniques were 
analyzed too for additional robustness (confirmatory analyses).  
 The first nonparametric test conducted was the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test; this is the 
nonparametric equivalent of the one-way ANOVA (Korosteleva, 2014). The null hypothesis here 
was that all location parameters are the same (across k samples) and the alternative hypothesis 
was that they are not the same. In a Kruskal-Wallis test, all observations are pooled together and 
ranked (in increasing order; with ties assigned to the average rank it would have received had 
there been no tie) (Korosteleva, 2014). Assuming there were no ties, the H statistic was 
computed as: 
 l =	 12n(n + 1)eo8:U8 − 3(n + 1)q8i4  (9) 
where o8 denotes the sum of ranks in the rth sample (Korosteleva, 2014). In the event of a tie (u 
sets of ties), however, the formula was as follows: 
 l =	 v 12n(n + 1)∑ o8:U8 	− 	3(n + 1)q8i4 x1	 −	∑ (y8z − y8){8i4nz − n  
(10) 
where y8 denotes the number of ties in the rth set (Korosteleva, 2014). Using a large sample 
approximation (i.e., n > 30), the critical values follow a chi-square distribution (Corder & 
Foreman, 2014).  
 If the Kruskal-Wallis test was significant, then post-hoc tests were needed to isolate the 
treatment differences, which were now sets of two-sample comparisons. As such, Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests were performed for each pair of samples. This test pooled the samples, ranked the 
observation, and computed the test statistics, W, which was the sum of the assigned ranks in the 
smaller sample. For large samples, the test statistic is approximately normally distributed 
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(Korosteleva, 2014), and, in particular, a standardized test statistic, z, was used with an 
asymptotic standard normal distribution (under the null hypothesis) (SAS, 2018b).  
 Logistic Regression (Cumulative, Multinomial, and Binary) 
 Lastly, logistic regressions were performed. For each experiment, a cumulative, 
multinomial, and binary logit were examined. These were performed—like the nonparametric 
techniques—because of the Likert-type nature of the response variable. The cumulative 
(sometimes referred to as an “ordered” logit) was appropriate for an ordered categorical variable, 
like a Likert-type response variable (Allison, 2012). The cumulative logit took the following 
form: 
 log I KL43KLM = 	Ä8 + 	Vj8,					Å = 1,… , É − 1  (11) 
where Vj8 = Ñ4'84 + ⋯+	Ñq'8q and Ü89 = ∑ #8{9{i4 , where Ü89 was the cumulative 
probabilities (i.e., that respondent i is in the jth category or higher) (Allison, 2012). The model 
was estimated by maximum likelihood (Allison, 2012). A critical assumption in the cumulative 
logit, though, was the proportional odds assumption, which regarded whether the effects 
(coefficients) of the predictor variables were the same across potential ways to dichotomize the 
response variable. In other words, whether the coefficients were invariant across 
dichotomizations (Allison, 2012). If this assumption was rejected, a cumulative logit was 
inappropriate, as there was no guarantee that the effects were consistent across levels of the 
response variable. To ameliorate that, the intentions were the collapsed into three categories 
(high, medium, and low), such that the proportional odds assumptions tended to not be violated. 
Indeed, the cumulative logit, with the three categories, was the ideal approach here, given the 
Likert-type response variable, but yet still being able to distinguish between varying levels of 
intentions.  
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Also, in those cases in which the proportional odds assumption was violated, a 
multinomial logit was examined. The multinomial logit took the following form: 
 log á#89#8àâ = 	V9j8,					Å = 1,… , É − 1 (12) 
where j8 was a column vector of predictor variables and V9 was a row vector of coefficients 
(Allison, 2012). Furthermore, #89 represents the probability that respondent i was in the jth 
category and was defined as: 
 #89 = 	 äVLjK1 + ∑ äVãjKà34qi4 ,					Å = 1,… , É − 1 (13) 
which can also be expressed as,  
 #8à = 	 11 + ∑ äVãjKà34qi4 			 (14) 
because probabilities must sum to unity (Allison, 2012). Consequently, after #89 and #8à were 
determined, then, for any comparison between categories (levels) j and k, the logit equation was 
as noted in Equation 15 (Allison, 2012). 
 log á#89#8àâ = 	 (V9−	Vq)j8 (15) 
 A binary logit was also examined to model high intentions (defined as an intention score 
of six or seven) to non-high intentions. The binary logit took the form of 
 log I #81 − #8M = 	Ä + 	Vj8		 (16) 
where Vj8 = Ñ4'84 + ⋯+	Ñq'8q, that is, j8 was column vector of predictor variables and V was 
a row vector of coefficients (Allison, 2012).   
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Chapter 4 - Results 
A complete descriptive table for the entire sample and by experiment is shown below 
(Table 4.1). Examining the subsamples for each experiment shows that each experiment was 
roughly equivalent to the sample as a whole. Looking at the entire sample, there was roughly an 
even split between males and females and the average age is 39. The vast majority (82%) of 
respondents were White, with Black being the next most common reported demographic 
(7.27%); the vast majority, moreover, reported non-Hispanic ethnicity (94%). A substantial 
percentage of respondents (90% plus) reported having at least some college experience, with 
over half reporting an earned degree (at any level). Almost half of the respondents reported being 
married, with single being the next highest reported marital status. The majority of respondents 
(57%) reported having full-time employment and a decent percentage (16.7%) reporting self-
employment. The majority of respondents reported earning less than $60,000 in household 
income (with nearly 15% reporting annual income in excess of $100,000).   
About 16% of respondents indicated financial strain. The average subjective financial 
knowledge score was 4.21, which was slightly more than the center response of 4. On average, 
they got two of the three financial knowledge questions correct. Of the three questions, 90% 
answered the compound interest question correctly; the inflation and stock risk questions were 
each answered correctly by approximately 80% of the respondents. 69% of respondents 
answered all three questions correctly and about 3.3% answered none of them correctly.17  
 
 
17 9.52% answered one question correctly; 18.51% answered two questions correctly.  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics     
 
Entire Sample  
(n=1156) 
Experiment 1  
(n=367) 
Experiment 2  
(n=389) 
Experiment 3 
 (n=400) 
Variable Prop. (%) M (SD) Prop. (%) M (SD) Prop. (%) M Prop. (%) M (SD) 
Age  
39.2 
(12.14)  
38.05 
(11.7)  
39.88 
(12.47)  
39.6 
(12.2) 
Male 48.79  40.87  50.39  54.5  
Female 51.21  59.13  49.61  45.5  
Race         
   White 82.44  82.56  80.98  83.75  
   Black 7.27  7.36  7.46  7  
   Asian 6.4  5.45  9  4.75  
   Other 3.89  4.63  1.54  4.5  
Ethnicity         
   Hispanic 6.06  5.45  4.37  8.25  
   NonHisp 93.94  94.55  95.63  91.75  
Education         
   No HS 0.52  0.82  0.51  0.25  
   High School 8.91  11.99  7.71  7.25  
   Some Coll. 22.58  22.89  22.11  22.75  
   Assoc. 11.51  11.99  9.77  12.75  
   Bach. 40.92  39.78  41.13  41.75  
   Post-Grad 15.57  12.53  18.77  15.25  
Marital Status         
   Married 45.5  44.96  43.96  47.5  
   Single 42.91  42.78  45.5  40.5  
   Divorced 10.64  11.17  9  11.75  
   Widow 0.95  1.09  1.54  0.25  
Children  .73 (1.10)  .74 (1.10)  .69 (1.02)  .75 (1.2) 
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Employment         
   Full-Time 56.83  54.22  53.98  62  
   Part-Time 11.51  11.99  13.37  9.25  
   Self-Emp. 16.7  18.53  15.94  15.75  
   Unemployed 10.29  10.90  11.05  9  
   Retired 4.67  4.36  5.66  4  
Income         
   < 20k 13.67  15.26  14.91  11  
   20 to 40k 22.06  24.25  21.85  20.25  
   40 to 60k 23.27  23.71  20.57  25.5  
   60 to 80k 16.26  17.71  14.4  16.75  
   80 to 100k 9.95  7.63  10.8  11.25  
   Above 100k 14.79  11.44  17.48  15.25  
Financial Strain  15.66  17.44  17.48  12.25  
Subj Fin. Know   4.21 (1.3)  4.10 (1.3)  4.21 (1.3)  4.32 (1.2) 
Obj Fin. Know  2.53 (.80)  2.43 (.86)  2.61 (.77)  2.54 (.76) 
Prom. Score  3.45 (.68)  3.42 (.66)  3.45 (.71)  3.47 (.68) 
Prev. Score  3.43 (.87)  3.41 (.88)  3.43 (.90)  3.47 (.85) 
RFQ Difference  .01 (1.04)  .01 (1.02)  .03 (1.03)  .00 (1.07) 
Promotion  49.13  49.05  49.1  49.25  
Prevention  50.87  50.95  50.9  50.75  
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 The average promotion scale and prevention scale scores were roughly the same, each 
about 3.4. Subtracting the prevention score from the promotion score meant that about 49% had 
positive difference scores, indicting a chronic promotion focus; about 51% had negative 
difference scores, indicating a chronic prevention focus; there were 36 respondents that had a 
difference score of zero, meaning they were neither chronic-promotion nor chronic-prevention.18 
The promotion scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .73, and the prevention scale had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .86, both of which were in acceptable ranges.  
 Research Question 1: Retirement Savings Planning 
 The first research question (Experiment 1, Retirement Savings Planning) concerned the 
effect of message framing on intentions to engage in retirement planning. In particular, whether 
narrative messages influenced these intentions (relative to a fact-based presentation or no 
information). Furthermore, whether the valence (positive or negative) of that narrative influenced 
intentions differently, which may be based on the underlying behavior. Then, whether that 
framing effect, if any, may be influenced by individual characteristics, such as regulatory 
orientation. Related to regulatory orientation, moreover, whether regulatory fit can enhance the 
appropriate framing effect—that is, the framing influence may be different depending on 
regulatory orientation (due to regulatory fit). In other words, looking at the main effects of 
narratives and regulatory orientation and then their interactions.  
 
18 Moreover, the median of the difference scores was zero before any listwise deletion; therefore, performing a 
median split would not have changed the classifications. Of the 36 respondents, 12 were from Experiment 1, 7 from 
Experiment 2, and 17 from Experiment 3. Theses respondents, moreover, were removed since they had neither a 
prevention nor promotion focus, which is central to many of the hypotheses examined. As well, their respective 
sizes would not have served as a reasonable reference group size (relative to those that were either promotion or 
prevention focused). Table 4.1 was presented after deletion of those respondents (as were the sample counts in 
Chapter 3).  
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 ANOVA and ANCOVA 
 The first hypothesis (H1a) was that narrative message framing will be positively 
associated with intentions to actively plan for having sufficient retirement savings. That is, there 
will be a difference in treatment means. To examine that preliminarily, a one-way ANOVA was 
analyzed.  Table 4.2 reports the one-way ANOVA for Experiment 1.  
Table 4.2 Experiment 1 One-Way ANOVA    
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 6.24 2.081 0.68 0.565 
Error 363 1110.87 3.06   
Corrected Total 366 1117.12    
 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of the group variance was not rejected at the 1% (F(3, 
363) = .63, p = .59), and the Brown and Forsythe test for homogeneity was not rejected either, 
F(3, 363) = .59, p = .62). The ANOVA showed a lack of a significant difference at the 5% level 
for the four groups, F(3, 363) = .68, p = .56. This indicated that the null hypothesis that all group 
intention means were the same cannot be rejected. Pairwise comparison of group means19 using 
Tukey-Kramer adjustments for multiple comparisons produced similar results: none of the means 
were significantly different from any other. This means a lack of support for H1a. Indeed, this 
also means that there likely is not evidence in favor the other hypotheses, as they imply (and 
depend upon) a framing effect.  
 Also, to examine the effect of narrative message framing (compared to the control or to a 
fact-based prompt), a contrast was performed to compare the average effect of framing (positive 
and negative) to the control group. That contrast similarly reported no significant difference in 
intentions, t(363) = .63, p = .53, again indicating a lack of support for H1a. Similarly, a contrast 
 
19 Due to the unbalanced nature of the treatment groups, least-squares means were used for all mean comparisons.  
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comparing the average effect of framing to the fact-based group did not result in a significant 
difference, t(363) = 1.41, p = .16. Moreover, because there was a control group, mean 
differences using Dunnett’s adjustment was performed, too; there were no significant mean 
differences compared to the control group. This, too, indicated a lack of support for H1a and the 
related hypotheses.  
 Similarly, the one-way ANOVA and contrasts inform hypotheses H1b and H1c. 
Hypothesis H1b posited that, due to the underlying nature of retirement planning (an analogy to 
the prevention behavior in the health literature), positive-valence (gain) narrative message 
framing will be positively associated with intentions to actively plan for having sufficient 
retirement income. Here, however, there was no treatment effect, indicating a lack of support for 
hypothesis H1b. Similarly, hypothesis H1c advanced that negative-valence (loss) narrative 
message framing will be positively associated with intentions to actively plan for having 
sufficient retirement savings. Again, without a difference in treatment means, there was no 
support for this hypothesis. And, due to this being a prevention behavior, H1d posited that, 
positive-valence (gain) narrative framing will result in higher intentions to engage in an 
insurance needs analysis than negative-valence (loss) framing—in other words, the gain framing 
would be more effective than loss framing. Because there was not a treatment effect (relative to 
the control), this, too, indicated a lack of support for hypothesis H1d.  
 The one-way ANOVA was also performed on subsamples of promotion-only and 
prevention-only respondents, which informed hypotheses H1e and H1f. Hypothesis H1e posited 
that, for promotion-focus respondents, the positive-valence will be more effective than the 
negative-valence narrative due to regulatory fit. For promotion-focus only, the model was not 
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significant, F(3, 176) = .37, p = .78. Similarly, none of the pairwise mean comparisons were 
significant. This indicated a lack of support for H1e.  
Hypothesis H1f posited that, for prevention-focus respondents, the negative-valence 
narrative would be more effective due to regulatory fit. For prevention-focus only, likewise, the 
model was not significant, F(3, 183) = .77, p = .51; and none of the pairwise mean comparisons 
were significant. This, too, indicated a lack of support for H1f. For each subsample analysis, the 
same contrasts from the main one-way ANOVA were estimated; in each case, the contrasts were 
not significant at the 5% level.   
 Instead of a one-way ANOVA on the complete sample and then a subsample basis, 
another approach could be a two-way ANOVA that incorporated regulatory focus. Table 4.3 
reports a two-way ANOVA (with Type III sums of squares) that incorporated both treatment 
group and chronic promotion or chronic prevention focus (with interactions).  
Table 4.3 Experiment 1 Two-Way ANOVA (Treatment x Chronic Focus) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 5.80 1.934 0.63 .60 
Focus 1 4.721 4.721 1.54 .216 
Interaction 3 5.074 1.691 0.55 0.648 
Error 359 1101.17 3.067   
Corrected Total 366 1117.12    
 
This model was not significant, F(7, 359) = .74, p = .64. Like the one-way ANOVA, this 
indicated a lack of support of H1a (framing effect), H1b (positive framing effect), H1c (negative 
framing effect), H1d (positive framing > negative framing), H1e and H1f (the regulatory focus 
hypotheses). In short, the framing effect, in this experiment, did not differ for regulatory focus 
(and, there was not even a framing effect to begin with).  
However, perhaps the framing effect (and the regulatory fit phenomenon) was being 
influenced by the strength of the regulatory focus (and the variation was not being addressed by 
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the random assignment). To control for that, Table 4.4 reports the one-way ANCOVA (with 
Type III sums of squares) for Experiment 1 using the RFQ difference as a covariate (and 
interacted).  
Table 4.4 Experiment 1 ANCOVA (RFQ Difference Covariate) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 6.57 2.19 0.72 0.54 
RFQ Diff 1 3.51 3.51 1.16 .28 
Interaction 3 18.52 6.17 2.03 0.11 
Error 359 1089.02 3.03   
Corrected Total 366 1117.12    
 
There was neither a main nor interaction effect, F(7, 359) = 1.32, p = .24. Because the model 
was not significant, additional analyses were not conducted.  
Relatedly, and similar to the analysis for the one-way ANOVA, another analysis of 
interest was whether this changed for examining only promotion- or prevention-focused 
respondents as subsamples, controlling for the effect, if any, of RFQ strength. Therefore, an 
ANCOVA was analyzed on a subsample basis (type of focus). For promotion-focus-only 
respondents, the ANCOVA (with Type III sums of squares) table is presented in Table 4.5. Here, 
the F-test was not significant at the 5% level, F(7, 172) = 1.85, p = .081.  
Table 4.5 Experiment 1 ANCOVA (RFQ Difference Covariate), Promotion Only 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment effect 3 6.911 2.30 0.81 0.491 
RFQ Diff effect 1 7.58 7.58 2.66 0.105 
Interaction 3 24.63 8.21 2.88 0.038 
Error 172 490.78 2.85   
Corrected Total 179 527.66    
 
Nevertheless, further examining the model—because it was significant at the 10% 
level—the interaction was significant at the 5% level, F(3, 172) = 2.88, p = .04. Consequently, a 
traditional ANCOVA model cannot be used because the slopes for each group were not the 
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same. Instead, separate slopes needed to be estimated for each treatment. Thus, mean differences 
were analyzed with Tukey-Kramer adjustments at two levels of absolute RFQ differences of 1 
and 2 (i.e., at increasing differences in chronic promotion strength). Here, there were two 
significant mean differences, neither of which were at an RFQ difference level of 1. First, at 
RFQ difference level of 2, the positive-valence narrative treatment had a 2.13 higher intention 
score compared to the fact-based treatment, 95% CI [.15, 4.11], p = 0.03. Second, at RFQ 
difference of 2, the fact-based treatment had a 2.30 lower, 95% CI [-4.46, -.14], intention score 
relative to the control-group (p = .03); this was confirmed, too, using Dunnett’s adjustment (p = 
.017).  
The difference between the positive-valence and the fact-based treatment was of note, but 
the positive-valence was not significantly different than the control group. Thus, it could just be 
that the fact-based treatment had a negative impact on intentions. Looking at prevention-focused 
respondents only, the ANCOVA with RFQ difference20 as a continuous covariate (and 
interaction) was not significant, F(7, 179) = 1.05, p = .39. Further analyses, therefore, are not 
discussed.  
 OLS Regression 
To tease out (and control for) possible variation that was not captured by the random 
assignment, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis with various covariates (multiple 
linear regression) was examined to investigate the effect of the treatments on retirement planning 
intentions. Two models are presented in Table 4.6. First, is a model with main effects only, and 
second, a model with main effects and interactions. For categorical variables, cell sizes were 
examined to preserve power, and categories were collapsed as needed (e.g., white versus non-
 
20 The regulatory differences were turned into absolute values (needed for the negative RFQ difference scores for 
prevention-focus) such that more positive values indicated stronger chronic prevention focus.  
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white; incomes less than $40,000 in the intercept and incomes above 80,000 collapsed; no 
college or college degree; married versus non-married; combining retired and unemployed)21. 
Second, is a model with main effects and interactions, in which the interactions are the RFQ 
difference score with each treatment group. The model is reported with robust standard errors. 
Variance inflation factors were examined for multicollinearity; in the main-effects model, all of 
the VIFs were between 1 and 2, except for the VIFs between the RFQ difference and dummy 
variable for promotion, which were slightly over three—this was not unexpected due to their 
relationships.22   
Table 4.6 Experiment 1 OLS Regression for Retirement Intentions (n = 367) 
Variable23 B SE p  B SE p 
Intercept 3.018 0.497 <.0001  3.066 0.505 <.0001 
Age -0.002 0.008 0.766  -0.002 0.008 0.807 
Male -0.329 0.181 0.071  -0.351 0.182 0.054 
Race: Non-white 0.484 0.218 0.027  0.453 0.216 0.037 
College degree  0.245 0.182 0.180  0.233 0.183 0.205 
Married 0.054 0.190 0.778  0.045 0.191 0.815 
Self-employed -0.658 0.246 0.008  -0.646 0.245 0.009 
Part-time -0.080 0.291 0.784  -0.087 0.291 0.765 
Unemp/retired -0.754 0.273 0.006  -0.741 0.274 0.007 
40k < Inc. < 60k 0.015 0.234 0.948  -0.010 0.237 0.965 
60k < Inc. < 80k 0.471 0.257 0.068  0.432 0.258 0.095 
Income 80k + 0.756 0.276 0.007  0.735 0.279 0.009 
Obj. Fin. Know. 0.014 0.106 0.893  0.002 0.106 0.987 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.197 0.071 0.006  0.202 0.071 0.005 
Financial Strain -0.529 0.250 0.035  -0.530 0.245 0.031 
Promotion 0.291 0.283 0.304  0.277 0.281 0.325 
RFQ Difference -0.114 0.144 0.431  0.100 0.214 0.641 
Fact treatment -0.091 0.247 0.714  -0.106 0.246 0.666 
 
21 Categories were collapsed to achieve at least 10 (or as close thereto as possible) respondents in each cell for each 
level of the response variable (i.e., the intentions score), as long as the collapsing made theoretical and practical 
sense. However, that was not possible across all categories for all intention score levels.  
22 Of course, in the interaction model, some VIFs were higher between those involved in or related to the 
interactions. 
23 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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Negative treatment 0.269 0.220 0.222  0.272 0.218 0.214 
Positive treatment 0.275 0.227 0.226  0.259 0.224 0.249 
Fact x RFQ Diff     -0.298 0.275 0.281 
Neg x RFQ Diff     -0.350 0.241 0.148 
Pos x RFQ Diff     -0.164 0.228 0.471 
Adjusted R2 .143    .142   
 
As shown, after controlling for these covariates, the treatments had no effect as main 
effects. Moreover, even after including the relative strength of the orientation effect (the 
interactions), there were still no treatment effects, which was consistent the earlier ANOVA and 
ANCOVA models. Therefore, the OLS regression did not provide support for any of the 
hypotheses; there was no treatment effect and that treatment effect did not differ based on RFQ 
difference. However, not related to this study’s research questions (but perhaps possible future 
research), both financial strain and subjective financial knowledge were significant. Financial 
strain was negatively associated with retirement planning intentions and subjective financial 
knowledge was positively associated with retirement planning intentions.  
For additional robustness, OLS regressions were performed (not presented) using 
subsamples of only promotion- or prevention-focused individuals (like with the one-way 
ANOVAs). For promotion-focus only, the main-effects regression did not have a significant F-
value, F(18, 161) = 1.57, p = .07; similarly, the interaction model was not significant either, 
F(21, 158) = 1.58, p = .06. For prevention-focus respondents only, the main effects model was 
significant, F(18, 168) = 4.13, p < .0001, but neither the treatment main effects nor the RFQ 
difference were significant (the variables of interest). The prevention-focus only interaction 
model was significant, F(21, 165) = 3.75, p < .0001, but none of the treatment main effects or 
interaction effects were significant at the 5% level. Though, the RFQ difference was significant, 
with a point estimate of -.79, indicating that as prevention focused increased, intentions 
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decreased, 95% CI [-1.49, -.08]. In short, the OLS regression, including the separate subsample 
regressions, did not provide support for any of the treatment hypotheses.  
 Nonparametric Analysis 
The foregoing analysis used parametric techniques (e.g., the ANOVA and OLS 
regression). Using parametric techniques, particularly ANOVA, is common in intentions-based 
studies (i.e., to treat the intentions index as a continuous variable). However, the dependent 
variable was still Likert-type data, and, consequently, parametric techniques may not be ideal. 
Therefore, as a robustness check, nonparametric techniques were examined, too.  
The main test was the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test for several independent samples, which is 
the nonparametric equivalent of the one-way ANOVA (Korosteleva, 2014). The Kruskal-Wallis 
test found no significant difference in location parameters for the four groups, χ2 (3, n = 367) = 
1.91, p = .59. Because the null hypothesis was not rejected here, additional Wilcoxon rank-sum 
pairwise comparisons between treatment groups was not necessary. Consistent with the one-way 
ANOVA, this indicated no evidence for hypothesis H1a (i.e., no evidence of any treatment 
effect).  
For the hypotheses with promotion-specific focus (i.e, H1e and H1g), examining only 
promotion-focused respondents similarly resulted in an insignificant Kruskal-Wallis H Test, χ2 
(3, n = 180) = .60, p = .90. The same was true for prevention-only (H1f and H1h) respondents 
too, χ2 (3, n = 187) = 2.59, p = .46. Consequently, the nonparametric tests were consistent with 
the parametric ANOVAs above that, for retirement planning intentions, the treatments had no 
effect on intentions, and that this was true even when splitting the sample based on regulatory 
focus.  
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 Logistic Regression (Cumulative, Multinomial, and Binary) 
 Next, logits were examined. This was done to, among other things, allay concerns with 
the Likert-type response variable. First, a cumulative logit was performed, which, like the above 
nonparametric analysis, was ideal with Likert-type data. The cumulative logit was first 
performed using all 7-levels of the intention scale. That cumulative logit is presented in Table 
4.7, both as main-effects only and main effects with interactions (similar to the OLS regression).  
Table 4.7 Experiment 1 Cumulative Logit of All Intention Levels (n = 367) 
Variable24 B SE OR p  B SE OR p 
Intercept (7) -4.075 0.613  <.0001  -4.096 0.614  <.0001 
Intercept (6) -2.559 0.580  <.0001  -2.579 0.582  <.0001 
Intercept (5) -0.993 0.567  0.080  -1.006 0.569  0.077 
Intercept (4) -0.359 0.565  0.525  -0.369 0.567  0.516 
Intercept (3) 0.347 0.565  0.540  0.342 0.567  0.547 
Intercept (2) 1.279 0.573  0.026  1.283 0.575  0.026 
Age -0.005 0.008 0.995 0.573  -0.003 0.009 0.997 0.688 
Male -0.374 0.199 0.688 0.061  -0.388 0.201 0.679 0.054 
Race: Non-white  0.505 0.256 1.657 0.048  0.476 0.256 1.609 0.064 
College Degree 0.241 0.206 1.273 0.241  0.233 0.207 1.262 0.262 
Married 0.028 0.218 1.028 0.899  0.019 0.219 1.019 0.931 
Self-employed -0.663 0.266 0.515 0.013  -0.644 0.267 0.525 0.016 
Part-time -0.136 0.309 0.873 0.659  -0.153 0.310 0.858 0.621 
Unemp/retired -0.811 0.291 0.444 0.005  -0.797 0.295 0.451 0.007 
40k < Inc. < 60k -0.001 0.262 0.999 0.996  -0.046 0.263 0.955 0.862 
60k < Inc. < 80k 0.574 0.295 1.776 0.052  0.531 0.296 1.701 0.073 
Income 80k + 0.871 0.317 2.389 0.006  0.843 0.318 2.323 0.008 
Obj. Fin. Know. 0.009 0.118 1.009 0.942  -0.003 0.119 0.997 0.981 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.219 0.078 1.245 0.005  0.229 0.078 1.257 0.003 
Financial Strain -0.639 0.262 0.528 0.015  -0.641 0.262 0.527 0.015 
Promotion 0.276 0.325 1.318 0.396  0.265 0.326 1.303 0.416 
RFQ Difference -0.076 0.159 0.927 0.632  0.164 0.237 1.179 0.487 
Fact Treatment -0.139 0.267 0.870 0.602  -0.158 0.268 0.854 0.557 
Neg. Treatment 0.310 0.267 1.364 0.246  0.307 0.268 1.359 0.252 
Pos. Treatment 0.270 0.273 1.309 0.323  0.257 0.273 1.293 0.347 
 
24 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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Fact x RFQ Diff      -0.316 0.278 0.729 0.257 
Neg x RFQ Diff      -0.438 0.263 0.646 0.096 
Pos x RFQ Diff      -0.175 0.270 0.839 0.516 
Pseudo R2  
(Cox & Snell) .181     .187    
AIC 1326.80     1329.91    
% Concordant 67     66.7    
 
Consistent with the earlier analyses, neither the treatment main effects nor the interaction 
effects were significant. Also, like before, the same model was performed on a subsample basis. 
For promotion-focus respondents only, the interaction model was significant, with a likelihood 
ratio test of χ2 (21, n = 180) = 33, p = .046. Considering the model, though, none of the main 
effects or interactions were significant at the 5% level, which was consistent with the prior 
analyses.  
In the prevention-only interaction model, which was significant (χ2 (21, n = 187) = 74.14, 
p < .0001), the negative valence treatment/RFQ interaction was significant, with a point estimate 
of 1.43, χ2 (1) = 4.71, p = .03. Although this may tend to support H1h—that, for prevention-
focus respondents, the negative-valence effect increased with levels (strength) of prevention 
focus—the model was suspect due to the proportional-odds assumption being violated in this 
specification, χ2 (105, n = 187) = 215, p < .0001. As such, for analytical purposes, this was not 
considered evidence in favor of H1h.  
Due to indication of the proportional odds assumption being violated,25 a multinomial 
logit (which has no similar proportional-odds assumption) was examined, too. The multinomial 
main-effects model (not presented due to the unwieldy number of category pairs), although 
significant, did not have any significant treatment effects in the main effects model. Similarly, in 
 
25 However, Allison (2012) notes that, with SAS, the test may reject the null hypothesis more often than needed. 
Allison (2012) further notes that, with many independent variables and larger sample sizes, in his experience, p-
values of less than .05 are routinely returned.  
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the multinomial interaction model, which was significant (χ2 (132, n = 367) = 200, p < .0001), 
none of the Type 3 analysis of effects chi-square tests were significant for the main effects or 
interactions, indicating that those variables had no effect on the outcome variable (Allison, 
2012).  
As a further check, a parsimonious multinomial logit was performed with only treatment-
based regressors (regulatory focus, difference score, treatment, and interactions). Under this 
specification, the model converged, but there was not even a significant likelihood ratio test (χ2 
(48, n = 367) = 43.64, p = .65), and no Type 3 main effects or interactions were significant. In 
short, like the prior analyses, no support for any of the hypotheses.   
To further strengthen the analysis from a statistical power perspective and to further 
account for possible issues with the proportional odds assumption,26 instead of using all seven 
levels, the levels were collapsed into a low- (1 or 2), medium- (3, 4, or 5), or high-intention level 
(6 or 7). A cumulative logit, therefore, was performed with both main effects and interactions. 
Those results are reported in Table 4.8 (the reference group is Low). Importantly, with three 
levels instead of seven, the proportional odds assumption was not violated.27 Similarly—and 
consistent with the prior results—neither the main effects nor interaction effects were significant. 
This, too, comported with the conclusions from the above parametric and non-parametric 
analyses.  
 
 
 
26 As well as the issue of potential smaller cells on the extremes of the intention measures (e.g., answers of 1 or 7).  
27 In the main-effects model, the proportional odds assumption test score was χ2 (19, n = 367) = 22.40, p = .26; in the 
interaction model, the test score was χ2 (22, n = 367) = 24.59, p = .32. 
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Table 4.8 Experiment 1 Cumulative Logit (High, Medium, Low)  
Variable28 B SE OR p  B SE OR p 
Intercept (High) -2.464 0.644  0.000  -2.447 0.646  0.000 
Intercept (Med.) 0.456 0.627  0.468  0.480 0.630  0.446 
Age -0.008 0.009 0.992 0.396  -0.008 0.010 0.992 0.412 
Male -0.448 0.223 0.639 0.045  -0.452 0.224 0.636 0.044 
Race: Non-white  0.562 0.284 1.754 0.048  0.541 0.285 1.717 0.058 
College Degree 0.163 0.230 1.177 0.479  0.150 0.232 1.162 0.516 
Married -0.036 0.243 0.965 0.883  -0.034 0.244 0.967 0.890 
Self-employed -0.720 0.298 0.487 0.016  -0.714 0.299 0.490 0.017 
Part-time -0.272 0.345 0.762 0.430  -0.295 0.346 0.744 0.394 
Unemp/retired -0.718 0.325 0.488 0.027  -0.679 0.329 0.507 0.039 
40k < Inc. < 60k -0.102 0.293 0.903 0.728  -0.148 0.294 0.863 0.616 
60k < Inc. < 80k 0.350 0.328 1.418 0.287  0.323 0.330 1.382 0.327 
Income 80k + 0.848 0.353 2.334 0.016  0.811 0.354 2.249 0.022 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.003 0.132 0.997 0.979  -0.008 0.132 0.992 0.952 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.231 0.087 1.260 0.008  0.234 0.087 1.264 0.007 
Financial Strain -0.687 0.292 0.503 0.019  -0.687 0.293 0.503 0.019 
Promotion 0.460 0.363 1.584 0.204  0.464 0.364 1.591 0.202 
RFQ Difference -0.153 0.177 0.858 0.387  -0.011 0.263 0.989 0.966 
Fact Treatment 0.085 0.297 1.088 0.776  0.058 0.299 1.060 0.845 
Neg. Treatment 0.399 0.298 1.490 0.181  0.399 0.299 1.491 0.181 
Pos. Treatment 0.393 0.304 1.481 0.196  0.373 0.305 1.452 0.222 
Fact x RFQ Diff      -0.293 0.310 0.746 0.345 
Neg x RFQ Diff      -0.275 0.292 0.760 0.346 
Pos x RFQ Diff      -0.011 0.301 0.989 0.970 
Pseudo R2 
(Cox & Snell) .150     .154    
AIC 706.13     710.40    
% Concordant 69.9     69.6    
 
 This interaction cumulative logit was also performed on a subsample basis. For 
promotion-focus respondents, the model was not significant, χ2 (21, n = 180) = 27.08, p = .17; 
and, even considering it, none of the main treatment effects or interactions were significant, 
indicating a lack of support for H1e and H1g. For prevention-focus respondents, the interaction 
 
28 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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model was significant, χ2 (21, n = 187) = 64.62, p < .0001, and the proportional odds assumption 
was not rejected, χ2 (21, n = 187) = 23.26, p = .33. However, none of the main treatment effects 
or interactions were significant at the 5% level, indicating a lack of support for H1f and H1h.  
Lastly, in addition to the cumulative logit, a binary logit29 was performed to examine high 
intentions (compared to non-high intentions) both with main effects and interactions, which is 
presented in Table 4.9. Although the main-effects model was significant, the interaction-effects 
model’s likelihood ratio test was marginally above the 5% level, χ2 (22, n = 367) = 33.47, p = 
.056.30 
Table 4.9 Experiment 1 Logit (High v. Non-High) (n = 367) 
Variable31 B SE OR p  B SE OR p 
Intercept -2.664 0.871  0.002  -2.645 0.872  0.002 
Age -0.013 0.013 0.987 0.305  -0.014 0.013 0.986 0.279 
Male -0.102 0.295 0.903 0.730  -0.084 0.297 0.920 0.778 
Race: Non-white  0.588 0.341 1.800 0.085  0.596 0.343 1.816 0.082 
College Degree 0.321 0.325 1.379 0.323  0.310 0.327 1.363 0.343 
Married -0.101 0.324 0.904 0.755  -0.091 0.325 0.913 0.779 
Self-employed 0.055 0.410 1.057 0.893  0.073 0.411 1.076 0.859 
Part-time -0.198 0.482 0.820 0.682  -0.204 0.484 0.816 0.674 
Unemp/retired -0.035 0.439 0.965 0.936  -0.005 0.444 0.995 0.991 
40k < Inc. < 60k 0.057 0.420 1.059 0.892  0.043 0.422 1.044 0.919 
60k < Inc. < 80k 0.597 0.426 1.817 0.161  0.613 0.429 1.846 0.153 
Income 80k + 0.993 0.446 2.698 0.026  0.978 0.447 2.659 0.029 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.020 0.177 0.980 0.910  -0.014 0.178 0.986 0.935 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.260 0.120 1.296 0.030  0.258 0.120 1.294 0.032 
Financial Strain -0.696 0.482 0.499 0.148  -0.696 0.482 0.499 0.148 
Promotion -0.155 0.475 0.856 0.744  -0.145 0.478 0.865 0.762 
RFQ Difference 0.188 0.239 1.207 0.430  0.142 0.365 1.153 0.698 
Fact Treatment 0.443 0.401 1.558 0.269  0.418 0.404 1.519 0.301 
Neg. Treatment 0.376 0.405 1.456 0.354  0.354 0.410 1.425 0.388 
Pos. Treatment 0.277 0.419 1.319 0.509  0.258 0.425 1.295 0.544 
 
29 Collapsing the Likert-type data into a binary classification obviates any ordinal data concerns; respondents 
indicating a 6 or 7 intention score were classified as having strong intentions.  
30 The Score and Wald tests were likewise greater than .05.  
31 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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Fact x RFQ Diff      -0.086 0.422 0.918 0.839 
Neg x RFQ Diff      0.134 0.406 1.144 0.741 
Pos x RFQ Diff      0.101 0.419 1.106 0.811 
Pseudo R2  
(Cox & Snell) .086     .087    
AIC 375.86     381.49    
% Concordant 71.2     71.5    
 
Like before, none of the treatment main effects or interactions were significant, indicating 
a lack of support for hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, and H1d. Subsample binary logits were 
performed, too. For promotion-focus only respondents, the interaction model was not significant, 
χ2 (21, n = 180) = 17.07, p = .71. As such, this indicated a lack of support for H1e (if promotion-
focused, positive-valence should be stronger) and H1g (if promotion-focused, positive-valence 
proportional to strength). For prevention-focus only respondents, the interaction model was 
significant, χ2 (21, n = 187) = 35.01, p = .028, but none of the main effects or interactions were 
significant). As such, this indicated a lack of support for H1f (if prevention-focused, negative-
valence should be stronger) and H1h (if prevention-focused, negative-valence proportional to 
strength). 
In sum, then, across the analyses performed above (whether parametric or not), there was 
no general support for a general narrative treatment effect (either gain-framed or loss-framed). 
Moreover, there was no support for the hypotheses that advanced that any treatment effect may 
be influenced by either the regulatory focus of the respondent or even the relative strength of that 
focus.  
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Research Question 2: Budget & Cash-Flow Planning 
 The second research question (Experiment 2, Budget and Cash-Flow Planning) 
concerned the effect of message framing on intentions to engage in budget and cash-flow 
planning. In particular, whether narrative messages influenced these intentions (relative to a fact-
based presentation or no information control group). Furthermore, whether the valence (positive 
or negative) of that narrative influenced intentions differently, which may be based on the 
underlying nature of the behavior. Then, whether that framing effect, if any, was influenced by 
individual characteristics, such as regulatory focus. Related to regulatory focus, moreover, 
whether regulatory fit can enhance the respective framing effect. In other words, looking at the 
main effects of narratives and regulatory orientation and then their interactions. The analysis 
proceeds in the same fashion as Research Question 1.  
 ANOVA and ANCOVA 
The first hypothesis (H2a) was that, narrative message framing will be positively 
associated with intentions to engage in monthly cash-flow budgeting (a general narrative effect). 
That is, at a minimum, there will be a difference in treatment means. To examine that 
preliminarily, Table 4.10 reports the one-way ANOVA for Experiment 2.  
Table 4.10 Experiment 2 One-Way ANOVA 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 34.820 11.607 4.83 0.003 
Error 385 925.638 2.404   
Corrected Total 388 960.458    
 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of the group variance was not rejected at the 1% (F(3, 
385) = .44, p = .74), and the Brown and Forsythe test for homogeneity was not rejected either, 
F(3, 385) = .77, p = .51. The ANOVA showed a significant group difference at the 5% level, 
F(3, 385) = 4.83, p = .0026. This indicated that that at least one group mean was different than 
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the others. However, post-estimation tests were required to further elucidate any evidence in 
support of the hypotheses.  
Consequently, pairwise comparison of group means using Tukey-Kramer adjustments for 
multiple comparisons showed two significantly different pairwise differences. First, the negative-
valence narrative produced a .78 higher mean, 95% CI [.21, 1.35], compared to the control (p = 
.003), which was true with Dunnett’s adjustment, too (p = .001); second, the negative-valence 
narrative had a .63 higher mean, 95% CI [.06, 1.21], compared to the positive-valence narrative 
(p = .0253). This supported hypothesis H2a that there may be a narrative effect and H2c for a 
negative valence effect.  
 Additionally, a contrast was performed to compare the average effect of the narratives 
(positive and negative) to the control group. That contrast indicated a significant difference in 
intentions, with a mean difference of .462, 95% CI [.09, .84], higher intentions for average 
narrative effect to the control group, t(385) = 2.41, p = .016. This also supported hypothesis H2a 
of a possible narrative effect (compared to control).  
A contrast comparing the average effect of framing to the fact-based group, however, did 
not result in a significant difference, t(385) = .07, p = .94. And, when just looking at the 
treatment pairwise mean differences, there were not significant differences between the fact-
based treatment and either the positive- or negative-valence narratives. The cleanest result would 
be for there to be a difference between both—that is, the narratives were different than the 
control and the fact-based treatment. On the other hand, the fact-based group was not 
significantly different than the control group. This created an ambiguity in interpreting the 
results: perhaps it was not strictly framing at play but priming and salience.  
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 The one-way ANOVA and contrasts also shed light upon hypotheses H2b and H2c. 
Hypothesis H2b advanced that, positive-valence (gain) narrative message framing will be 
positively associated with intentions to engage in monthly cash-flow budgeting. Here, however, 
the positive-valence narrative mean was not significantly different than the control, which does 
not provide support for H2b. Hypothesis H2c posited that, negative-valence (loss) narrative 
message framing will be positively associated with intentions to engage in monthly cash-flow 
budgeting. That is, there is still a narrative effect even with negative-valence framing. Here, the 
negative-valence narrative was positively associated with higher intentions relative to the control 
group, i.e., support indicated for H2c.  
Due to the prevention nature of the behavior, the literature would hypothesize that gain 
(positive) framing should be more effective. Thus, hypothesis H2d posited that, positive-valence 
(gain) narrative framing will be result in higher intentions to engage in monthly cash-flow 
budgeting. Here, however, the negative treatment had the highest mean intention score (M = 
4.72, SE = .16), compared to the positive treatment (M = 4.08, SE = .16). And, this difference 
was significant, t(385) = 2.83, p = .03. Therefore, this does not indicate support of H2d; that is, 
the positive narrative did not have a stronger treatment effect compared to the negative narrative.  
 The one-way ANOVA was also performed on a subsample basis. For promotion-focus 
respondents, the model was significant, F(3, 187) = 3.88, p = .01. Pairwise mean comparisons 
using Tukey-Kramer adjustments showed two significantly different mean pairs. First, the 
negative-valence treatment had a .79 higher, 95% CI [.01, 1.58], mean than the control, p = .045. 
This bolstered H2c (negative-valence effect), but this was opposite of the hypothesized direction 
for promotion-focus respondents, for which gain-framing should be more effective due to 
regulatory fit. Second, the negative-valence had a .93 higher mean, 95% CI [.10, 1.75], compared 
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to the positive-valence treatment. Again, this is opposite of the hypothesized direction. As such, 
this indicated a lack of support for H2e.  
For prevention-focus respondents, the one-way ANOVA was not significant, F(3, 194) = 
1.83, p = .14. As such, additional analyses were not conducted; however, the lack of significance 
indicated a lack of support for H2f (if prevention-focus, negative valence should be more 
effective).  
 Next, a two-way ANOVA is reported in Table 4.11 that incorporates regulatory 
orientation, i.e., both treatment group and chronic promotion focus or chronic prevention focus 
(with interactions). This related to hypotheses H2e and H2f, which posited that, in accord with 
regulatory fit, the narrative treatment effect will be influenced by regulatory focus. That is, for 
promotion-focus respondents, gain framing (positive valence) will be more effective, and, for 
prevention-focus respondents, loss framing (negative valence) will be more effective. This model 
was significant at the 5% level, F(7, 381) = 2.42, p = .02.  
Table 4.11 Experiment 2 Two-Way ANOVA (Treatment x Chronic Orientation) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 35.839 11.946 4.95 0.002 
Regulatory Focus 1 0.6791 0.679 0.28 0.596 
Interaction 3 5.462 1.821 0.75 0.520 
Error 381 919.564 2.414   
Corrected Total 388 960.458    
 
However, the interaction was not significant. Therefore, the two-way ANOVA without 
interaction was analyzed too (not presented). Although that model was significant, F(4, 384) = 
3.68, p = .006, the main effect for chronic regulatory focus was not, F(1, 384) = .25, p = .615 
(similar to the model with the interaction). This indicated a lack of support for hypotheses H2e 
and H2f; that is, the framing effect, in this experiment, did not depend on regulatory focus.  
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However, perhaps the framing effect (and the regulatory fit phenomenon) was being 
influenced by the strength of the regulatory focus (and the variation was not being addressed by 
the random assignment). Therefore, to control for that, the next model incorporated the RFQ 
difference as a covariate; Table 4.12 reports the one-way ANCOVA (with Type III sums of 
squares) for Experiment 2 using the RFQ difference as a covariate (and interacted).  
Table 4.12 Experiment 2 ANCOVA (RFQ Difference Covariate) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 33.499 11.167 4.64 0.003 
RFQ Difference 1 0.189 0.189 0.08 0.780 
Interaction 3 8.165 2.722 1.13 0.336 
Error 381 917.462 2.408   
Corrected Total 388 960.458    
 
The overall model was significant, F(7, 381) = 2.55, p = 0.014. However, because the 
interaction term was not significant (F(3, 381) = 1.13, p = .34), an equal-slopes model was 
estimated by removing the interaction term. Here, without the interaction term, the model was 
still significant, F(4, 384) = 3.61, p = .007. There was a main effect for the treatment group, F(3, 
384) = 4.81, p = .003, but not for regulatory difference, F(1, 384) = 0.00, p = .96. After 
controlling for RFQ difference, there were two significant mean pairwise differences (with 
Tukey-Kramer adjustments). First, the negative-valence narrative had a .78 higher mean, 95% CI 
[.21, 1.35], than the control group, p = .003. Second, the positive-valence narrative had a .63 
lower mean than the negative group, 95% CI [-1.21, -.05], p = .03. In short, the negative valence 
mean was higher than both the control and positive valence groups. This comported with the 
prior analysis; that is, there was not a stable positive treatment effect that resulted in an increased 
level of intentions, but there was a consistent (and positive) negative-valence effect. But after 
controlling for RFQ difference, the negative treatment mean was not significantly different than 
the fact-based treatment, which was the case, too, without incorporating the RFQ covariate.  
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To see if this changed when only the subsamples were examined, an ANCOVA was 
analyzed on a subsample basis (type of regulatory focus). For promotion-focus only respondents, 
the F-test for the model was significant at the 5% level, F(7, 183) = 3.08, p = .004. The 
ANCOVA (with Type III sums of squares) table is presented in Table 4.13.  
Table 4.13 Experiment 2 ANCOVA (RFQ Difference Covariate), Promotion 
Only (n = 191) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 30.527 10.176 4.61 0.004 
RFQ Difference 1 3.977 3.977 1.8 0.181 
Interaction 3 19.203 6.401 2.9 0.036 
Error 183 403.808 2.207   
Corrected Total 451.435     
 
Importantly, the interaction effect was significant, F(3, 183) = 2.90, p = .036. As such, an 
unequal-slope model was estimated with least squares mean differences calculated at different 
levels of absolute RFQ difference; mean differences were analyzed with Tukey-Kramer 
adjustments at two levels of absolute RFQ differences of 1 and 2, indicating little difference to 
greater difference in levels of chronic promotion focus. Analyzed at both levels, there were no 
significant mean differences. Also, compared to the control group, with Dunnett’s procedure, 
there were no significant mean differences at the two RFQ difference levels. The contrast 
between the average narrative effect to the control was not significant, t(183) = -.40, p = .69; the 
contrast for the average narrative effect to the fact-based group was insignificant, too, t(183) = 0, 
p = .99.  
Looking at prevention-focused respondents only, the ANCOVA with absolute RFQ 
difference as a continuous covariate was not significant, F(7, 190) = 1.52, p = .16.32 Further 
analysis, therefore, is not discussed.  
 
32 This was true when even restricting it to a main-effects model (no interaction), F(4, 193) = 1.94, p = .11. 
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 OLS Regression 
Like with Experiment 1, a regression analysis with various covariates (multiple linear 
regression) was also examined to examine the effect of the treatments on cash-flow and budget 
intentions (and to control for possible variation not captured by the random assignment). Two 
models are presented in Table 4.14. First, is a model with main effects only, and second, a model 
with main effects and interactions. For categorical variables, cell sizes were examined to 
preserve power, and categories were collapsed as needed (e.g., white versus non-white; incomes 
less than $40,000 in the intercept and incomes above 80,000 collapsed; no college or college 
degree; married versus non-married; combining retired and unemployed).33 The model is 
reported with robust standard errors. Variance inflation factors were examined for 
multicollinearity; in the main-effects model, all VIFS were under 3.0.34 
Table 4.14 Experiment 2 OLS Regression for Budget Intentions (n = 389) 
Variable35 B SE p  B SE p 
Intercept 5.00 0.486 <.0001  4.995 0.482 <.0001 
Age -0.011 0.007 0.124  -0.011 0.007 0.136 
Male -0.139 0.165 0.401  -0.149 0.163 0.361 
Race: Non-white 0.220 0.190 0.249  0.215 0.189 0.257 
College Degree 0.068 0.178 0.702  0.046 0.176 0.792 
Married 0.095 0.174 0.584  0.110 0.171 0.519 
Self-employed -0.059 0.244 0.809  -0.072 0.241 0.767 
Part-time 0.153 0.230 0.507  0.131 0.233 0.575 
Unemp/retired -0.332 0.234 0.157  -0.354 0.233 0.130 
40k < Income < 60k 0.334 0.239 0.164  0.314 0.235 0.184 
60k < Income < 80k 0.321 0.226 0.156  0.296 0.221 0.182 
 
33 Categories were collapsed to achieve at least 10 (or as close thereto as possible) respondents in each cell for each 
level of the response variable (i.e., the intentions score), as long as the collapsing made theoretical and practical 
sense. However, that was not possible across all categories for all intention score levels. Thus, the cumulative logit 
with three ordered levels, discussed later, may be the ideal analysis.  
34 The highest VIFs were, of course, between the RFQ difference and the promotion dummy, which were still under 
3.0. In the interaction model, all VIFs except those RFQ and the interactions were less than 2. The RFQ difference 
and promotion dummy had higher VIFs, which was not unexpected.  
35 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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Income 80k + -0.219 0.245 0.371  -0.232 0.240 0.335 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.306 0.104 0.004  -0.301 0.103 0.004 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.072 0.073 0.325  0.072 0.071 0.311 
Financial Strain -0.075 0.225 0.740  -0.088 0.225 0.695 
Promotion -0.325 0.263 0.217  -0.279 0.262 0.287 
RFQ Difference 0.135 0.145 0.351  -0.008 0.203 0.970 
Fact Treatment 0.402 0.220 0.069  0.384 0.219 0.081 
Neg. Treatment 0.778 0.211 0.000  0.764 0.210 0.000 
Pos. Treatment 0.130 0.213 0.541  0.121 0.212 0.568 
Fact x RFQ Diff     0.289 0.219 0.188 
Neg x RFQ Diff     0.065 0.234 0.748 
Pos x RFQ Diff     0.078 0.235 0.741 
Adjusted R2 .07    .07   
 
The main effects model was significant, F(19, 369) = 2.54, p = .0004; so too was the 
interaction model, F(22, 366) = 2.30, p = .0009. As shown, after controlling for these covariates 
in the interaction model, relative to the control (intercept), the negative treatment had a 
significant impact on intentions (consistent with the ANOVA and ANCOVA analyses), with the 
negative treatment mean of .76 higher than the control group, 95% CI [.35, 1.18]. The fact-based 
treatment was not significant at the 5% level but would be significant at the 10% level.  This 
supported hypotheses H2a (of a narrative treatment effect) and H2c (negative-valence effect), but 
a lack of support for the other hypotheses (at least in terms of directionality).  
To test H2d (positive-valence is greater than negative-valence effect) a linear hypothesis 
of parameter equivalence was conducted by a robust Wald test, which rejected the null 
hypothesis of equivalency, χ2 (1, n = 389) = 8.95, p = .003 (under the main-effects only model).36 
As such, the parameters were not the same and the negative-valence parameter was significantly 
higher than the positive-valence parameter; thus, this indicated a lack of support for H2d. Using 
the interaction-effect model, a similar test was performed on the equivalency between the 
 
36 The same was true under the interaction model, χ2 (1, n = 389) = 8.89, p = .003. 
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negative treatment coefficient and the fact-based treatment coefficient, χ2 (1, n = 389) = 3.18, p = 
.07; although not rejected at the 5% level, it would be rejected at the 10% level, and fact-based 
coefficient was not different than zero in the underlying model at the 5% level.  
Additional multiple OLS regressions were also performed (not presented) using only 
subsamples of promotion- or prevention-focused individuals only. This related to hypotheses 
H2e through H2h. For promotion-focus only respondents, the interaction model was significant, 
F(21, 169) = 2.78, p = .0001. Here, the positive treatment/RFQ difference interaction term was 
significant, t(1) = 2.59, p = .01, with an estimate of 1.27, 95% CI [.30, 2.23], indicating that, as 
promotion-focus strength increased, so too did the mean intention score for those in the positive 
treatment, which supported H2g (if promotion-focused, intentions in positive-valence related to 
promotion strength)—that is, regulatory fit. However, the underlying main effect for the positive 
treatment was -1.26, 95% CI [-2.21, -.31]. None of the other treatment main effects or 
interactions were significant at the 5% level.  
A robust Wald test was used to test for the equivalency of the positive-valence and 
negative-valence main effect parameters; this test was rejected (χ2 (1, n = 191) = 11.64, p = 
.0006); but, again, the positive main effect had a negative parameter estimate, which was 
contrary to the hypothesized direction. A robust Wald test was performed for the equality of the 
positive treatment and fact-based treatment, which was not rejected, χ2 (1, n = 191) = 1.75, p = 
.19). Insofar as the positive-valence treatment, though, the Wald test results were less meaningful 
due to the significant positive interaction effect. 
The disparate directionality between the main effect and interaction was less than ideal 
for support of H2e and H2g (the regulatory fit hypotheses for promotion respondents). For H2g 
and regulatory fit, though, the relationship of interest was really the interaction effect—that the 
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positive effect depended on the strength of the promotion-focus, and that it increased with 
increasing levels of promotion focus. This indicated slight support for regulatory fit based on the 
OLS promotion-only subsample regression.  
For prevention-only respondents, the main effects model was not significant, F(18, 179) 
= 1.62 p = .06. Nor was the interaction model, F(21, 176) = 1.52 p = .076. Considering the 
model, though, none of the interactions were significant. But, the fact-based and negative-
valence main effects were both significant. The negative-valence main effect estimate was 1.23, 
95% CI [.22, 2.23], indicating that prevention-respondents had higher intention scores when 
exposed to the negative-valence treatment. So, too, though was the fact-based treatment, 1.23, 
t(1) = 2.41, p = .02. Moreover, a robust Wald test could not reject the null hypothesis that the 
fact-based and negative-valence parameter estimates were equivalent, χ2 (1, n = 198) = .00, p = 
.99. Thus, it was unclear whether the negative-valence effect was truly a framing effect or, say, a 
result of priming or salience. Given that the positive-valence treatment was not significant in this 
specification, that cuts against the difference being attributable due pure priming or salience 
(which would arguably be present in the positive-valence treatment, too). As such, there was 
tentative support for H2f (if prevention focus, negative valence is > positive valence). But, no 
support that the negative-valence effect is influenced by the prevention-focus strength (H2h). 
And, still, the model was not significant, so it should not be given great consideration.   
 Nonparametric Analysis 
As was the case for Research Question 1, the foregoing analysis used parametric 
techniques (e.g., ANOVA and OLS regression). However, the dependent variable was still 
Likert-type data, and, consequently, parametric techniques may not be ideal. Therefore, as a 
robustness check, nonparametric techniques were examined, too.  
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Primarily, the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test for several independent samples was examined, 
which was relevant for H2a (general narrative effect). This test found a significant difference in 
location parameters for the four groups, χ2 (3, n = 389) = 14.27, p = .003. This supported H2a in 
that the group location parameters were different. Consequently, two-sample Wilcoxon test were 
then conducted for each group-pair comparison.37  
Comparing the control and fact-based groups, the Wilcoxon test was not significant, Z = 
1.8, p = .067; for the control and negative valence, the test was significant, Z = 3.54, p = .0004,38 
with the negative valence having a larger Wilcoxon score (higher values). This supported the 
prior analyses, i.e., in support of H2c (negative-valence effect). For the control and positive 
valence, the test was not significant, Z = .48, p = .63, which indicated a lack of support for H2b 
(positive-valence effect); for the fact-based and negative valence, the test was not significant, Z = 
1.56, p = .12; for fact-based and positive valence, the test was not significant, Z = -1.30, p = .19; 
finally, for negative and positive valences, the test was significant, Z = -2.89, p = .004, with the 
negative valence having a higher score (higher values), i.e., a lack of support for H2d (that 
positive-valence will be higher). In sum, then, the nonparametric analysis supported the 
parametric analysis insofar as the treatment parameters were not the same, and, in particular, the 
negative valence treatment resulted in higher intentions. And, contrary to the expectation from 
theory, the positive-valence was not higher than the negative-valence.  
 Similarly, examining only promotion-focused respondents resulted in a significant 
Kruskal-Wallis H Test, χ2 (3, n = 191) = 10.39, p = .016. Related to H2d (for promotion, gain-
framing should be more effective than negative-framing), then, a two-sample Wilcoxon test was 
conducted. The test was significant, Z = -2.81, p = .005, but the negative valence had the higher 
 
37 Due to the sample sizes involved, continuity corrections were not used.  
38 Two-sided (absolute value) p-values reported throughout. 
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score value (higher intention levels). Thus, this does not indicate support for H2d. For 
prevention-only respondents, the test was insignificant, χ2 (3, n = 198) = 6.43, p = .093. This 
indicated a lack of support for H2f (for prevention-focus, negative valence should be stronger).  
In sum, the nonparametric tests support the parametric ANOVAs and regressions above 
that, for cash-flow and budget planning intentions, the treatments had an effect on intentions. 
Alternatively, it could be that the nonparametric tests did not have sufficient power to isolate 
differences that the OLS regressions can.  
 Logistic Regression (Cumulative, Multinomial, and Binary) 
Next, logits were examined. As before, this was done to allay concerns with using 
parametric techniques on a Likert-type response variable. First, a cumulative logit was 
performed, which, like the above nonparametric analysis, was ideal with a Likert-type response 
variable. The cumulative logit was first performed using all 7-levels of the intention scale. That 
cumulative logit is presented in Table 4.15 both as main-effects only and main effects with 
interactions (similar to the above OLS regression). 
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Table 4.15 Experiment 2 Cumulative Logit of All Intention Levels (n = 389)  
Variable39 B SE OR p  B SE OR p 
Intercept (7) -2.258 0.607  0.000  -2.255 0.609  0.000 
Intercept (6) -0.611 0.582  0.294  -0.600 0.584  0.304 
Intercept (5) 0.773 0.582  0.184  0.794 0.584  0.174 
Intercept (4) 1.524 0.586  0.009  1.549 0.588  0.008 
Intercept (3) 2.483 0.595  <.0001  2.509 0.596  <.0001 
Intercept (2) 3.846 0.626  <.0001  3.869 0.628  <.0001 
Age -0.014 0.008 0.986 0.086  -0.014 0.008 0.986 0.083 
Male -0.198 0.195 0.820 0.309  -0.191 0.196 0.826 0.330 
Race: Non-white 0.298 0.236 1.347 0.206  0.295 0.236 1.342 0.212 
College Degree 0.120 0.213 1.127 0.572  0.092 0.214 1.097 0.667 
Married 0.063 0.204 1.065 0.756  0.085 0.204 1.089 0.676 
Self-employed -0.043 0.266 0.958 0.871  -0.076 0.267 0.927 0.776 
Part-time 0.171 0.293 1.186 0.561  0.152 0.295 1.164 0.606 
Unemp/retired -0.365 0.279 0.694 0.191  -0.367 0.282 0.693 0.192 
40k < Inc. < 60k 0.423 0.266 1.527 0.112  0.384 0.267 1.467 0.151 
60k < Inc. < 80k 0.245 0.310 1.277 0.430  0.220 0.312 1.246 0.482 
Income 80k + -0.285 0.280 0.752 0.308  -0.294 0.281 0.745 0.295 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.371 0.129 0.690 0.004  -0.366 0.129 0.694 0.005 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.137 0.079 1.147 0.082  0.133 0.079 1.142 0.094 
Financial Strain -0.092 0.262 0.912 0.726  -0.102 0.263 0.903 0.698 
Promotion -0.396 0.300 0.673 0.188  -0.337 0.302 0.714 0.265 
RFQ Diff 0.179 0.148 1.196 0.227  0.048 0.225 1.049 0.831 
Fact 0.472 0.257 1.603 0.066  0.451 0.258 1.571 0.080 
Neg 0.931 0.261 2.536 0.000  0.930 0.261 2.535 0.000 
Pos  0.123 0.257 1.131 0.632  0.124 0.257 1.132 0.628 
Fact x RFQ Diff      0.317 0.241 1.373 0.188 
Pos x RFQ Diff      0.078 0.261 1.081 0.766 
Neg x RFQ Diff      -0.050 0.264 0.952 0.851 
Pseudo R2  
(Cox & Snell) .12     .122    
AIC 1409     1412    
% Concordant 63.4     63.8    
 
 
39 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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In both models, the proportional odds assumption was not rejected at the 5% level.40 
Therefore, the multinomial logit was not examined. Examining the cumulative logit, none of the 
interaction effects were significant. Moreover, the negative valence was significant (p = .000), 
indicating a negative treatment effect, which was consistent with the prior analyses, and 
supportive of H2c (negative framing effect) and H2a (narrative effect generally). In particular, 
with an odds ratio of 2.5, this meant that, everything else being equal, those exposed to the 
negative treatment were more likely to express a higher intention level (compared to the control 
group). As well, like the OLS and ANOVA, this undercut hypothesis H2d, which posited that 
positive framing should be more effective than negative framing; this was not evident from the 
cumulative logit.  
The cumulative logit was also performed on a subsample basis. For promotion-focus 
respondents only, although the interaction model was significant, χ2 (21, n = 191) = 55.27, p < 
.0001, the proportional-odds assumption was rejected, χ2 (105) = 186.05, p < .0001. 
Nevertheless, examining the model, the positive-valence/promotion-strength interaction was 
significant, χ2 (1) = 5.60, p = .02, with a point estimate of 1.44, indicating that the positive-
valence increased in effect as promotion strength increased (H2g). However, like before, the 
positive-valence main effect was negative (B = -1.48). And, because the negative-valence 
parameter was not significant (i.e., could be 0), this could slightly support H2e, too (if 
promotion-focus, positive-valence is greater than negative-valence), at least at higher levels of 
promotion strength, due to the interaction effect. The fact-treatment/RFQ difference interaction 
was significant, too, χ2 (1) = 3.97, p = .046. However, due to the proportional-odds assumption 
being rejected, additional analysis should be performed.  
 
40 For the main effects model, the proportional effects score test was χ2 (95, n = 389) = 105.12, p = .224; for the 
interaction model, it was χ2 (110, n = 389) = 129.72, p = .097. 
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For prevention-focus only respondents, the interaction model was significant, χ2 (105, n = 
198) = 36, p = .02; however, like before, the proportional-odds assumption was rejected, χ2 (105) 
= 231.2, p < .0001. Here, none of the interaction effects were significant at the 5% level. 
However, all the treatments main effects were significant; but a linear hypothesis test showed 
that they were not significantly different, χ2 (1) = .73, p = .69. For instance, the negative-valence 
treatment had a point estimate of 1.82 (p = .005), which corresponds to an odds ratio estimate of 
6.18, 95% CI [1.74, 21.97]. At first blush, this would normally indicate support for H2f, that, for 
prevention-focus respondents, the negative-valence will be more effective than the positive. But, 
due to the linear hypothesis test showing no significant difference between the parameter 
estimates, and, due to the proportional-odds assumption being rejected, additional analysis was 
still needed.  
For the sake of comparison (across experiments) and to increase power (by reducing the 
number of cells and thereby increasing cell size count), the seven intention levels were collapsed 
into three (low, medium, and high) for a cumulative logit, which was performed with both main 
effects and interactions. Those results are reported in Table 4.16.  
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Table 4.16 Experiment 2 Cumulative Logit (High, Medium, Low) (n = 389) 
Variable41 B SE OR p  B SE OR p 
Intercept (High) -0.516 0.658  0.434  -0.519 0.661  0.432 
Intercept (Med) 2.629 0.674  <.0001  2.638 0.676  <.0001 
Age -0.011 0.009 0.989 0.233  -0.011 0.009 0.989 0.241 
Male -0.190 0.223 0.827 0.394  -0.190 0.224 0.827 0.395 
Race: Non-white 0.278 0.268 1.320 0.300  0.267 0.268 1.306 0.319 
College Degree 0.060 0.242 1.062 0.803  0.029 0.244 1.029 0.905 
Married -0.035 0.232 0.966 0.880  -0.015 0.232 0.985 0.948 
Self-employed -0.084 0.303 0.919 0.781  -0.105 0.305 0.900 0.730 
Part-time 0.178 0.335 1.195 0.594  0.167 0.337 1.182 0.620 
Unemp/retired -0.298 0.319 0.742 0.350  -0.301 0.322 0.740 0.349 
40k < Inc. < 60k 0.449 0.303 1.567 0.139  0.426 0.304 1.531 0.162 
60k < Inc. < 80k 0.284 0.353 1.329 0.421  0.266 0.355 1.305 0.454 
Income 80k + -0.071 0.319 0.932 0.825  -0.074 0.320 0.929 0.818 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.469 0.147 0.626 0.001  -0.464 0.147 0.628 0.002 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.115 0.090 1.122 0.201  0.113 0.091 1.120 0.212 
Financial Strain -0.105 0.299 0.901 0.727  -0.114 0.300 0.892 0.704 
Promotion -0.236 0.342 0.790 0.491  -0.184 0.345 0.832 0.594 
RFQ Diff 0.082 0.169 1.085 0.629  -0.068 0.257 0.935 0.793 
Fact 0.572 0.296 1.772 0.053  0.555 0.296 1.741 0.061 
Neg 1.137 0.300 3.119 0.000  1.131 0.301 3.097 0.000 
Pos  0.043 0.294 1.044 0.884  0.038 0.295 1.039 0.897 
Fact x RFQ Diff      0.323 0.276 1.381 0.242 
Pos x RFQ Diff      0.134 0.299 1.143 0.655 
Neg x RFQ Diff      -0.007 0.300 0.993 0.980 
Pseudo R2  
(Cox & Snell) .109     .113    
AIC 723     727    
% Concordant 67     67.2    
 
 Similarly—and consistent with prior results—there were no significant interactions 
effects, but there was a significant negative valence effect, χ2 (1) = 14.14, p = .0002. Again, 
indicating a negative narrative effect (H2c) and a narrative effect generally (H2a); those in the 
 
41 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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negative-valence narrative have three-times the odds of being in a higher level of intentions 
(compared to the control group). This supported H2c but did not support H2d.  
For promotion-only respondents, the interaction model was significant, χ2 (21, n = 191) = 
50.73, p = .0003, and the proportional-odds assumption was not rejected (albeit marginally), χ2 
(21) = 32.5, p = .052. Here, the positive interaction effect was significant at the 5% level, but the 
main effect was negative. The significant positive interaction tended to support H2g (that, if 
promotion-focused, positive effect was related to promotion strength). And although the main 
positive-valence effect was negative—recall, given the model including the interaction, that main 
effect was assuming a promotion strength level of zero—after incorporating promotion strength, 
that could change due to the interaction, at least at higher levels of promotion strength. So, there 
was at least slight support for H2e (if promotion, positive treatment was greater than negative). 
For prevention-only respondents, the interaction model was not significant, χ2 (21, n = 
198) = 31.25, p = .07,42 and the proportional-odds assumption was not rejected, χ2 (21) = 21.84, p 
= .41. But, the main effects-only model was significant (χ2 (18) = 29.82, p = .04), and the 
proportional odds assumption was not rejected, χ2 (18) = 17.73, p = .47. The negative-valence 
effect was significant (p = .003), with a point estimate of 1.34, corresponding to an odds ratio of 
3.84, 95% CI [1.59, 9.18]. This indicated that, for prevention-focus respondents, negative-
valence was effective (H2f), and, in particular, compared to the control, those with the negative 
narrative treatment had nearly four times the odds of being in a higher intention level. None of 
the other treatment main effects were significant. The linear hypothesis test found a significant 
difference between the negative-valence and the positive-valence (χ2 (1) = 5.25, p = .02), again in 
support of H2f. No support, however, was found for H2h (that negative effect would be 
 
42 The interaction model was not significant under the Score or Wald tests either.  
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influenced by the negative-focus strength, i.e., the interaction and RFQ difference main effects 
were not significant).   
Lastly, a binary logit,43 as presented in Table 4.17, was performed to examine high 
intentions (compared to non-high intentions) both with main effects and interactions.  
Table 4.17 Experiment 2 Binary Logit (High v. Non-High) (n = 389)   
Variable44 B SE OR p  B SE OR p 
Intercept -1.335 0.823  0.105  -1.303 0.831  0.117 
Age -0.014 0.012 0.986 0.222  -0.014 0.012 0.987 0.251 
Male -0.158 0.273 0.854 0.565  -0.174 0.277 0.840 0.528 
Race: Non-White 0.277 0.309 1.320 0.369  0.265 0.312 1.303 0.396 
College Degree 0.071 0.298 1.073 0.813  0.020 0.302 1.020 0.947 
Married -0.122 0.284 0.885 0.667  -0.094 0.287 0.910 0.743 
Self-employed 0.168 0.362 1.183 0.642  0.113 0.368 1.120 0.759 
Part-time 0.287 0.402 1.333 0.474  0.250 0.404 1.284 0.537 
Unemp/retired -0.166 0.415 0.847 0.690  -0.211 0.419 0.809 0.614 
40k < Inc. < 60k 0.427 0.359 1.533 0.234  0.402 0.362 1.494 0.267 
60k < Inc. < 80k -0.162 0.443 0.850 0.714  -0.213 0.449 0.808 0.635 
Income 80k + -0.161 0.396 0.851 0.684  -0.198 0.400 0.821 0.622 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.404 0.165 0.668 0.014  -0.390 0.165 0.677 0.018 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.239 0.115 1.269 0.037  0.224 0.115 1.251 0.052 
Financial Strain 0.003 0.372 1.003 0.993  -0.021 0.372 0.979 0.954 
Promotion 0.093 0.418 1.097 0.824  0.181 0.427 1.198 0.672 
RFQ Diff -0.160 0.204 0.852 0.434  -0.316 0.353 0.729 0.371 
Fact 0.704 0.384 2.023 0.067  0.684 0.388 1.981 0.078 
Neg 1.262 0.375 3.532 0.001  1.243 0.378 3.467 0.001 
Pos  0.268 0.407 1.307 0.511  0.244 0.415 1.276 0.556 
Fact x RFQ Diff      0.446 0.369 1.563 0.227 
Pos x RFQ Diff      -0.140 0.434 0.870 0.747 
Neg x RFQ Diff      -0.041 0.384 0.960 0.915 
Pseudo R2  
(Cox & Snell) .084     .093    
AIC 426.65     429.00    
% Concordant 68.8     69.9    
 
43 Collapsing the Likert-type data into a binary classification obviates any ordinal data concerns; respondents 
indicating a 6 or 7 intention score were classified as having high intentions.  
44 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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Like before, there was a negative-valence treatment effect; here, indicating that those in 
the negative-valence group have nearly 3.5 increased odds of being in a high intention group 
(strong likelihood) of engaging in cash-flow and budget planning compared to the control group. 
This supported H2a (narrative effect generally) and H2c (negative effect) but did not support 
H2d (that positive should be stronger than negative), as the positive treatment was not 
significant.  
 For promotion-focus only respondents, the interaction model was significant, χ2 (21, n = 
191) = 41.27, p = .005. However, none of the main effects or interactions were significant. 
Indeed, looking at the main-effects model only, none of the treatment main effects were 
significant (though, the negative-valence was marginally outside the 5% level, p = .051—which 
would comport with the prior results, i.e., a negative narrative treatment effect (H2c)).  
For prevention-focus only respondents, the interaction model was not significant, χ2 (21, 
n = 198) = 20, p = .52. This was true of the main-effects only model, too, χ2 (18, n = 198) = 
19.07, p = .39. Under this specification, then, there was a lack of support for H2f and H2h. As 
discussed more in Chapter 5, this was not necessarily a contradiction of the cumulative logit 
(with 3 categories), rather the variability could be between a different order of the levels and not 
at the high versus non-high distinction (i.e., how the variable was dichotomized); that is, the 
collapsing of intent levels 1 through 5 obscured the variability between, say, a level 1 and a level 
5, which was isolated and identified in the cumulative logit.    
 In sum, then, across the analyses above, there was a generally narrative effect, which 
supported H2a that narratives can have an impact of cash-flow and budgeting intentions. 
Moreover, that effect was seemingly driven by the negative-valence narrative, which supported 
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H2c. And, there was some support for regulatory fit (e.g., H2e and H2g) from the cumulative 
logits. 
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 Research Question 3: Insurance Needs Analysis 
 Lastly, the third research question (Experiment 3, Insurance Needs Analysis) concerned 
the effect of message framing on intentions to engage in an insurance needs analysis. In 
particular, whether narrative messages influenced these intentions (relative to a fact-based 
presentation or no information control group). Furthermore, whether the valence (positive or 
negative) of that narrative influenced intentions differently, which may be based on the 
underlying behavior. Then, whether that framing effect, if any, was influenced by individual 
characteristics, such as regulatory focus. In other words, looking at the main effects of narratives 
and regulatory orientation, and then their interactions. The analysis proceeds in the same fashion 
as Research Questions 1 and 2.  
 ANOVA and ANCOVA 
 The first hypothesis (H3a) was that narrative message framing will be positively 
associated with intentions to engage in an insurance needs analysis; that is, there will be a 
difference in treatment means—whether that arises from the positive or negative valence 
treatment. To examine that, a one-way ANOVA was analyzed. Table 4.18 reports the one-way 
ANOVA for Experiment 3.  
Table 4.18 Experiment 3 One-Way ANOVA (n = 400) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 49.403 16.468 5.32 0.0013 
Error 396 1225.387 3.094   
Corrected Total 399 1274.79    
 
The ANOVA showed a significant group difference at the 5% level, F(3, 396) = 5.32, p = 
.0013. Levene’s test for homogeneity of the group variance was not rejected at the 1% (F(3, 396) 
= 2.14, p = .09), and the Brown and Forsythe test for homogeneity was not rejected either, F(3, 
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396) = 1.22 p = .30). The ANOVA indicated that at least one group mean was different than the 
others.  
Post-estimation tests were conducted to further examine the hypotheses. Pairwise 
comparison of group means using Tukey-Kramer adjustments for multiple comparisons showed 
one significantly different pairwise difference. The negative-valence narrative produced a .99 
higher mean compared to the control, 95% CI [.35, 1.64], p < .001, which was true with 
Dunnett’s adjustment, too, p = .0002. This supported both hypothesis H3a (of a narrative effect) 
and H3c (negative valence will be effective). However, because the positive-valence treatment 
was not significantly different than the control, this did not provide evidence for H3b (that 
positive-valence framing will be positively associated with intentions). Furthermore, although 
the negative treatment reported a higher mean (M = 3.92, SD = 1.88) than the positive treatment 
(M = 3.41, SD = 1.70), their pairwise difference was not significant at the 5% level with the 
Tukey-Kramer adjustment (p = .18).45 This indicated a lack of support for H3d (that negative 
framing will be more effective than positive framing).  
 To examine the average effect of framing, a contrast was performed to compare the 
average effect of the narratives (positive and negative) to the control group. That contrast 
indicated a significant difference in intentions, with a mean difference of .74 higher intentions 
for average narrative effect to the control group, 95% CI [.31, 1.17], t(396) = 3.41, p <. 001. 
Again, this supported H3a of a general narrative effect. A contrast comparing the average effect 
of framing to the fact-based group, however, did not result in a significant difference, t(396) = 
.78, p = .43. Like before, this could indicate that the narrative effect was due to priming and 
salience; additional analysis was needed.   
 
45 However, without the Tukey-Kramer adjustment, it was significant, p = .04. 
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 A similar analysis was conducted at the subsample level. For promotion-focus 
respondents only, the one-way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 193) = 2.67, p = .049. However, 
none of the mean comparisons were significant at the 5% level (with Tukey-Kramer 
adjustments). Without the Tukey-Kramer adjustment, though, both the negative-valence and 
positive-valence were significantly different than the control, p = .01, p = .02, respectively. 
Based on the lack of significance with the Tukey-Kramer adjustment—a more conservative 
approach—however, indicated a lack of support for H3e (if promotion focus, promotion should 
be stronger).  
 Among prevention-focus respondents only, the one-way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 
199) = 4.51, p = .004. There were two pairwise mean differences; first, the negative-valence 
mean was 1.11 higher than the control, 95% CI [.24, 1.99], p = .006, and .98 higher than the 
positive-valence treatment, 95% CI [.11, 1.84], p = .02, which indicated support for H2f (if 
prevention, negative-valence better than positive-valence). 
The next model incorporated regulatory orientation as a factor. Table 4.19 reports a two-
way ANOVA (with Type III sums of squares) that incorporates both treatment group and chronic 
regulatory state (promotion- or prevention-focus) and interactions. This model was significant, 
F(7, 392) = 4.09, p = .0002.  
Table 4.19 Experiment 3 Two-Way ANOVA (Treatment x Chronic Focus) (n = 400) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 51.170 17.057 5.63 0.0009 
Chronic Focus 1 26.426 26.426 8.72 0.0033 
Interaction 3 11.0173 3.672 1.21 0.3051 
Error 392 1188.011 3.031   
Corrected Total 399 1274.790    
 
Here, the treatment main effect was significant, indicating support for H3a. The pairwise 
means comparison still showed that the negative valence was significantly higher than the 
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control. However, the interaction effect was not significant. Running the model without any 
interaction effect resulted still in a significant effect for chronic regulatory orientation, F(1, 395) 
= 8.68, p = .0003. Those that had a promotion chronic regulatory focus (as prevention was the 
reference), on average, had intention scores .51 higher than those who were chronically 
prevention oriented, 95% CI [.17, .86], p = .003.  
However, perhaps the framing effect was being influenced by the relative strength of the 
chronic regulatory focus (the RFQ difference). To control for that, an ANCOVA (with Type III 
sums of squares) for Experiment 3 that incorporated both main effects and used the RFQ 
difference as a covariate (and interaction) was performed. The overall model was significant, 
F(7, 392) = 4.79, p  < .0001. However, the interaction term was not significant (F(3, 392) = 1.41, 
p = .24), an equal-slopes model can be estimated by removing the interaction term. 
Consequently, Table 4.20 reports the model without the interaction term (with Type III sums of 
squares).  
Table 4.20 Experiment 3 ANCOVA (RFQ Difference Covariate) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 51.124 17.041 5.67 0.0008 
RFQ Difference 1 38.438 38.438 12.79 0.0004 
Error 395 1186.948 3.005   
Corrected Total 399 1274.790    
 
Here, again, the model was significant, F(4, 395) = 7.31, p < .0001. There was a main 
effect for both the treatment group, F(3, 395) = 5.67, p = .0008, and regulatory difference, F(1, 
395) = 12.79, p = .0004. Even accounting for the RFQ difference, there was still a significant 
mean difference, namely the negative valence treatment had 1.01 higher intention score than the 
control group, 95% CI [.38, 1.65], p = .0003. This, again, provided evidence for H3a (narrative 
effect generally) and H3c (negative-valence narrative effect).  
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Another analysis of interest, like in the prior experiments, was whether the results 
changed when examining on a subsample basis (i.e., only promotion- or prevention-focused 
respondents), which informed hypotheses H3e to H3g. In other words, among only promotion-
focus respondents, whether the effect changed based on strength of the promotion focus. As 
before, the regulatory differences were turned into absolute values (needed for the negative RFQ 
difference scores for prevention-focus) such that higher values indicated stronger promotion or 
prevention focus, respectively. Here, for promotion-focused respondents, the F-test for the model 
was not significant at the 5% level, F(7, 189) = 1.51, p = .168. Additional analyses were 
therefore not performed on this specification.  
Looking at prevention-focused respondents only, however, the ANCOVA with absolute 
RFQ difference as a continuous covariate was significant at the 5% level, F(7, 195) = 4.09, p = 
.0003. The interaction effect was significant, F(3, 195) = 3.81, p = .011. This is presented in 
Table 4.21. 
Table 4.21 Experiment 3 ANCOVA (RFQ Difference Covariate), 
Prevention Only (n = 203) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Treatment 3 2.494 0.831 0.31 0.8204 
RFQ Difference 1 2.853 2.853 1.05 0.3061 
Interaction 3 30.982 10.327 3.81 0.011 
Error 195 525.251 2.709   
Corrected Total 202 605.892    
 
Therefore, an unequal-slopes model was estimated with least squares mean differences 
calculated at different levels of absolute RFQ difference; mean differences were analyzed with 
Tukey-Kramer adjustments at two levels of absolute RFQ differences of 1 and 2, indicating an 
increasing change in chronic prevention strength. At an RFQ difference of 1, the negative 
valence treatment was 1.40 higher than the control, 95% CI [.49, 2.32], p = .0006; the negative 
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valence treatment was also 1.26 higher than the positive valence treatment, 95% CI [.35, 2.16], p 
= .0023. At an RFQ difference of 2, there were two significant mean differences. First, the 
negative valence treatment was 3.35 higher than the control, 95% CI [1.32, 5.39], p = .0002. 
Second, the negative valence treatment was 2.77 higher than the positive valence treatment, 95% 
CI [.67, 4.88], p = .004. Both of these results provided support for H3d (negative-valence will be 
stronger than positive-valence) and H3f (among prevention-focus respondents, negative-valence 
will be more effective).  
Comparing to the control group, with Dunnett’s procedure, the results were similar. That 
is, there was significant differences between the control with the negative valence treatment at 
RFQ difference levels at 1 and 2. Both contrasts (the average narrative effect to the control and 
the average narrative effect to the fact-based group) were insignificant, t(195) = -.81, p = .42, and 
t(195) = -.10, p = .92, respectively.  
 OLS Regression 
As before, to tease out additional variation (not addressed by the random assignment), an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis with various covariates (multiple linear 
regression) was examined to ascertain the effect of the treatments on insurance needs analysis 
intentions. Two models are presented in Table 4.22. First, is a model with main effects only, and 
second, a model with main effects and interactions. For categorical variables, cell sizes were 
examined to preserve power, and categories were collapsed as needed, like the in the prior 
regression analyses (e.g., white versus non-white; incomes less than $40,000 in the intercept and 
incomes above 80,000 collapsed; no college or college degree; married versus non-married; 
combining retired and unemployed).46 The model is reported with robust standard errors. 
 
46 Categories were collapsed to achieve at least 10 (or as close thereto as possible) respondents in each cell for each 
level of the response variable (i.e., the intentions score), as long as the collapsing made theoretical and practical 
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Variance inflation factors were examined for multicollinearity; most VIFs were under 2, and the 
highest were for the RFQ difference and the promotion dummy variable, which was not 
unexpected (even those were under 3).47  
Table 4.22 Experiment 3 OLS Regression of Insurance Needs Analysis 
Intentions (n = 400) 
Variable48 B SE p  B SE p 
Intercept 3.080 0.553 <.0001  3.021 0.556 <.0001 
Age 0.006 0.007 0.444  0.005 0.007 0.525 
Male -0.360 0.185 0.052  -0.358 0.185 0.054 
Race: Non-White 0.557 0.247 0.025  0.617 0.252 0.015 
College Degree -0.035 0.196 0.860  -0.031 0.195 0.874 
Married 0.053 0.189 0.780  0.073 0.188 0.699 
Self-employed -0.314 0.266 0.238  -0.307 0.262 0.243 
Part-time 0.153 0.288 0.596  0.141 0.291 0.627 
Unemp/retired -0.625 0.251 0.013  -0.549 0.244 0.025 
40k < Income < 60k -0.220 0.241 0.362  -0.215 0.240 0.372 
60k < Income < 80k -0.128 0.258 0.618  -0.136 0.258 0.599 
Income 80k + 0.191 0.251 0.449  0.214 0.250 0.391 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.367 0.114 0.001  -0.350 0.114 0.002 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.193 0.084 0.022  0.193 0.083 0.020 
Financial Strain -0.139 0.264 0.600  -0.128 0.260 0.622 
Promotion 0.060 0.272 0.825  0.087 0.269 0.745 
RFQ Diff 0.174 0.139 0.211  0.184 0.169 0.278 
Fact 0.500 0.233 0.032  0.502 0.231 0.031 
Neg 0.925 0.235 0.000  0.918 0.235 0.000 
Pos  0.449 0.225 0.046  0.460 0.224 0.040 
Fact x RFQ Diff     0.051 0.214 0.811 
Neg x RFQ Diff     -0.305 0.251 0.224 
Pos x RFQ Diff      0.118 0.207 0.567 
Adjusted R2 .117    .118   
 
 
sense. However, that was not possible across all categories for all intention score levels. Indeed, small cell-related 
issues are ameliorated by the later logit analysis in which the dependent variable is defined by larger categories (e.g., 
high-, medium-, and low-intentions).  
47 In the interaction model, most VIFs were under 2, but the RFQ difference and promotion dummy had higher 
VIFs, which was not unexpected given their relationship.  
48 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group.  
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 As shown, none of the interactions were significant. So, looking at the main-effects 
model, all the treatments (fact-based, negative-valence, and positive-valence) were significant at 
the 5% level. This supported hypotheses H3a (general narrative effect), H3b (positive-valence 
effect), and H3c (negative-valence effect). Using the main-effects model, a linear hypothesis test 
(for equivalency)—in particular, a robust Wald test—for the negative-valence treatment and the 
fact-based treatment parameters could not be rejected at the 5% level (p = .084),49 i.e., cannot 
conclude they have different effects relative to the control. Also, this was consistent with the 
one-way ANOVA pairwise mean comparisons. A robust Wald test for the equivalency of 
negative-valence and positive-valence was rejected at the 5% level, p = .044, indicating support 
for H3d (that negative valence > positive valence). A robust Wald test for the equivalency of the 
positive-valence and fact-based parameters likewise could not be rejected, p = .083.  
For robustness, additional multiple OLS regressions were also performed (not presented) 
using subsamples of only promotion- or prevention-focused individuals with the same main 
effects and interactions. For promotion-focus respondents only, the main-effects regression was 
significant, F(18, 178) = 1.90, p = .019. All treatments were significant at the 5% level with 
positive effects estimates of .65, 95% CI [.005, 1.30]; .84, 95% CI [.13, 1.55]; and .78, 95% CI 
[.10, 1.45] for the fact-based, negative-valence, and positive-valence, respectively, i.e., this 
directionality was the same as the whole sample. However, the robust Wald test on each pairwise 
difference could not reject the null hypotheses that they were different from each other. This 
indicated a lack of support for H3e (if promotion-focus, positive valence > negative valence).   
The interaction model was significant, too, F(21, 175) = 1.62, p = .049; however, none of 
the interactions were significant at any commonly used significance level.50 This indicated a lack 
 
49 Testing whether prevention = fact-based, χ2 (1) = 3.01, p = .092.  
50 As well, in the interaction model, the main effects were no longer significant.  
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of support for H3g that, for promotion-focus, positive-valence was influenced by promotion 
strength (that is, a lack of an interaction effect); indeed, the RFQ difference main effect was not 
significant either.  
For prevention-only respondents, the main-effects only model was significant, F(18, 184) 
= 2.62, p = .0006. In this model, only the negative treatment had a significant main effect, t(1) = 
3.25, p = .001, with a positive estimate of .951, 95% CI [.37, 1.53]. This provided evidence of 
H3f that, for prevention-focused respondents, negative-valence (loss) narrative message framing 
would be more effective than positive-valence (gain) narrative for engaging in an insurance 
needs analysis—indicating support for regulatory fit. This was supported by a robust Wald test, 
too, which rejected their equivalence, χ2 (1) = 6.55, p = .011.  
The interaction model was significant, too, F(21, 181) = 2.68, p = .0002. Indeed, in the 
interaction model, the negative-valence treatment interacted with the RFQ difference, indicating 
that strong levels of prevention orientation, coupled with the negative valence treatment, led to 
higher intention scores, relative to the control group; the interaction effect was estimated at 1.69, 
95% CI [.62, 2.77], t(1) = 3.11, p = .0002. This provided support for H3f and also H3h, which 
posited that, for prevention-focused respondents, as the strength of prevention focus increases, 
negative-valence (loss) narrative framing will be positively associated with intentions to engage 
in an insurance needs analysis; again, indicating support for regulatory fit.  
 Nonparametric Analysis 
Like in the previous experiments, the foregoing analysis used parametric techniques (e.g., 
the ANOVA and OLS regression). And, like before, as a robustness check, nonparametric 
techniques were examined, too. The Kruskal-Wallis H-Test for several independent samples 
125 
found a significant difference in location parameters for the four groups, χ2 (3, n = 400) = 14.31, 
p = .003. Providing preliminary support for H3a (a narrative treatment effect).  
Consequently, two-sample Wilcoxon test were then conducted for each group-pair 
comparison.51 Comparing the control and fact-based groups, the Wilcoxon test was significant, Z 
= -2.16, p = .031, with the fact-based group having higher scores; for the control and negative 
valence, the test was significant, Z = -3.72, p = .0002, with the negative valence having a larger 
Wilcoxon score (higher values)—this provided support for H3c (negative-valence effect); for the 
control and positive valence, the test was significant, Z = -2.01, p = .045, with positive valence 
having higher scores—this provided support for H3b (positive-valence effect); for the fact-based 
and negative valence, the test was not significant, Z = 1.61, p = .11—consistent with the OLS 
regression parameter test results; for fact-based and positive valence, the test was not significant, 
Z = -.20, p = .84, again consistent with OLS robust Wald tests on the parameters; finally, for 
negative and positive valences, the test was not significant, Z = -1.86, p = .062. In sum, then, the 
nonparametric analysis supported the parametric analysis insofar as the treatment location 
parameters were not the same, but that the treatment effects may not be significantly different 
from each other.  
Examining only promotion-focused respondents resulted in an insignificant Kruskal-
Wallis H Test, χ2 (3, n = 197) = 7.69, p = .052, albeit just marginally outside the 5% level. This 
would imply that the pairwise Wilcoxon should not be significantly different either. And, indeed, 
the Wilcoxon test for the negative- and positive-valence treatments were not significantly 
different, Z = .231, p = .82. This indicated a lack of support for H3e.   
 
51 Like before, continuity corrections were not implemented due to the sample sizes involved; reported p-values are 
two-sided.  
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However, for prevention-focused respondents only, the Kruskal-Wallis test was 
significant, χ2 (3, n = 203) = 11.60, p = .009. The Wilcoxon test for a difference between the 
positive-valence and negative-valence the test was significant, Z = -2.76, p = .006, with the 
negative-valence having the higher scores (values). As such, this supported H3f (if prevention, 
negative-valence > positive-valence). Consequently, the nonparametric tests support the 
parametric ANOVAs and regressions above that, for insurance needs analysis, the treatment 
effects may depend on regulatory focus.  
 Logistic Regression (Cumulative, Multinomial, and Binary) 
Next, logits were examined. First, a cumulative logit was performed, which, like the 
above nonparametric analyses, was ideal with Likert-type data. The cumulative logit was first 
performed using all 7-levels of the intention scale. That cumulative logit is presented in Table 
4.23 both as main-effects only and main effects with interactions (similar to the above OLS 
regression). However, both the main-effect only and interaction models rejected the proportional 
odds assumption, so they should be examined cautiously.  
Table 4.23 Experiment 3 Cumulative Logit of All Intention Levels (n = 400) 
Variable52 B SE OR p  B SE OR p 
Intercept (7) -3.984 0.620  <.0001  -4.075 0.622  <.0001 
Intercept (6) -2.696 0.587  <.0001  -2.788 0.589  <.0001 
Intercept (5) -1.319 0.575  0.022  -1.409 0.577  0.015 
Intercept (4) -0.688 0.573  0.230  -0.776 0.575  0.177 
Intercept (3) 0.005 0.572  0.992  -0.080 0.573  0.889 
Intercept (2) 1.032 0.574  0.072  0.953 0.576  0.098 
Age 0.006 0.008 1.006 0.423  0.006 0.008 1.006 0.442 
Male -0.349 0.194 0.706 0.073  -0.347 0.195 0.707 0.076 
Race: Non-white 0.583 0.255 1.791 0.022  0.638 0.259 1.893 0.014 
College Degree -0.028 0.212 0.973 0.896  -0.027 0.212 0.973 0.899 
Married 0.078 0.201 1.081 0.700  0.094 0.202 1.098 0.642 
 
52 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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Self-employed -0.336 0.261 0.715 0.198  -0.322 0.261 0.724 0.217 
Part-time 0.188 0.321 1.206 0.560  0.195 0.323 1.215 0.546 
Unemp/retired -0.713 0.286 0.490 0.013  -0.664 0.289 0.515 0.022 
40k < Inc. < 60k -0.186 0.256 0.831 0.468  -0.175 0.256 0.840 0.494 
60k < Inc. < 80k -0.072 0.289 0.931 0.803  -0.076 0.289 0.927 0.793 
Income 80k + 0.171 0.270 1.186 0.528  0.188 0.271 1.206 0.488 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.356 0.130 0.700 0.006  -0.345 0.131 0.708 0.009 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.225 0.086 1.252 0.009  0.226 0.086 1.254 0.008 
Financial Strain -0.087 0.288 0.917 0.764  -0.087 0.289 0.917 0.763 
Prevention 0.025 0.292 1.026 0.931  0.077 0.293 1.080 0.793 
RFQ Diff 0.243 0.141 1.275 0.085  0.257 0.194 1.293 0.185 
Fact 0.509 0.254 1.664 0.045  0.509 0.255 1.664 0.046 
Negative 1.016 0.261 2.761 <.0001  0.995 0.260 2.705 0.000 
Positive 0.550 0.261 1.733 0.035  0.566 0.261 1.761 0.030 
Fact x RFQ Diff      0.026 0.235 1.026 0.912 
Pos x RFQ Diff      0.083 0.232 1.087 0.720 
Neg x RFQ Diff      -0.354 0.250 0.702 0.157 
Pseudo R2  
(Cox & Snell) .156     .162    
AIC 1468     1471    
% Concordant 64.5     65.2    
 
In the above model, none of the interactions were significant. However, all three 
treatment effects were significant, indicating support for H3a (framing effect), H3b (positive-
valence effect) and H3c (negative-valence effect). A linear hypothesis test of the equivalency of 
the positive-valence and negative-valence parameters could not be rejected (although it would be 
rejected at the 10% level, p = .094), indicating a lack of support for H3d (negative-valence > 
positive-valence). A linear hypothesis test of the equivalency between the fact-based and 
negative treatment was just marginally outside the 5% level, χ2 (1, n = 400) = 3.699, p = .054. 
For promotion-focus respondents only subsample analysis, the interaction model was 
significant, χ2 (21, n = 197) = 34.22, p = .034. Yet, none of the main effects or interactions were 
themselves significant at the 5% level. The main-effects-only model was also significant, χ2 (18, 
n = 197) = 33.74, p = .014. The negative-valence and positive-valence main effects were 
128 
significant, p = .01 and p = .02, respectively. However, the linear hypothesis could not reject the 
null hypothesis that they were the same, i.e., indicating a lack of support for H3e (if promotion, 
positive-valence > negative-valence). And, again, the proportional-odds assumption was rejected 
(χ2 (90) = 160.82, p < .001), indicating the model should be considered cautiously.  
For prevention-only respondents, the interaction model was significant, χ2 (21, n = 203) = 
58.11, p < .0001. Although none of the main treatment effects were significant, the negative-
valence/RFQ difference interaction was significant, with a point estimate of 2.46 (OR = 11.75, p 
= .0006), indicating support for H3h. Indeed, looking at the main-effects model only, which was 
significant, too, χ2 (18, n = 203) = 46.57, p = .0002, the negative-valence treatment was 
significant, with a point estimate of 1.04 (OR = 2.83, 95% CI 1.33, 6.02, p = .007). A linear 
hypothesis test was just marginally outside the 5% level (p = .055) for the parameter equivalence 
between the positive-valence and the negative-valence; however, in the model, the positive effect 
was not significant and the negative effect was significant, which still indicates slight support for 
H3f. Though, as noted, the proportional-odds assumptions were violated in these models.  
Consequently, due to indication of the proportional-odds assumption being violated in the 
above specifications,53 a multinomial logit was examined, too. That analysis is not presented due 
to the unwieldy number of category pairs. Also, there was possible quasi-complete separation of 
the data (this was true in both the main effects and interaction model specifications), likely due 
to low cell size in the extreme values (e.g., scores of 7) in the treatment cells. Therefore, to 
alleviate that issue, a parsimonious multinomial logit was performed with just the treatment main 
effects as regressors, which allowed the model to converge. In this parsimonious specification, 
 
53 As noted earlier, Allison (2012) notes that, with SAS, the test may reject the null hypothesis more often than 
needed. And that, with many independent variables and larger sample sizes, in Allison’s experience, p-values of less 
than .05 are routinely returned (Allison, 2012).  
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none of the Type 3 analysis of effects were significant for the main effects. And, only one level 
of the negative valence (level 6) was significant (which was being compared to the control group 
at an intention level of 1), which was not that remarkable (given these were extreme answer 
values).  
Similarly, the full interaction model (with all previous covariates) suffered possible 
quasi-separation. Therefore, the parsimonious model of just main treatment effects and 
interactions was analyzed (without other covariates); this model was significant, χ2 (36, n = 400) 
= 65.02, p = .002. Here, none of the Type 3 analysis of effects were significant for the main 
effects or interactions. But several individual interactions were significant, which tended to be at 
higher levels of intention scores, which makes sense given they were being contrasted with an 
intention level of 1 in the control group (the intercept). As noted in the prior experiments, there 
were some issues with this approach, however—namely that the reference level was the baseline 
level of one for intentions; it was natural, then, to expect some very large odds ratios for some of 
the treatment contrasts (e.g., someone indicating a 7 being compared to a 1) particularly with the 
endpoint values, which may have smaller cell size.  
To further strengthen the analysis, increase power, and account for the proportional odds 
assumption, like in the prior analyses, instead of using all seven levels, the levels were collapsed 
into a low- (1 or 2), medium- (3, 4, or 5), and high-intention levels (6 or 7). A cumulative logit, 
therefore, was performed with both main effects and interactions. Those results are reported in 
Table 4.24. Importantly, with three levels instead of 7, the proportional odds assumption was 
soundly not rejected.54 The reference condition was low intentions.  
 
 
54 For the main effects model, χ2 (19, n = 400) = 24.23, p = .19; for the interaction model, χ2 (22, n = 400) = 28.14, p 
= .17. 
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Table 4.24 Experiment 3 Cumulative Logit (High, Medium, Low) (n = 400) 
Variable55 B SE OR p  B SE OR p 
Intercept (High) -2.741 0.647  <.0001  -2.865 0.651  <.0001 
Intercept (Med.) -0.054 0.631  0.931  -0.158 0.633  0.803 
Age 0.010 0.009 1.010 0.246  0.009 0.009 1.009 0.290 
Male -0.217 0.215 0.805 0.312  -0.218 0.216 0.804 0.314 
Race: Non-white 0.610 0.281 1.840 0.030  0.687 0.287 1.987 0.017 
College Degree 0.046 0.235 1.047 0.844  0.057 0.236 1.058 0.810 
Married 0.117 0.223 1.124 0.600  0.145 0.224 1.156 0.518 
Self-employed -0.359 0.289 0.698 0.214  -0.346 0.291 0.708 0.235 
Part-time 0.052 0.356 1.053 0.884  0.043 0.358 1.044 0.904 
Unemp/retired -0.659 0.319 0.518 0.039  -0.578 0.322 0.561 0.073 
40k < Inc. < 60k -0.374 0.284 0.688 0.187  -0.366 0.285 0.693 0.199 
60k < Inc. < 80k -0.329 0.321 0.719 0.304  -0.335 0.322 0.715 0.297 
Income 80k + -0.010 0.299 0.990 0.973  0.012 0.300 1.012 0.969 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.308 0.144 0.735 0.032  -0.288 0.145 0.750 0.047 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.195 0.095 1.215 0.040  0.197 0.095 1.218 0.038 
Financial Strain -0.053 0.320 0.948 0.868  -0.050 0.322 0.951 0.877 
Prevention -0.080 0.323 0.923 0.805  -0.040 0.324 0.961 0.902 
RFQ Diff 0.269 0.157 1.308 0.086  0.276 0.218 1.318 0.206 
Fact 0.392 0.282 1.480 0.164  0.389 0.284 1.476 0.170 
Neg 0.985 0.289 2.678 0.001  0.978 0.289 2.659 0.001 
Pos 0.514 0.289 1.672 0.076  0.531 0.291 1.700 0.068 
Fact x RFQ Diff      0.079 0.265 1.082 0.766 
Pos x RFQ Diff      0.137 0.261 1.147 0.600 
Neg x RFQ Diff      -0.394 0.279 0.675 0.158 
Pseudo R2  
(Cox & Snell) .120     .129    
AIC 774     776    
% Concordant 66.4     67.2    
 
In the main-effects model, the negative-valence treatment was significant at the 5% level, 
and the positive-valence treatment was significant at the 10% level.  In the interaction model, 
however, none of the interaction effects were significant, but the negative treatment was still 
significant. This provided support for H3c (negative-valence effect) and H3a (framing effect 
 
55 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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generally). Moreover, in this model, the Wald test was rejected for the equivalency of the 
negative and fact-based treatment parameters,56 indicating a true difference between the two. 
However, a Wald test could not reject the equivalency for the positive-valence and negative-
valence (or fact-based treatment) in the interaction model. But the negative-valence was still 
significantly non-zero, which was not true for the positive-valence. This tended to support H3d.  
Like before, separate subsample analyses were conducted, too. For promotion-only 
respondents, the interaction model was not significant, χ2 (21, n = 197) = 28.73, p = .12; the 
main-effects only model was not significant either, χ2 (18, n = 197) = 27.91, p = .064.57 Even 
considering the main-effects model, the only significant parameter was for the negative-valence, 
with a point estimate of 1.02, corresponding to an odds ratio of 2.78, 95% CI [1.20, 6.48], p = 
.02. However, this did not indicate support for any hypothesis (other than a general negative 
valence effect), and even if considered, would not support H3e or H3g.  
For prevention-only respondents, the interaction model was significant, χ2 (21, n = 203) = 
46.41, p = .001 and the proportional-odds assumption was not rejected, χ2 (21) = 23.16, p = .34. 
Even though the negative-valence main effect was negative (B = -.747), the negative-valence-
strength interaction was significant, with a point estimate of 2.32 (p = .005), indicating support 
of H3h (if prevention-focus, negative valence related to strength), at least at higher levels of 
prevention strength—that is, as prevention strength increased, so too did the effect of the 
negative-valence treatment. And, looking at the main-effects model, which was significant (χ2 
(18) = 37.08, p = .005), the negative-valence parameter was significant with a point estimate of 
.99 (OR = 2.69, p = .02), but none of the other treatments were significant, which indicated 
support for H3f (if prevention, negative-valence > positive-valence). However, the Wald test 
 
56 χ2 (1, n = 400) = 4.40, p = .036. 
57 The model was not significant under Score or Wald tests either.  
132 
could not reject the null equivalency at 5% (p = .10), but again, the other parameter estimates 
were not significantly different than zero. 
Lastly, in addition to the cumulative logit, a binary logit,58 reported in Table 4.25, was 
performed to examine high intentions (compared to non-high intentions) both with main effects 
and interactions. As before, only the negative-valence treatment was significant, indicating 
support for H3c (negative-valence effect) and H3a (framing generally). As well, the Wald test 
rejected the null hypothesis that the negative and fact-based parameters were equivalent. A Wald 
test also rejected the null hypothesis that the positive-valence and negative-valence were 
equivalent, which supports H3d (negative-valence > positive-valence). 
Table 4.25 Experiment 3 Logit (High v. Non-High) (n = 400) 
Variable59 B SE OR p  B SE OR p 
Intercept -4.747 1.105  <.0001  -4.898 1.138  <.0001 
Age 0.013 0.015 1.013 0.397  0.007 0.015 1.007 0.636 
Male -0.299 0.349 0.741 0.391  -0.268 0.355 0.765 0.450 
Race: Non-white 0.748 0.409 2.114 0.068  0.879 0.420 2.409 0.037 
College Degree 0.126 0.390 1.134 0.747  0.136 0.392 1.146 0.728 
Married 0.172 0.359 1.188 0.632  0.216 0.364 1.241 0.553 
Self-employed -0.175 0.471 0.839 0.710  -0.219 0.478 0.804 0.647 
Part-time 0.208 0.532 1.231 0.696  0.096 0.537 1.101 0.859 
Unemp/retired -1.218 0.690 0.296 0.078  -1.058 0.699 0.347 0.130 
40k < Inc. < 60k -0.553 0.479 0.575 0.249  -0.571 0.482 0.565 0.236 
60k < Inc. < 80k -0.152 0.503 0.859 0.762  -0.186 0.506 0.830 0.713 
Income 80k + -0.462 0.481 0.630 0.336  -0.419 0.488 0.658 0.391 
Obj. Fin. Know. -0.301 0.213 0.740 0.158  -0.253 0.218 0.777 0.246 
Sub. Fin. Know. 0.446 0.163 1.561 0.006  0.456 0.167 1.578 0.006 
Financial Strain 0.381 0.483 1.463 0.430  0.373 0.489 1.452 0.446 
Prevention 0.353 0.520 1.423 0.498  0.540 0.544 1.716 0.321 
RFQ Diff 0.130 0.253 1.138 0.608  0.141 0.488 1.151 0.774 
Fact 0.847 0.569 2.332 0.137  0.931 0.612 2.538 0.128 
 
58 Collapsing the Likert-type data into a binary classification obviates any ordinal data concerns; respondents 
indicating a 6 or 7 intention score were classified as having high intentions.  
59 Reference groups were non-married, White, full-time employed, income less than $40,000, and in the control 
group. 
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Neg 1.852 0.544 6.369 0.001  1.901 0.581 6.694 0.001 
Pos 0.830 0.581 2.293 0.153  0.470 0.692 1.600 0.497 
Fact x RFQ Diff      -0.253 0.552 0.776 0.647 
Post x RFQ Diff      0.611 0.591 1.842 0.302 
Neg x RFQ Diff      -0.428 0.536 0.652 0.425 
Pseudo R2 ( 
Cox & Snell) .106     .118    
AIC 304.40     304.94    
% Concordant 76.3     78.4    
 
The logit was performed on the subsamples of promotion-focus-only and prevention-
focus-only subsamples, too. For the promotion-focus subsample, the overall interaction model 
was significant, χ2 (21) = 37.20, p = .02, but none of the treatment effects or interactions were 
significant. This indicated a lack of support for H3e (if promotion, positive-valence > negative 
valence) and H3g (positive-valence effect increases with RFQ score). And, in the main-effects 
model, the negative-valence was significant, with a point estimate of 1.78 (OR = 5.95, p = .01), 
again indicating a general negative narrative effect (H3c). 
For the prevention-focus subsample, the interaction model was not significant, χ2 (21, n = 
203) = 31.05, p = .07 (this was true even upon removing the interaction effects, i.e., using only 
the main-effects model, χ2 (18, n = 203) = 24.53, p = .14). This, too, indicated a lack of support 
for H3h (negative-valence effect increases with RFQ score). However, as described in 
Experiment 2, this could because the additional collapsing of categories obscured the variability 
between, say, those with a level 1 intention to those of a level 5 (or higher) intention value.  
 Summary 
A summary table is presented in Table 4.26, which depicts the hypotheses examined and 
the resulting indication of supported (✓), not supported (x), or not applicable (—) by the several 
statistical analyses performed.  
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Table 4.26 Results/Hypotheses Summary Table by Experiment 
Experiment 1 
Analysis H1a  (Framing) 
H1b  
(PV) 
H1c  
(NV) 
H1d  
(PV > NV) 
H1e  
(If Prom.,  
PV > NV) 
H1f  
(If Prev.,  
NV > PV) 
H1g  
(If Prom., 
 PV ⍺ PromF) H1h  (If Prev.,  NV ⍺ PrevF) 
ANOVA  
(incl. sub-sample 
ANOVA) 
x x x x x x — — 
Pairwise Mean 
Comparisons x x x x x x — — 
Linear Contrast x — — — — — — — 
Two-Way ANOVA x x x x — — — — 
OLS Regression  
(incl. sub-sample OLS) x x x x x x x x 
Kruskal-Wallis test x x x x x x — — 
Wilcoxon test — — — — — — — — 
Cumulative Logit  
(7-levels)  
(incl. sub-samples) 
x x x x x x x x 
Cumulative Logit  
(3-levels)  
(incl. sub-samples) 
x x x x x x x x 
Binary Logit  
(incl. sub-samples) x x x x x x x x 
✓ = support, x = no support, — = n/a; PV = positive-valence; NV = negative-valence;  
PromF = promotion-focus strength; PrevF = prevention-focus strength    
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Experiment 2 
Analysis H2a  (Framing) 
H2b  
(PV) 
H2c  
(NV) 
H2d  
(PV > NV) 
H2e  
(If Prom.,  
PV > NV) 
H2f  
(If Prev.,  
NV > PV) 
H2g  
(If Prom.,  
PV ⍺ PromF) H2h  (If Prev.,  NV ⍺ PrevF) 
ANOVA  
(incl. sub-sample 
ANOVA) 
✓ — — — — — — — 
Pairwise Mean 
Comparisons ✓ x ✓ x x x — — 
Linear Contrast ✓ — — — — — — — 
Two-Way ANOVA ✓ — — — — — — — 
OLS Regression  
(incl. sub-sample OLS) ✓ x ✓ x x x ✓ x 
Kruskal-Wallis ✓ — — — — — — — 
Wilcoxon — x ✓ x x x — — 
Cumulative Logit  
(7-levels)  
(incl. sub-samples) 
✓ x ✓ x ✓ x ✓ x 
Cumulative Logit  
(3-levels)  
(incl. sub-samples) 
✓ x ✓ x ✓ ✓ ✓ x 
Binary Logit  
(incl. sub-samples) ✓ x ✓ x x x x x 
✓ = support, x = no support, — = n/a; PV = positive-valence; NV = negative-valence;  
PromF = promotion-focus strength; PrevF = prevention-focus strength    
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Experiment 3 
Analysis H3a (Framing) 
H3b  
(PV) 
H3c  
(NV) 
H3d  
(NV > PV) 
H3e  
(If Prom.,  
PV > NV) 
H3f  
(If Prev., 
NV > PV) 
H3g  
(If Prom.,  
PV ⍺ PromF) H3h  (If Prev.,  NV ⍺ PrevF) 
ANOVA ✓ — — — — — — — 
Pairwise Mean 
Comparisons ✓ x ✓ x x ✓ — — 
Linear Contrast ✓ — — — — — — — 
Two-Way ANOVA ✓ — — — — — — — 
OLS Regression  
(incl. sub-sample OLS) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ x ✓ 
Kruskal-Wallis ✓ — — — — — — — 
Wilcoxon ✓ ✓ ✓ x x ✓ — — 
Cumulative Logit  
(7-levels)  
(incl. sub-samples) 
✓ ✓ ✓ x x ✓ x ✓ 
Cumulative Logit  
(3-levels)  
(incl. sub-samples) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ x ✓ x ✓ 
Binary Logit  
(incl. sub-samples) ✓ x ✓ ✓ x x x x 
✓ = support, x = no support, — = n/a; PV = positive-valence; NV = negative-valence;  
PromF = promotion-focus strength; PrevF = prevention-focus strength   
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Chapter 5 - Discussion 
This chapter proceeds in four part. First, the research findings are summarized, 
synthesized, and analyzed. This is done on an experiment-by-experiment basis and then as a 
whole to discuss common themes and findings; particular care will be given to how the empirical 
findings comport with the expectations from theory and prior research and literature. Second, 
those findings are discussed for their implications for the financial-planning and related 
professions. Third, limitations of this study are discussed. Fourth, suggestions for future research 
are explored.   
 Research Findings 
 Retirement Savings: Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 regarded retirement savings intentions. Despite the various statistical 
techniques used, no significant relations were shown. At first blush, this is surprising. Prior 
research has generally found support for relationships between psychological characteristics and 
savings behavior (e.g., Asebedo et al., 2019). For example, literature has discussed that 
psychological characteristics, such as time perspectives (Hershey & Mowen, 2000) and self-
efficacy (Chatterjee, Finke, & Harness, 2011); affective states (Guven, 2012); and personality 
traits are associated with savings behavior or wealth accumulation (Asebedo et al., 2019; 
Nabeshima & Seay, 2015). Therefore, it was surprising that regulatory focus had no impact on 
savings behavior in this experiment.   
Moreover, under the tripartite framework established from the medical framing literature, 
retirement savings behavior was modeled as a prevention behavior. From that literature, 
prevention behaviors allow individuals to prevent future harm (e.g., a future health malady) 
(Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Thus, the critical distinction between a detection behavior and a 
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prevention behavior is the proximal risk (Detweiler at al., 1999); the risk is in the future for 
prevention behaviors, and the risk is current for the detection behavior.  
 Based on that distinction, then, theory indicated that gain framing should be ideal. 
However, this was basically a result by implication. Loss framing is not ideal in prevention 
behaviors because loss framing encourages risk-seeking (to avoid the loss). For prevention 
behaviors, there is no current risk, so loss framing would appear to be counter-productive—this 
leaves gain framing as the viable choice. And, indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, there has been 
empirical results that support gain framing for prevention behaviors (e.g., Christopherson & 
Gyulay (1981) for car seats, and Linville, Fischer, & Fischhoff (1993) for condom usage). But, 
O’Keefe and Jensen (2007) noted that the effect of gain framing for disease prevention behavior 
may be misleading. Here, the data did not support gain framing in Experiment 1. 
 Surprisingly—and unlike the other experiments—there was not a negative-valence 
framing effect either. Indeed, there was no significant mean intention difference in any of the 
treatments or control group. Due to the lack of any treatment effect (and this lack of treatment 
effect was consistent across model specifications—e.g., the binary high-low or cumulative three-
category logits), this could be due to the fact that people basically know they need to save for 
retirement; that is, the public is generally aware of it and then social desirability bias takes over. 
It could also be that, unlike the other behaviors examined, the retirement horizon is so far off, it 
is not readily salient (e.g., “Yes, I’ll do that eventually, but not now—I can do it later”). If that 
were the driving factor, though, there may be an age effect (as retirement becomes more salient). 
However, age was not a significant predictor in any of the models. Moreover, the lack of a 
significant framing effect was even true when the sample was split into prevention and 
promotion subsamples.  
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It may be that the retirement savings problem was not a suitable financial behavior proxy 
for a preventative behavior; that is, the narrative did not ably fit the theory. Even if that were the 
case, based on the other experiments, some treatment effect may be expected (at a minimum due 
the potential priming effect of the fact-based treatment relative to the control group). Yet, there 
was no effect across the experiment regardless of treatment or control.  It could have also been 
that the Experiment 1 narratives were not as charged as the other narratives; that is, the story did 
not evoke the desired emotional response.60 Stated simply, perhaps the loss and gain framing 
were not of significant magnitude to induce a framing response. Thus, it is unclear why 
Experiment 1 did not yield a significant difference across any treatment.  
 Cash-Flow and Budgeting: Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 regarded budget and cash-flow planning intentions. This was modeled as a 
treatment behavior. Treatment behaviors remedy a current problem (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). 
Rothman and Salovey (1997) argued that undergoing the treatment is the risk-averse (safer) 
option compared to no treatment and suffering from the problem. Under prospect theory, then, to 
encourage the risk-averse option, gain framing should be used (because loss framing encourages 
risk-seeking choices).  
 There were four takeaways from Experiment 2. First, consistent support for a narrative 
effect; that is, one of the narratives were significantly different than the control; this was true 
across model specifications and statistical analyses. Second, there was a consistent lack of 
support for a positive-valence (gain) framing effect. This was contrary to the directionality 
hypothesized by theory; relatedly, the positive-valence effect, therefore, was not stronger than 
the negative-valence. Third, the framing effect was attributable to the negative-valence (loss) 
 
60 As noted more in the limitations section, manipulation checks should be used in future research to ensure the 
proper response was induced, i.e., the narrative conveyed the desired emotion.   
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narrative, which was generally consistent across models and specifications. Fourth, there was 
indication of regulatory fit, despite the lack a positive-valence main effect. Each will be 
addressed in turn.  
 There was a consistent framing effect, which emanated from the negative-valence 
narrative. In other words, across the sample as a whole, although there were negative-valence 
main effects, there was no positive-valence main effect. Based on the literature, this was 
unexpected. Recall that, for treatment behaviors, the literature predicted that gain-framing should 
be more persuasive than loss-framing—and there was empirical support for the gain-framing 
main effects (e.g., McNeil et al., 1982; Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Nevertheless, the negative-
valence (loss) framing was consistently associated with higher intention levels (across models 
and specifications). There could be several reasons for that.  
First, as noted in the literature review, was the possibility for negativity bias. In short, 
“bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister et al., 2001, p. 362). Derived from prospect theory, 
powerful negativity potency stems from the shape of the value function and loss aversion. Here, 
that negative potency could have been stronger than any effect in the gain frame. Second, the 
gain frame (i.e., the positive-valence) may not have been that “charged”—that is, it poorly 
implemented the perspective of a gain frame. However, upon review of the positive-valence 
narrative, it presented each item in the issue mix in a gain, positive outcome, or win; as such, this 
rationale is unlikely. Third is that budgeting and cash-flow planning may not have been an ideal 
financial behavior proxy for a treatment behavior. However, its selection was rooted in the 
theoretical nature of treatment and recuperative behaviors. The current problem was the monthly 
budget shortfall that created collateral problems; the treatment (the budget and cash-flow 
planning) ameliorated that problem in the positive-valence narrative, and the lack of the 
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treatment exacerbated that problem in the negative-valence narrative. The selection of budget 
and cash-flow planning therefore had a basis in theory as a treatment behavior.  
Experiment 2 also provided the first, albeit slight, indication of support for regulatory fit 
in this research. Regulatory fit refers to when a goal is pursued that is consistent with the 
underlying regulatory state (Idson et al., 2004). And the prior literature indicated that regulatory 
fit should enhance the message framing impact (e.g., Cesario et al., 2004, 2008). Based on 
theory, then, it was expected that gain framing (focusing on the benefits) would be more 
persuasive for promotion-focus respondents, and loss framing (focusing on the costs) for 
prevention-focus respondents (Spiegel et al., 2004). Although there was not consistent support 
for H2e and H2f (the regulatory fit main effects hypotheses), for promotion-focus respondents, 
there tended to be indication of a positive interaction effect between relative promotion strength 
and the positive effect (H2g). In other words, among promotion-focus respondents, the effect of 
the positive-valence narrative increased with the strength of the promotion focus (i.e., the RFQ 
difference). This comports with a regulatory fit rationale. Curiously, this was not true for 
prevention-respondents (H2h).  
 Insurance Needs: Experiment 3 
 Lastly, Experiment 3 examined intentions concerning performing an insurance needs 
analysis. This was modeled as a detection behavior. Detection behaviors are those that detect or 
identify a current problem. Detection behaviors examined in past studies included, for example, 
breast self-examinations, skin-cancer exams, and HIV testing—each of those behaviors give rise 
to the possibility of identifying a current problem. Here, in the narratives, the problem detected 
was a lack of adequate insurance protection (across various risk sources). Based on theory, then, 
loss framing was expected to be the more impactful framing choice. This is because detection 
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behaviors are seen as risky at the time of the behavior (i.e., taking the test) because it exposes the 
person to a potential loss (being alerted to the problem). Because loss framing encourages risk-
seeking behavior, therefore, loss framing should complement detection behaviors.  
 Surprisingly—and unlike in Experiments 1 and 2—there was indication of both a 
positive- and negative-valence effect. The positive-valence and negative-valence effects were 
consistent across model specifications. According to theory, the negative-valence (loss) framing 
should be more impactful than the positive-valence (gain) framing. There were mixed results in 
the analyses on this front. Three of the statistical methods indicated that negative valence was 
superior, but three did not. However, the pairwise comparison would have been significant 
without the Tukey-Kramer adjustment, and the nonparametric Wilcoxon test may not have had 
enough power to notice differences that were on the margin of significance (which may be the 
case given the Tukey-Kramer significance change). The other technique—seven-level 
cumulative logit—should not be given much deference due to the proportional-odds assumption 
being violated. Indeed, the ideal model to examine would be the three-level cumulative logit—
due to the proportional-odds assumption not being violated and the naturally larger cell sizes 
(more power)—which did indicate that the negative-valence effect was larger than the positive-
effect.61  
 Regarding regulatory fit, the Experiment 3 results were mixed. There was a consistent 
lack of support for the promotion-focus respondents and the positive-valence (i.e., the positive 
valence effect would be greater than the negative valence effect). One reason could be that, 
despite being promotion-focused, the negative-valence was particularly dominating here (i.e., 
 
61 Though, the Wald tests in both the main effect and interaction model could not reject the null hypothesis of 
equivalency.  
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irrespective of the individual’s chronic regulatory focus orientation).62 For prevention-focus 
respondents, however, there was consistent support that the negative-valence was stronger than 
the positive-valence. However, this could just be the main effect (i.e., the negative-valence effect 
generally) rather than being specifically attributable to regulatory fit. But, when considering the 
similarly consistent results that, for prevention-focus respondents, the higher the level of 
prevention focus (i.e., stronger), lead to an increased negative-valence effect (H3h), which 
supported the presence of regulatory fit.  
 Narrative Effects 
 Experiments 2 and 3 both found some support consistent with a narrative effect. That is, 
compared to the control group, there were indications that those exposed to a narrative (either 
positive- or negative-valence) had higher mean intention scores. This was predicted by theory. 
Narrative framing (presenting information in a story-like manner) invokes emotional responses 
that are not present when merely processing fact-based information (e.g., Carlsson Hauff et al., 
2014, 2016). Indeed, the narrative effect has been demonstrated in the financial decision-making 
context, too (Carlsson Hauff et al., 2014, 2016) 
However, there was a possible confounding issue here—a potential priming effect; that 
is, reading about budgeting or an insurance needs analysis may naturally predispose someone to 
that behavior (as it is now more salient). Thus, comparing the narrative effects jointly and 
separately to the fact-based treatment is critical (to minimize the confounding influence, if any, 
of priming).  
In Experiment 2, although there were pairwise mean comparisons significant relative to 
the control, neither the positive- nor negative-valence treatments were significantly different than 
 
62 This was noted as a limitation, too—the actual emotional effect of any narrative on the reader was indeterminate.  
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the fact-based treatment group. Similarly, although the narrative average effect contrast was 
significantly different than the control, it was not different than the fact-based treatment effect. 
This was borne out by the nonparametric analyses, too. So, it was unclear whether, at least in 
Experiment 2, what was the factor leading to the effect—was it truly the narrative or just priming 
and salience.  
In Experiment 3, the picture, unfortunately, was not clearer. The narrative treatment 
effects, although significantly different than the control group, were not significant relative to the 
fact-based treatment (or the joint contrast either). In the various regression analyses, Wald tests 
generally could not reject the parameter equivalencies either between the narrative treatments 
and the fact-based treatment. However, in the three-level cumulative logit, the Wald test did 
reject the equivalency for the negative-valence and fact-based treatment; as did the same test in 
the binary logit. Thus, there was some support from Experiment 3 that the narrative effect is not 
solely attributable to mere priming and salience. As noted in the suggestions for further research 
section, this precise issue should be addressed in future research.  
 Framing Effects 
The framing effects considered by this research were negative- and positive-valence 
narratives, which were akin to the hypothetical gain or loss framing that is present in the 
behavioral economics and related literature. Based on prospect theory, there was an expectation 
that, depending on how information was presented (i.e., its frame), the choice would be either be 
risk-seeking or risk-averse. The notion that choice is dependent upon the frame of information is 
antithetical to traditional rational expectation theory analysis. As prospect theory indicates and 
empirical studies routinely demonstrate, people view gains and losses differently—and different 
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from their mere mathematical equivalencies. And, from that theoretical basis, losses tend to 
encourage risk-seeking behavior and gains tend to encourage risk-averse behavior.  
Here, there was consistent support from Experiments 2 and 3 of framing effects. In both 
experiments, the negative-valence treatment had higher mean intention scores relative to the 
control groups. In Experiment 3, there was decent support for a positive-valence effect, too. 
These findings were generally consistent across statistical method, which adds to its robustness. 
However, for the same reasons discussed in the Narrative Effects section, it may be hard to 
isolate this effect from just priming. But, consider Experiment 2, in which there was a significant 
negative-valence effect but not a significant positive-valence effect. If, at bottom, the results 
were arising solely from priming and salience, it would be expected for both valences to be 
significant. Indeed, that only one valence is effective (and not the other) actually supports that 
the treatment effects may not be solely attributable to priming and salience. Though, this is a 
potential limitation that should be studied expressly in future research.  
Moreover, as the core tenants of prospect theory have been examined empirically, a rich 
medical and public health literature has emerged, which is rooted in behavioral economics and 
prospect theory. That literature indicated that the framing effect can depend on the underlying 
nature of the behavior (was the behavior for prevention, treatment, or detection). Based on that 
framework, it was expected that the positive valence would be more effective in Experiment 2 
and that the negative valence would be more effective in Experiment 3.63 However, that result 
was not borne out here.  
In Experiment 2, the positive-valence treatment was not significant, despite the prediction 
from the literature. And the negative-valence treatment was significant, which was not the 
 
63 The lack of any significance in Experiment 1 was relevant to the empirical validation of this framework applied to 
personal financial planning decision making, too.  
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theoretical expectation. In Experiment 3, both narratives were effectives. But, the real test, it 
seemed, for whether the theoretical expectation is accurate was whether the predicted framing 
effect was stronger. In Experiment 2 the positive-valence treatment was not more effective than 
the negative-valence treatment. In Experiment 3, the negative-valence treatment was more 
effective than the positive-treatment treatment, at least in the regression models. So, there was at 
least some support that negative-valence narratives are stronger than positive-valence narratives 
for prevention behaviors, which comports with the theoretical prediction. Future research should 
be conducted using different financial behaviors (but still under the three-behavior framework) to 
see if those empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. At a minimum, 
though, Experiment 3 supports that negative-valence narratives can be effective to encourage 
risk-seeking behavior (the detection behavior) in the financial planning context.  
 Regulatory Focus and Regulatory Fit 
 This study joined the growing body of literature by applying psychological theory to 
inform financial planning research and financial behavior (e.g., Asebedo et al., 2019; Asebedo & 
Seay, 2014, 2015). Stated simply, regulatory focus theory posits that people “approach pleasure 
and avoid pain in different ways” (Higgins, 1997, p. 1282). Consequently, those who are 
promotion-focused achieve success by achieving positive outcomes; those who are prevention-
focus achieve success by avoiding losses. Based on this theory, then, it was expected that 
promotion-focus respondents prefer gain states (and are motivated by achieving such end states), 
and prevention-focus respondents want to avoid loss states (and are motivating by avoiding such 
loss states). As such, gain framing should be effective for promotion respondents and loss 
framing for prevention respondents. This phenomenon is known as “regulatory fit”—when the 
goal pursuit matches (or sustains) the underlying regulatory focus.  
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 There was some support for a regulatory focus and regulatory fit effect in Experiments 2 
and 3, which arose from the subsample analyses.64 In Experiment 2, the subsample OLS 
regression and the promotion-focus subsample cumulative logits had significant positive-
valence/RFQ interaction effects for promotion-focused respondents, with positive point 
estimates, indicating that, as promotion strength increased, so too did the effect of the positive-
valence treatment. This was consistent with a regulatory fit rationale. Also, for prevention-focus 
respondents, it was expected that negative-valence narratives would be stronger than the 
promotion-focus narratives. And, in Experiment 2, in the prevention-focus subsample cumulative 
logit (three level), the negative-valence effect was stronger than the positive-valence effect for 
prevention-focus respondents. Again, indicating support for regulatory fit as applied to narrative-
based financial planning decision making.  
In Experiment 3, had some mixed results, too, which indicated regulatory fit. The 
prevention-focus respondents still had a greater negative-valence effect—which was expected 
under the theory. But the promotion-focus respondents did not have a greater positive-valence 
effect. So, based on the prevention-focus respondents, there was still some support for regulatory 
fit.  
Relatedly, under a regulatory fit rationale, as the respective promotion- or prevention-
focus grew stronger, it may be expected that the respective narrative would be that much 
stronger, too; that is, the interaction effects. There were some indications of this phenomenon in 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. In Experiment 2’s promotion-focus subsample, there was a 
significant interaction effect—that is, as the RFQ differential increased (became more positive), 
so did the slope of the positive-valence narrative effect (it became more positive, leading to 
 
64 Of course, as before, Experiment 1 resulted in null results across the board.  
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higher intentions). And, in Experiment 3, this phenomenon occurred for the prevention-focus 
respondents. Again, indicating additional support for regulatory fit.  
 In sum, based on these experiments, there was support for narrative effects, framing 
effects, and that those effects can depend upon underlying regulatory focus. These findings have 
implications for the financial planning profession, which are discussed next.  
 Implications 
 This research demonstrated that, in the financial decision-making context, framing 
matters, stories (narratives) are powerful, and that these effects can be different due to underlying 
psychological differences. These three findings can be used to advance the financial planning 
profession and related domains at both the individual and public levels. Each will be considered 
in turn.  
 First, framing matters. From a micro perspective (i.e., an individual client advising and 
counseling), advisors should be mindful of how they frame discussions and planning options to 
their clients. Related to the prior literature that has examined the impact of exact words used in 
describing financial planning techniques—for example, differences in using jargon or simple 
descriptions (James, 2018)—this study also demonstrated a difference between gain framing and 
loss framing in financial planning domains. Therefore, to increase financial planning behavior 
adoption and implementation, advisors should integrate framing into their client discussions.  
Now, in choosing between loss framing and gain framing, loss framing tended to be 
pervasive (i.e., significant more often). But, in the insurance needs context, gain framing worked 
too. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Experiment 3, the loss framing was typically stronger than 
the gain framing, which makes sense from a prospect theory and loss aversion perspective. If an 
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advisor is unsure of which frame a client is more sensitive to, the advisor should, therefore, err 
on the side loss framing.  
 From a macro perspective (i.e., a public at large perspective), framing can be used in 
various public awareness campaigns. These approaches are prevalent in many domains already, 
such as in public health (consider, for example, the various well-known anti-smoking or anti-
drug campaigns). Similarly, these public awareness campaigns should embrace loss framing, as 
the negative valence tended to be more significant more often (and more consistently). 
Embracing the loss framing is particularly true in public campaigns because the messages cannot 
be tailored for idiosyncratic psychological differences (such as regulatory focus).   
 In addition to just general public awareness campaigns—which may be sponsored by 
governments or nonprofits—the framing effect is also relevant to financial product creators, 
national advisories, and others that engage in advertising campaigns. Marketing can be used to 
both educate the public about financial products and services and coupled with a framing 
strategy can also shape and affect intentions to adopt and use those products and services.  
 Second, stories are powerful. This research has shown that, in the financial planning 
context, stories are powerful, and that people respond to stories. Although the narrative effect 
was not present in all three experiments, it was present in two of them, and there was no decrease 
in intentions in the first experiment due to the narratives (i.e., it was not counterproductive). 
Based on this research, the advisor loses nothing by using a narrative/story approach but may 
gain increased client implementation rates for some planning behaviors.  
 Consequently, advisors should think of ways to communicate financial planning advice 
through stories. Ideally, this could be in the form of client testimonials (stories); however, there 
are testimonial and ethical considerations that advisors should be mindful of. Other than direct 
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client testimonials, advisors should communicate the value of financial planning 
recommendations in the form of a story. Good stories are memorable, vivid, and, as 
demonstrated, impactful—and can shape intentions. This is not to say that numerical 
calculations, forecasts, and Monte Carlo and stochastic modeling (and other math/number-based 
aspects of financial planning) are not important—they undoubtedly are! But they may not be the 
most persuasive way to get a client to engage in a healthy financial behavior.  
 A major implication of this research—particularly for the narrative effect—is marketing 
material (either at the individual advisor level or the mass-marketing level). As noted above with 
the framing, these findings can be applied to communicating the value proposition of financial 
planning and financial products. These value propositions should be communicated by stories 
rather than dry, sterile facts. This approach can be used by individual advisors and also by 
financial services companies. For individual advisors, these stories can be used in newsletters, 
mailers, waiting-area brochures, and the like. For financial services companies (i.e., product 
creators), their products and services should be marketed with strong story-based elements—for 
example, in commercials and written materials. Similarly, for the public awareness campaigns, 
strong story elements should be integrated.  
Indeed, the maximum impact is achieved by combining the framing and narrative effects. 
Attention should be paid to which valence is applied to that narrative—that is, extolling the 
benefits of a particular financial behavior or focusing on the consequences for not doing so. 
Although some literature indicates that the valence should be determined by looking at the 
underlying nature of the behavior, there is some indication that framework may not fully square 
in the financial decision-making context. Despite that, there is a relatively consistent negative-
valence effect at least across several financial behaviors (as demonstrated here, in budgeting and 
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insurance domains). Therefore, story-based elements should be used with a negative valence 
(i.e., loss framing) in the aforementioned advertising and marketing strategies.  
 Third, these effects can be different due to underlying psychological differences. This 
means that, when possible, underlying individualized characteristics should be considered. 
Moreover, this research joined the growing application of psychological theory and examination 
of personality and psychological traits to inform financial planning behavior (e.g., Asebedo et al., 
2019; Nabeshima & Seay, 2015). This research advanced the literature by examining regulatory 
focus theory, which basically regards how people find satisfaction (by achieving positive 
outcomes or by avoiding losses). However, this is also implied by prospect theory, too, which 
posits that reference points matter.  
In accord with regulatory focus and regulatory fit, people can respond to those stories 
differently. Advisors may want to identify the regulatory focus of their clients. It is not 
uncommon for planners to administer questionnaires to their clients, such as to gauge risk 
tolerance. Therefore, planners and advisors may find utility in adding a regulatory focus 
questionnaire to their tests. Then, based on a client’s determined regulatory focus, the planner 
can tailor communications to that. The impact of regulatory focus is broader than just to framing; 
planners may find regulatory focus orientation helpful information for tailoring client 
communication generally. Moreover, if a client is prevention focused, this may also inform the 
advisor’s approach to the client’s risk tolerance.65  
In sum, there are many implications to the findings of this research that framing matters, 
stories are powerful, and people can respond differently to these. These implications range from 
one-on-one advisor-client counseling and advising to national marketing and public awareness 
 
65 Indeed, the interplay between regulatory focus and risk tolerance is another aspect that should be studied in future 
research.  
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campaigns. The goal on both levels is to increase adoption and implementation of healthy 
financial behaviors. This research can be used to advance that paramount goal by being strategic 
with how the value proposition of financial planning is communicated.  
 Limitations and Future Research 
 In this study, there were four main questions as related to financial planning decision 
making: (a) are narratives effective; (b) does the frame of the narrative manner; (c) does that 
effect, if any, depend on the underlying behavior; and (d) was that effect, if any, influenced by 
the individualistic characteristic of regulatory focus. In answering these questions, some 
limitations were noticed and suggestions for future research were indicated.  
 In any survey-based study, survey data quality was of paramount concern. Although 
MTurk-based surveys are becoming more common in social sciences, there may still be issues of 
data quality present. As noted earlier, trap questions were intentionally not used; if they were 
used, additional respondents may have been eliminated.  But, as noted earlier, Peer et al. (2014) 
found that MTurkers with high reputations rarely failed attention check questions. Moreover, in 
this study, reasonable steps were taken (described in Chapter 3)—such as features available in 
MTurk (minimum entrance ratings) and Qualtrics (preventing ballot-box stuffing and timers)— 
to ameliorate these data quality concerns.  
 Related to general data quality, was also the data quantum. There was approximately 400 
persons (per the survey design) in each experiment block, and, within that block, about 100 
persons per treatment group (and control). When considering the seven-point Likert-type 
response variable, some of the cell counts may be less than desirable—this was particularly acute 
when looking at the subsamples. This was potentially true, too, when considering some of the 
explanatory variables (namely the categorical variables) when conducting the regressions (OLS 
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and logits). The presence of small cells may affect statistical power to discern significant 
differences. Attempts were made to ameliorate this concern to collapse categorical cells when it 
made practical and theoretical sense. Nevertheless, future research should engage more 
respondents to increase cell size and thereby increase power.  
 Another potential limitation was the Likert-type response variable. Although its use is 
common in social sciences—and with OLS regression—a single Likert-type response is not truly 
continuous. Quantitative and methodological techniques were applied in this research to account 
for that—such as using nonparametric methods and logit-based models (in addition to the 
ANOVA and OLS regression techniques). Generally, the results from these techniques were 
consistent, which were favorable to their legitimacy. Yet, future research may want to use a truly 
continuous variable. There are several ways to accommodate that. One may be to use a Likert 
scale, which combines and averages several Likert-type responses, which, being a composite 
average, would be closer to a continuous and interval measure. Instead of a Likert-type response, 
a 100-point scale could be used with various descriptive anchors (James & Routley, 2016). 
Another approach may be to use a visual analog scale (or an average of VAS scores) for the 
response variable, which can be readily implemented in online surveys.   
 Another possible limitation was related to the narratives. The narratives used a third-party 
protagonist. The effect of a third-party protagonists may be different than if the narrative asked 
the respondent to place him- or herself into the narrative personally—that is, the narrative effect 
could be greater if it was more personalized to the respondent. Future research then should 
examine the narrative effects, if any, between a third-party protagonist and placing oneself into 
the narrative.  
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 Relatedly, the narratives consistently used a female schoolteacher as the protagonist. 
Future research should examine whether the effects are different based on the protagonist. That 
is, those in that profession may relate more to the protagonist (and those in dissimilar professions 
may not be able to relate to the protagonist). With a schoolteacher protagonist, moreover, some 
respondents may have felt (or thought) that the teacher had other pension plans or other benefits 
typically afforded to teachers, which may have impacted their response and connection to the 
narrative. Alternatively, perhaps narratives that do not use professions should be examined too.   
 Similarly, the narratives and underlying theory assumed that engaging in the financial 
behaviors were the rational choice to make. However, there may be situations in which not 
engaging in the behavior could be considered rational. For example, someone who was 
financially strained may not be able to save for retirement, regardless of the narrative treatment 
they were exposed to. Hopefully, some of this possible confounding was ameliorated by the 
regressions. But the possibility remains that, for some, it may have been perceived as completely 
rational to not engage in the behavior, perhaps due to some other immediate financial need or 
financial strain. In that vein, although some literature indicates that regulatory focus is a stable 
characteristic, a particular focus can be temporarily induced (Latimer et al., 2008). It may be the 
case then that, for some respondents, perhaps financial strain or other change-in-circumstance 
affected their regulatory focus. Fortunately, as others have noted, due to the nature of the RFQ 
questions asking about subjective histories, it is unlikely that chronic RFQ changes based on 
short-term changes in circumstances (Latimer et al., 2008). In any event, financial strain was 
controlled for in the various regressions.  
 Another limitation that arose in analyzing the results was ascertaining a difference 
between a valence treatment or the fact-based treatment. Sometimes, those differences were not 
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significant. A possible confounding effect, then, may be priming and salience. By discussing and 
reading about the behavior, the respondent may be more prone to respond favorably to a prompt 
concerning the behavior. This can also be affected by the sample size, which, as already noted, 
should be increased in future work. Additional research should focus on the difference between 
the fact-based treatments and the valence-based treatments.  
 Related to that was whether the respondents viewed the prompts as intended by the 
researcher. In other words, whether the positive-valence narrative actually communicated a gain 
frame (or positive affect) and whether the negative-valence narrative actually communicated a 
loss frame (or negative affect). In short, did the intended emotional or affective response take 
place. A manipulation check (measuring the affective response) should be included in future 
research.  
 Lastly, another limitation—and one rooted in the underlying theoretical lens—is that 
prospect theory studies are necessarily reference-point dependent (Tonsor, 2018). Many prospect 
theory-based studies consider only one reference point or a common reference point (Tonsor, 
2018). Yet reference points can and do differ—indeed, they are expectations-based can change 
with time (e.g., Koszegi & Rabin, 2006, 2007; Tonsor, 2018). As such, respondents’ loss 
aversion may be different due to their underlying (individual) reference point. Similarly, 
reference points are typically assumed to be known (and known with certainty!) (Caputo, Lusk, 
& Nayga, 2019).  
Here, data was not collected in attempts to derive or construct underlying reference points 
or to assess their certainty. Although some data collected could be used for that (e.g., income 
data), due to its categorical nature, it would only be a crude proxy for a numerical reference 
point. As well, those reference points (and loss aversion) could be rooted in past experience or 
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events (e.g., the loss of a loved one who did not have insurance—and even how recent that 
experience was). Hopefully, some of these effects, if any, were ameliorated by the experimental 
design and randomization. Nevertheless, future research should investigate, if possible, the 
difference in these framing effects due to underlying variability in reference points.  
 Conclusion 
 Although the mathematical elegance and tractability of homo economicus is alluring, 
behavioral economics and related social science research demonstrates that, empirically, it is 
naïve and often divergent from real world decision making. As such, behavioral economics 
offers keen insights to how real people make real decisions—and how those decisions can be 
shaped and affected.  
 Stories and narratives have been integral to culture, religion, and society at large since 
time immemorial. This dissertation demonstrated that narrative message framing—a behavioral 
economics phenomenon—can be used to increase financial planning intentions. And that the 
narrative effect can depend on the underlying financial behavior and underlying psychological 
characteristics of the individual. Naturally, shaping intentions is a first step to changing actual 
behavior. Thus, financial planners and policymakers should explore ways to use narrative 
messages as nudges to increase implementation of healthy financial behaviors on the micro 
(client-level) and macro (public) scales. 
 In sum, this dissertation found support for the propositions, as applied to financial 
planning, that stories are powerful, framing matters, and these effects can be enhanced by 
incorporating underlying psychological differences. Critically, then, these insights should be 
applied to increase objectively healthy and desirable financial planning behaviors—to nudge 
healthy financial behaviors. As such, these findings are important for a variety of constituencies, 
157 
ranging from individual advisors to national financial services firms, non-profits, and 
governments.  
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Appendix A - Survey Instrument 
Examining Financial Planning Intentions 
This survey involves research and is being used to gather information regarding financial 
planning and intentions regarding financial behavior; the purpose of this research is to inform 
potential improvements for financial planning behavior implementation. 
  
You may not derive a direct personal benefit from this research, but we hope this research will 
improve and advance the financial planning field. 
  
To participate in this study, you must (a) reside in the United States, (b) read and speak fluent 
English, and (c) be at least 18 years old. Additional eligibility criteria are screened early in the 
survey. 
  
This survey should take about 10-15 minutes to complete and is performed online. If you agree 
to participate, you will answer a series of questions and may read short prompts or stories and 
answer related questions. You may proceed at your own pace. 
  
We believe there are minimal risks with this survey and study. With any electronic research 
study, however, a risk of breach of confidentiality always exists. All responses will be kept 
confidential to the best of our ability. Your MTurk worker ID may be collected for purposes of 
distributing compensation. You are encouraged to review the MTurk Privacy Policy at 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/privacynotice. 
  
After completion of this study, your MTurk worker ID may be removed from your responses, 
and the information may be used for future research studies or distributed to other investigators 
for future research without additional informed consent from you and without additional 
compensation. 
  
If you satisfactorily and fully complete the survey, you will receive $0.50 (fifty cents). Payment 
is dependent upon answering all questions. There may be quality control measures built into the 
survey. Failure to satisfactorily meet the quality checks will end the survey and no compensation 
will be paid. The first few questions contain screener questions. If you do not meet our full 
eligibility criteria, the survey will end, and no compensation will be paid. If the survey is not 
satisfactorily completed, you will not be compensated. It may take several days after you 
complete the survey for us to approve and process the payment. 
  
Participation is voluntary; you do not need to be in this study. There is no penalty for refusal to 
participate. You may stop the survey at any time by simply closing and exiting your browser; 
however, if you do not satisfactorily complete the survey, you will not be compensated. 
  
For questions about the study, please contact Tim Todd (tmtodd@ksu.edu) or Martin Seay 
(mseay@ksu.edu). You may also contact Rick Scheidt, Chair, Committee on Research Involving 
Human Subjects, 203 Fairchild Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506, (785) 532-
3224; Cheryl Doerr, Associate Vice President for Research Compliance, 203 Fairchild Hall, 
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Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506, (785) 532-3224. 
  
 By clicking “I Agree” and continuing to the survey, you affirm that (a) reside in the United 
States, (b) read and speak fluent English, (c) you are over 18 years old, (d) have read and 
understand these terms, and (e) agree to such terms. 
o I consent and agree to the terms above   
o I do not consent  
 
 
 Please select the answer that best describes you or fill in the blank as indicated. All questions 
must be completed. 
 
1 Age:  
 
2 Gender: 
o Male   
o Female  
 
3 My country of current residence is:  
o Outside of the United States  
o The United States  
o Other  
 
4 I can read, speak, and write in English fluently. 
o True   
o False  
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5 Marital Status 
o Married   
o Single  
o Divorced or Separated   
o Widowed/Widower  
 
[Behavior Screeners] 
6 Do you currently have a written plan with a set savings goal in place to save for retirement? 
o Yes   
o No   
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6 Do you currently have a written monthly budget that you try to follow? 
o Yes   
o No   
 
6 In the last two years, have you performed an insurance needs analysis (an insurance needs 
analysis reviews if you have enough insurance across various types of loss)? 
o Yes   
o No   
 
7 Which best describes your race? 
o White or Caucasian  
o Black or African-American  
o Asian   
o Other   
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8 Which best describes your ethnicity? 
o Hispanic   
o Non-Hispanic  
 
9 Which best describes your current employment and work status? 
o Self-employed   
o Full-time employee  
o Part-time employee  
o Unemployed   
o Retired  
 
10 How many children do you have who are financially dependent on you or spouse/partner? 
(Include children not living at home and step-children, too, if they are financially dependent):  
 
11 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
o Did not complete high school   
o High school (or GED)   
o Some college, no degree  
o Associate’s degree  
o Bachelor's degree   
o Post-graduate degree (e.g., master’s or doctorate)  
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12 What is your (or household’s, if married) approximate annual income? This includes all 
sources of income, such as wages, tips, investments, public benefits, retirement plans, etc.  
o Less than $20,000  
o At least $20,000 but less than $40,000   
o At least $40,000 but less than $60,000   
o At least $60,000 but less than $80,000   
o At least $80,000 but less than $100,000  
o $100,000 or more  
 
13 In a typical month, how difficult is it for you to cover your expenses and pay all of your bills? 
o Not at all difficult   
o Not very difficult   
o Somewhat difficult  
o Very difficult  
o Completely difficult  
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14 On a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 means very low and 7 means very high), how would you assess 
your overall financial knowledge? 
o 1 (Very Low)   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6   
o 7 (Very High)   
 
15 Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 
years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow? 
o More than $102   
o Exactly $102   
o Less than $102  
o Do not know  
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16 Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% 
per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account? 
o More than today  
o Exactly the same  
o Less than today   
o Do not know   
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17 Please tell me whether this statement is true or false. “Buying a single company’s stock 
usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” 
o True   
o False  
o Do not know  
 
This set of questions asks you HOW FREQUENTLY specific events actually occur or have 
occurred in your life. Please indicate your answer to each question by selecting the appropriate 
number below it.  
 
18 Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life?  
o (1) never or seldom   
o (2)   
o (3) sometimes  
o (4)   
o (5) very often  
 
19 Growing up, would you ever “cross the line” by doing things that your parents would not 
tolerate? 
o (1) never or seldom  
o (2)   
o (3) sometimes  
o (4)   
o (5) very often  
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20 How often have you accomplished things that got you “psyched” to work even harder?  
o (1) never or seldom  
o (2)   
o (3) a few times  
o (4)  
o (5) many times  
 
21 Did you get on your parents’ nerves often when you were growing up? 
o (1) never or seldom  
o (2)  
o (3) sometimes  
o (4)  
o (5) very often  
 
22 How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents?  
o (1) never or seldom  
o (2)   
o (3) sometimes  
o (4)  
o (5) always  
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23 Growing up, did you ever act in ways that your parents thought were objectionable?  
o (1) never or seldom  
o (2)   
o (3) sometimes  
o (4)  
o (5) very often  
 
24 Do you often do well at different things that you try?  
o (1) never or seldom   
o (2)   
o (3) sometimes  
o (4)   
o (5) very often  
 
25 Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times.  
o (1) never or seldom  
o (2)  
o (3) sometimes  
o (4)   
o (5) very often 
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26 When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don’t perform as well 
as I ideally would like to do.  
o (1) never true   
o (2)   
o (3) sometimes true  
o (4)   
o (5) very often true  
 
 
 
27 I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life.  
o (1) certainly false   
o (2)   
o (3)   
o (4)   
o (5) certainly true   
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28 I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my interest or motivate me 
to put effort into them.  
o (1) certainly false  
o (2)  
o (3)  
o (4)   
o (5) certainly true   
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[Experiment 1: Retirement Income Planning] 
 
[Fact-Based] 
29 Please read the following:  
 
There are several steps to planning for retirement. You set a goal about your retirement. Based 
on that, you set a savings goal. You then save over your working years to meet that goal. 
Properly saving for retirement will allow you to do those things you want in retirement, such as 
travel, hobbies, and visiting with family.  
 
 
In the next six months, how likely are you to establish a retirement savings goal and begin to 
take steps to accomplish that goal?  
o Very Unlikely   
o Unlikely  
o Somewhat Unlikely   
o Undecided  
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely  
o Very Likely   
 
[Positive-Valence] 
29 Please read the following: 
 
Sally is a recently retired schoolteacher. She planned for her retirement. She set a savings goal 
based on what she wanted her retirement to look like. Based on that goal, she saved each month 
to meet it, and her retirement is now funded. Now that she is in retirement and has enough saved, 
she does not worry about making ends meet. She does not stress about money matters. She is 
able to do the things she wants to in retirement, such as travel, take on new hobbies, and visit 
with her family.  
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In the next six months, how likely are you to establish a retirement savings goal and begin to 
take steps to accomplish that goal?  
o Very Unlikely   
o Unlikely   
o Somewhat Unlikely  
o Undecided   
o Somewhat Likely   
o Likely  
o Very Likely  
 
[Negative Valence] 
29 Please read the following:  
 
Sally is a recently retired schoolteacher. She did not plan for her retirement. She did not have a 
retirement savings goal based on what she wanted her retirement to look like. Without a specific 
goal, she did not save regularly each month, and her retirement is not funded. Now that she is in 
retirement and does not have enough saved, she constantly worries about making ends meet. She 
regularly stresses about money matters. She is not able to do the things she wants to in 
retirement, such as travel, take on new hobbies, and visit with her family.  
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In the next six months, how likely are you to establish a retirement savings goal and begin to 
take steps to accomplish that goal?  
o Very Unlikely  
o Unlikely   
o Somewhat Unlikely   
o Undecided   
o Somewhat Likely   
o Likely  
o Very Likely  
 
[Control] 
29 In the next six months, how likely are you to establish a retirement savings goal and begin to 
take steps to accomplish that goal?              
o Very Unlikely  
o Unlikely  
o Somewhat Unlikely  
o Undecided   
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely  
o Very Likely  
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[Experiment 2: Cash Flow and Budget Planning] 
 
[Fact-Based] 
29 Please read the following:  
 
Budgeting is the process of monitoring monthly income and expenses. With a budget in place, 
you can identify expenses that can be eliminated. This may free-up additional cash each month. 
Budgeting may allow you to set aside funds for an emergency, like an unexpected car repair bill 
or loss of a job. Budgeting may also help you start saving for long-term financial goals.  
 
 
In the next six months, how likely are you to establish and follow a monthly budget?  
o Very Unlikely   
o Unlikely  
o Somewhat Unlikely  
o Undecided   
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely   
o Very Likely   
 
[Positive Valence] 
29 Please read the following:  
 
Sally is a schoolteacher. Money is tight, so she regularly monitors her monthly income and 
expenses. Based on that, she has been able to identify expenses that she can reduce and free-up 
additional monthly cash. She has established a budget. Due to this planning, she has been able to 
set aside funds for emergencies; if she had a sudden car repair or lost her job, she is comforted by 
knowing she has an emergency savings fund. With the budget, she is starting to save for long-
term financial goals. Because of the monthly budget, she knows she can make ends meet each 
month. She does not regularly stress or worry about money matters because she has a plan in 
place.  
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In the next six months, how likely are you to establish and follow a monthly budget?  
o Very Unlikely   
o Unlikely   
o Somewhat Unlikely  
o Undecided  
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely  
o Very Likely   
 
[Negative Valence] 
29 Please read the following: 
 
Sally is a schoolteacher. Money is tight, but she does not regularly monitor her monthly income 
and expenses. Based on that, after her monthly expenses, she does not have extra additional 
monthly cash. She does not have an established budget. Due to this lack of planning, she has not 
been able to set aside funds for emergencies; she does not know where the money would come 
from if she had an unexpected car repair bill or if she lost her job. Without a budget, she is not 
saving for long-term financial goals. With no budget, she does not know whether she can make 
ends meet each month. She regularly stresses and worries about money matters because she has 
no plan in place.  
199 
 
In the next six months, how likely are you to establish and follow a monthly budget?  
o Very Unlikely  
o Unlikely   
o Somewhat Unlikely   
o Undecided  
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely  
o Very Likely   
 
[Control] 
29 In the next six months, how likely are you to establish and follow a monthly budget?  
o Very Unlikely  
o Unlikely  
o Somewhat Unlikely  
o Undecided  
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely  
o Very Likely  
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[Experiment 3: Insurance Needs Analysis] 
 
[Fact-Based] 
29 Please read the following:  
 
An insurance needs analysis reviews if you have enough insurance. You review your current 
insurance policies. You also consider insurance you do not have but may need. Types of 
insurance include automobile, disability, life, casualty, and others. An insurance needs analysis is 
a first step in finding gaps and issues so that they can be fixed.  
 
 
In the next six months, how likely are you to perform an insurance needs analysis? 
o Very Unlikely 
o Unlikely  
o Somewhat Unlikely  
o Undecided  
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely  
o Very Likely  
 
[Positive Valence] 
29 Please read the following:  
 
Sally is a school teacher. She is working with a financial advisor. A part of that process is 
insurance needs analysis—making sure she has the insurance protection she needs. Working with 
her financial advisor revealed that Sally did not have adequate insurance in place. She needed to 
increase her car insurance; take out a disability insurance policy (in case she became disabled); 
increase her life insurance policy (for the benefit of her kids); and take out an additional policy to 
protect her home and other assets. Now that she has identified these issues, she can fix them. 
Knowing that she is now protected, she does not worry and stress about these issues.  
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In the next six months, how likely are you to perform an insurance needs analysis? 
o Very Unlikely  
o Unlikely   
o Somewhat Unlikely  
o Undecided  
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely  
o Very Likely  
 
[Negative Valence] 
29 Please read the following: 
 
Sally is a school teacher. She does not work with a financial advisor. She has never analyzed her 
insurance needs, which would make sure she the insurance protection she needs. She does not 
know if she has adequate insurance in place. She is unsure if her car is adequately protected; she 
is unsure if she is protected if she becomes disabled; she is unsure if her current life insurance is 
enough for her kids; and she does not know if her home and other assets are protected. Not 
knowing if she has enough in place, she does not know what needs fixed. Due to this uncertainty, 
she regularly worries and stresses about these issues.  
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In the next six months, how likely are you to perform an insurance needs analysis? 
o Very Unlikely  
o Unlikely  
o Somewhat Unlikely  
o Undecided   
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely  
o Very Likely   
 
[Control] 
29 In the next six months, how likely are you to perform an insurance needs analysis? 
o Very Unlikely  
o Unlikely   
o Somewhat Unlikely  
o Undecided  
o Somewhat Likely  
o Likely   
o Very Likely  
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[End of Experiment] 
 
Thank You Please make note of this 7-digit code.  
 
[Random Code]    
 
You will input this code through Mechanical Turk to indicate your completion of the survey.   
 
Then click the button on the bottom of this page to submit your answers. You will not receive 
credit unless you click this button and submit your answers.  
    
 
